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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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'ARMENIAN TERROR' SAID TO BE SUPPORTED BY FRENCH AUTHORITIES

Istanbul MIDDLE EAST REVIEW in English Apr 83 p 13

[Article by Zafer Atay]

[Text]

"P.O. Box 892-114, Tanzana, California 91356." This is the address of the terrorist band known as the "Justice Commandoes for Armenian Genocide", which carried out the foul attack on our ambassador in Bulgaria. "Asberaz" newspaper, which rains continuous curses on Turkey, is also prepared here. The newspaper is at the same time spokesman for the "Armenian Revolutionary Federation". The Federation's center is in the same area with a large sign in both English and Armenian on the door.

"Archbishop Yeprem Tabakian", with conical headpiece, sceptre in hand and wearing a long, black robe, in a word, a priest. Tabakian is "regional leader of the Armenian Atleias Church of western America". You might run into him at any time in Los Angeles. He conducts the church's worship services and delivers sermons praising the killing of Turkish diplomats.

"Ara Torunian" lives in Paris. He is an official of the "Armenian Culture Society", nurtured by the ASALA dogs. Appearing frequently on French radio and television, he makes speeches describing how Turkish diplomats are being killed and how each of the killers is a hero. The Society also has a big sign on its door.

"Patrick Devejian" is campaign manager and private lawyer of Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris and future president of France. He is also the head of ASALA. He is so sure of himself that he once told Turkish journalists, "We are going to start

hitting Turkish targets in America from now on."

"In Brussels, there is a luxury restaurant on the Grand Platz in the city center." It's called 'Ararat' and is owned by a rich Armenian. Everybody knows that financial backing for the attacks on Turkish diplomats comes from here.

"In Cyprus, a stone building with a dark facade rises up from the Todos Mountains in the Greek sector. On the door is written 'Melkonian Institute'." There is strong evidence to the effect that this Institute is the headquarters of Armenian terror with Mideast connections. In name, the Melkonian Institute is a school for priests.

"In Jerusalem, there is a religious school where poor Christian children brought from Turkey are educated." For years Armenian terrorist leaders have been being trained there.

"In Beirut, the Armenian Party is still operating." It even has representatives in parliament. It is common knowledge that the party supports ASALA and other organizations.

"In Athens, the Cyprus-Greece-Armenia Society carries on its activities in the most central part of the city." This society organizes marches and meetings with certain Turkish fugitives from justice and publishes proclamations of joy following every criminal attack.

"In Moscow, there is a building with a grim facade across from the Kremlin. It's the KGB Headquarters."

Inside is the Third Bureau responsible for terrorist movements, including those operating within Turkey. At the head of it is a professional terror export of Armenian descent named Brutens. Secret reports indicating that training of and supply of weapons to Armenian terrorists are provided by this bureau have been discussed at NATO meetings.

It would be possible to make this list much longer. We did not get these names and addresses by covert means as you might think. Information concerning most of them appeared in Turkish newspapers. And the others were confirmed by English and American publications. We saw that Armenian terror is the most flagrant form of terrorism in the world. Everything is out in the open. Nothing is secret or concealed. The word "secret" appears only in the name of the artificial "Armenian Secret Army". Obviously, there is no question of the authorities being less well informed than we are.

The most important reason for the excesses of Armenian terror is the fact that it is protected. However determined the Reagan administration may be to fight terror, it should still not be forgotten that one of the

centers of Armenian aggression is California, where George Deukmejian is governor.

In France, too, Armenian terror can boast a chain of supporters extending all the way up to President Mitterand himself. In fact, the newspaper *Le Figaro* wrote, in reference to the death of French woman killed in an attack on a Turkish tourism firm two weeks ago, that the Mitterand administration was very offended because "the Armenians had broken their gentlemen's agreement and blown up a French citizen."

French Defense Minister Monsieur Hernu and Interior Minister Monsieur Deferre are two of the primary administrators cooperating with the Armenians. If you ask us, their fingerprints are on every bullet pumped into Turks in France.

We have written all of this to answer those at home and abroad (if there are any, which we doubt) who still ask "I wonder where these Armenian killers have their headquarters?" even after the vile attack in Belgrade.

It is our wish that such questions and demands for justice be addressed to these "open addresses" and that everyone take a lesson from the decisiveness and heroism that the Yugoslav people showed in the face of terror. ●

CSO: 4600/609

INTERVIEW WITH MOULOUD OUMEZIANE

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 1001, 29 Apr-5 May 83 pp 22-27

[Interview with Mr Mouloud Oumeziane, member of the Central Committee and minister of labor, by Z. Ferroukhi: "Mr Mouloud Oumeziane on SGT: 'To Each What He Is Entitled To, All That He Is Entitled To, But No More Than What He Is Entitled To'"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Through your Ministry, an important effort was made and is still being made in favor of workers, in particular to achieve a more equitable distribution of wages, to improve benefits and, generally speaking, to abolish the inequalities that result from the fact that there are many remuneration systems... This is in the spirit of the National Charter and, we believe, it is also the objective of the National Worker Statute [SGT].

Could you give us a preliminary assessment?

[Answer] To realize how much was done in the past few years, you must first recall the anarchy and considerable inequalities that prevailed in the wages paid by the various economic sectors, the various enterprises and, sometimes, even for identical jobs within the same enterprise.

Obviously, such a situation was detrimental to national development. It fostered discontent and feelings of frustration among workers. To restore a sound atmosphere and give "to each according to his work," the National Worker Statute laid the foundations for a more rational wage policy and renovated labor laws.

However, the statute merely laid down principles, and at least 100 texts (laws, decrees, orders of various types) were required to put it into actual practice. To prepare these texts, consultations had to be organized with the major parties involved (workers and managers), field studies and investigations had to be started, negotiations had to be carried out with the ministries involved.

This is why specialized authorities, commissions and working groups, were created. The program of action adopted defined priorities. We had to:

- control wage increases to keep them in line with our national resources;

- increase selectively the wages of the less-privileged categories to achieve a progressive harmonization of wage levels and pave the way for job classification;
- strengthen the incentive part played by wages by tying them to production results.

Also, harmonizing wages meant harmonizing statutes and general labor conditions and, therefore, an effort had to be made simultaneously to standardize and renovate laws and regulations in this domain, to guarantee that all workers, no matter in what sector, would have the same rights and the same duties.

As a result, the texts prepared to implement the National Worker Statute were oriented in three major directions:

1. Putting into practice the principles of the new national wage policy: fundamental texts concerning jobs classification, classification methods and tools, allowances, productivity bonuses and penalties, work quotas, etc.
2. To pave the way to an effective implementation of this policy, which is to be part of an overall wage-planning system and still requires considerable work, transition measures were initiated starting in 1980, to meet the immediate needs concerning the protection of workers' purchasing power and simultaneously ease the transition to the new system.
3. Finally, at the same time, basic legal texts were drawn up to unify labor laws and serve as a basis to model-statutes in the various economic sectors: decrees concerning working hours, vacations, legal holidays, individual labor relations, union laws, the prevention of labor conflicts, etc.

As far as texts are concerned, the results to-date are as follows:

Texts already promulgated	40
Texts about to be promulgated	7
Texts about to be adopted	17
Total	64

This represents about two thirds of the texts resulting from the National Worker Statute. Needless to say other, less urgent, texts are also being prepared and, as they are completed, will be submitted to the authorities involved.

[Question] Therefore, could you tell us what is the present status of the SGT implementation? And, of course, how much remains to be done? And what main benefits workers have derived from all this so far?

[Answer] We started implementing the National Worker Statute on several fronts, our objective being to harmonize wages progressively and pave the way for a national job classification.

a) First, we adopted floor wages for each major socio-professional category. A general wage increase was not really advisable since it would have increased

existing inequalities; the adoption of floor wages enabled us to improve selectively the wages that were lagging farthest behind, thus reducing disparities.

As an example, the minimum wage for the first category (unskilled labor) was raised from 800 to 1,000 Algerian dinars per month in 1980, and to 1,100 dinars today. The minimum agricultural wage was abolished to be assimilated to this initial floor wage which is applicable to all Algerian workers without distinction, not excepting of course government employees.

Similarly, 12 more floor wages were adopted for skilled workers, technicians, cadres, etc. They now form a basis for the future wage scale, and a national yardstick for typical jobs.

b) The allowance system was standardized at the same time as existing allowances were raised (allowances for stationed work, nuisances, permanent service, etc.). There again, the most disadvantaged workers were those who received the most substantial raises, in certain cases up to 250 or 300 Algerian dinars per month.

c) The establishment of a relation between wages and production (Decree 80.48) and the creation of individual and collective productivity bonuses made it possible to stimulate production, reduce absenteeism and improve the rate of achievement of planned objectives, especially in certain large industrial enterprises. As I could see myself during a recent visit to Setif and Bejaia, certain units fulfilled 110 and even 120 percent of their production quotas.

Similarly, by improving the profit-sharing system, based on criteria other than strictly financial, we were able to distribute large shares to workers in certain units of SONELEX [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment], SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company], SONITEX [National Textile Industry Company], SNTA [expansion unknown], etc.

d) Progress in the implementation of the National Worker Statute also had an impact in granting tenure to contractual and temporary personnel: over 100,000 workers were thus confirmed in their jobs during the past 3 years, especially in the Postal, Telecommunications and Television Administration, and in hospitals and local communities.

Thus, the progressive implementation of these texts has brought about material improvements in the position of many worker categories, with respect to their wages as well as to their status and working conditions. We must now proceed by carrying out our major operation, the pillar of our new system: job classification.

This classification, based on a single national method decided by the government, is now in progress in all enterprises and production units. It will establish a job hierarchy, rationalize the organization of labor and guarantee that each will receive a remuneration in line with the complexity of the tasks he carries out.

[Question] It is sometimes said that SGT texts are misinterpreted or even not applied. Therefore, is it true that, especially in certain sectors, there is

still a wide gap between theory and practice? What is the cause for such a gap?

[Answer] The transition measures of the National Worker Statute have been applied in most major economic and administrative sectors, although sometimes rather slowly. The adjustment of wage levels, for instance, has been applied practically everywhere, except in small units of the private sector where control is still difficult.

On the other hand, as far as allowances, productivity bonuses and profit-sharing is concerned, although much progress has been made, application is still uneven. Certain sectors are still lagging far behind. We must admit frankly that certain officials, being too involved in the daily routine of operational management or in restructuring their enterprises, have not yet recognized the full importance of implementing these texts. In other cases, they implemented them hastily, according to bureaucratic procedures, i.e. without prior consultations with labor representatives. This has sometimes resulted in misunderstandings and discontent.

Certainly, some enterprises are starting from a very complex position, because of former remuneration systems, the lack of a rational classification, the existing anarchy when it comes to bonuses and allowances. Actually, these objective difficulties require far greater efforts to improve the situation, find the best solutions and those that best comply with the spirit and the letter of the law.

At any rate, whenever implementation was correct and just, there has been an appreciable improvement in the labor climate, in labor relations and, as a result, in production and labor productivity (heavy industry, light industries, housing and construction, etc.).

As for the Ministry of Labor, it is trying to ensure proper implementation of the texts by opposing any violation of workers' rights, but also by refusing to go beyond the law, fighting carelessness and the lack of rigor: for instance, the overrating of certain workers, the abusive granting of allowances that should be strictly restricted to those who are entitled to them, etc.

Each shall receive what he is entitled to, all that he is entitled to, and no more than what he is entitled to. Also, each must rigorously accomplish his duty. This is where the true interest of workers, their enterprises and the whole national economy lies.

In concluding, I must say that the same applies to the major job classification operation that is now in progress. There again, we could give examples of good realizations, within the time prescribed, as well as examples of slow progress and delays that are sometimes hardly justifiable. It is the duty of workers, managers and all officials involved to carry out these operations responsibly, to guarantee the success of our national wage policy which is part and parcel of our Five-Year Development Plan.

[Question] It looks as if the Socialist Management of Businesses [GSE] policy has not yet been extended to all enterprises of an economic, social or cultural

nature, as provided for by the GSE charter. Probably--the National Charter emphasizes this point--there are difficulties in putting the GSE in actual practice, which result from inadequate enterprise organization or a lack of maturity in management or union cadres. What can the Ministry of Labor, then, do about it, and what conclusions can we draw in this respect?

[Answer] Indeed, the GSE was not introduced in all enterprises of an economic, social or cultural nature.

Until now, this new management method has been implemented only in enterprises belonging to economic sectors such as industry, transports, water-supply, housing, public works, trade, banking and insurance, tourism and, to some extent, energy.

From November 1972 to May 1979, 57 enterprises representing a total of 841 units and employing a total of 310,000 workers were affected by the GSE.

Since May 1979, a date marked by the Third National GSE Conference, 41 new enterprises have been organized, thus bringing the total number of enterprises involved to 98, and that of units to 1,200, employing close to 500,000 workers.

We should also mention that these are September 1982 figures.

Since then, GSE implementation in these various sectors has continued, taking advantage in particular of the large restructuring operation that has been taking place in enterprises.

The GSE has adhered to this operation, which has resulted in the creation of new enterprise and unit worker assemblies and has seen an enterprise as large as the former ES-DNC [expansion unknown] organize itself according to GSE methods.

Next to these results which quantify the progressive adoption of GSE, we should mention that Party and State institutions as a whole, regrouped within the National GES Commission (CNGSE) attach great importance to investigating and resolving the inadequacies, difficulties and other problems that have accompanied the implementation of this management method and its application in the field.

This is the qualitative side of GSE, and it has shown significant progress which I would like to review briefly.

I. Politically

A material reality experienced by hundreds of thousands of workers in strategic sectors of the national economy, GSE has proved to be the right choice to provide a democratic framework for consultation, mobilization and to merge creative energies to serve our fundamental objectives of national independence and social progress.

We can state today that there exists in our country a GSE dynamism which, among other things, has provided impetus for an alliance between workers and cadres of all categories and for the struggle against waste, corruption, malversation and bureaucratism.

II. Economically

The GSE implementation has yielded encouraging results in more than one respect, although these results have been uneven.

The emergence of poles from which it is radiating confirms this assessment.

Nearly everywhere, and especially in the heavy and light industry sectors, we can observe improvements in production and labor productivity. We can note an increasing awareness of the economic problems of socialist enterprises.

This means that GSE stimulates the awakening of economic awareness. This is a dimension that is linked to its collective character, a leaven for consultation and dialogue that will contribute to problem maturation.

This steadily progressing awareness is no longer restricted to the sole dimension of the unit or the enterprise. It no longer boils down to a local perception of economic problems. Increasingly, it is expressed through a more global perception that takes national and economic concerns into consideration. This is especially true in the field of planning and international exchanges.

III. Socially And Professionally

Much has been done to create conditions and a potential to satisfy workers' social and cultural needs.

Much has been done to create the most favorable conditions for a unification process that would guarantee the equality of workers' rights and duties.

The GSE will have had a powerful impact in providing means and tools for this unification, as expressed in particular in the National Worker Statute, in the fields of labor relations, wages and other factors of the social and cultural policy.

Although the results achieved are positive, many gaps and inadequacies still persist in many fields, and they concern all sectors.

The GSE must become a veritable mass phenomenon, and this can be achieved by impelling activity toward:

- GSE consolidation through the development and intensification of democratic management; for this, management boards, workers' assemblies and active standing commissions will have to integrate tasks at enterprise and inter-enterprise level, and stress the essential role to be played by workers' collectives;
- Progressive GSE extension: in particular by creating conditions favorable to its extension to the socio-cultural sector and its implementation in those enterprises in the economic sector that have not yet adopted it.

To achieve this extension, much work has been done by the National GSE Commission, in agreement with the recommendations of the Third National GSE Conference.

In the coming months, we shall make it a point of doing everything to prepare the introduction of GSE to large enterprises and sectors such as those of energy and petrochemicals, maritime transport, higher education, health, etc.

[Question] Since it is the 1st of May, do you have a message for the Algerian workers?

[Answer] I would like to tell our workers that celebrating a holiday is not incompatible with the necessity of reflecting on the country's problems.

The Fourth Congress and the Extraordinary Congress of the FLN Party did not fail to cast a dispassionate look on our progress, to assess the formidable sum of our experience, to locate our strong points, to identify our deficiencies and weaknesses, and to open for the social forces of Revolution prospects of action in keeping with the demands of the moment.

This approach to development problems, which is both democratic and scientific, has led us to recognize quite objectively that the results achieved are still well below existing potentialities and actual production capacities.

This gap cannot fail to be a cause for concern considering that gas and oil account for most of the country's income and development. Therefore, we must assess this gap correctly and realize that the future of our country, the safeguard of its independence and the welfare of its people cannot depend on a non-renewable resource whose quite precarious existence is actually a historical chance of salvation.

It is in these terms that we should state the development challenge that we must meet if we are to satisfy our people's ever-increasing social needs and progress in the way to economic liberation that is offered to us: we must increase production and labor productivity.

In this respect, we must cope with a nagging concern. What have we done to translate into facts, within the time allotted, the just orientations of the Five-Year Plan defined by the Extraordinary Congress of the Party in the light of the results obtained during the last decade? Or again, what have we done to achieve a durable improvement in the overall efficiency of our production apparatus? Individually and collectively, it is our duty to provide a material answer to these questions, by convincing ourselves of the highly patriotic nature of our management and production battle and of the central position that belongs to work in our society, as the latter can consume only what it has produced.

In the present context, and independently of our progress and achievements, workers cannot ignore the fact that constraints related to the construction of our economy force us to implement a policy of austerity and that, for the moment, certain needs cannot be satisfied as much as would be desirable. Workers must understand this necessity and accept sacrifices as part of a collective effort.

This is why we must start a merciless and permanent struggle against carelessness, waste and absenteeism.

For our workers, I would like to emphasize that economic and social development and the efficiency of our production apparatus depend on the quality of labor relations prevailing within enterprises and production units.

They depend on a major and decisive factor: man and human relations with respect to the production of material goods and services.

In this context, improving the social climate represents an important task that must be correctly assumed, in compliance with existing laws and regulations.

I would also like to say that we must work hard and demonstrate through our actions that, as the president of the Republic and general secretary of the Party, Comrade Chadli Bendjedid, pointed out, "the battle for production and the struggle against waste are a patriotic and revolutionary duty."

This battle, on which the future of the country hinges, must be led firmly and resolutely through a powerful, democratic and conscious mobilization of all available energies, and worker's energies in the first place.

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CSO: 4519/219

PROBLEMS CREATED BY FOREIGN CURRENCY BLACK MARKET EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 742, 4 Apr 83 pp 12-14

[Article by 'Imad Ghunaym: "Police in Service of Egyptian Pound"]

[Text] The value of the U.S. dollar in the past few days scored a new rise on the currency black market, reaching 120 piasters, an increase of nearly 20 percent over the end of last summer. As a result of the rise in the price of the dollar, the prices of other Arab and foreign currencies have risen on the black market, with the Kuwaiti dinar attaining a value of 4 Egyptian pounds, the Jordanian dinar rising to 3.80 Egyptian pounds, the Iraqi dinar to 3.70 pounds, the Saudi riyal to 35 piasters and the Qatari riyal and the UAE dirham rising to 32 piasters.

On the other hand, the total sum of monies seized last year in cases of trading in foreign currency totaled 10.6 million pounds compared with 5 million seized in 1981.

Even though the sums seized last year are double the sums seized in the preceding year, they still represent less than 1 percent of all currency traded annually outside the framework of the banking apparatus. What is the reason for this low percentage, what are the reasons that lead to more extensive trading of currencies in the black market and what are the obstacles to curtailment of this market? What is the bank's role in the foreign currency trading process? Officials in the Public Monies Police underline the serious role played by the investment banks in this illegal operation. Finally, has the smuggling of Egyptian currency to the outside world turned into a phenomenon that requires attention and what is the extent of the danger of this action? Many questions arise in any discussion of this illegal relationship between the Egyptian pound and the foreign currencies beyond the framework of the banking apparatus. In this interview, we will try to define what is happening in this market through the changes being adopted by officials of the Public Monies and Currency Crimes Police, who are entrusted with protecting the market from the crimes of currency trading under the canopy of a strange law that prohibits trading in foreign currency but permits the unlimited possession of such currency with no questions asked about its source. Moreover, it is a law that allows agreement to be reached with foreign currency traders when all elements of the crime are present against them, thus making it possible for charges against them to be dropped completely.

Black Market Activity

Maj Gen Hasan al-Alfi, director of the Bureau for Control of Crimes Against Public Monies, says that it is not enough to talk about the foreign currency black market without taking into consideration the reasons behind the intensified activity of this market. Most of these reasons are well known, the most important being the system of importation without money transfers. Allocations for this kind of importation total nearly \$1 billion annually, with the entire sum coming from the black market, despite the presence of the imports streamlining committees. This is why we find it necessary to reconsider the commodities whose importation is permitted in accordance with this system and to ban the importation of luxury goods such as luxury cars, posh furniture and luxury equipment in order to reduce market demand for the dollar.

He adds that the government itself contributes to the pressure exerted on this market by purchasing its needs from abroad with the Egyptian pound through inviting bids from the private sector, which secures the foreign currency from the market and imports the needs according to the specifications of government authorities. Moreover, many of the public sector companies open bank accounts in accordance with the credit facilities given them and then delay repayment to the last possible moment. When the repayment date becomes, these companies resort to the black market to secure the needed currency. This leads to raises in the price of the dollar because of the vast sums that are paid to the banks.

Arab Money Changers

Major General al-Alfi also points out that one of the reasons for the rising price of the dollar on the black market is the system of importing foreign currency from abroad through the so-called foreign correspondent, namely, the well-known money changers in the Arab world, such as al-Rajihi and al-Mayzini. The competition among the national banks for foreign currency is intensifying and this allows the money changers to control the Egyptian pound's exchange rate. If we add to this the fact that these money changers obtain the foreign currencies from Egyptians working abroad, then we understand the extent of the loss incurred by the national economy as a result of letting this situation go unchecked. In this respect, studies can be conducted on opening branches of the national banks in these countries so that they can attract the savings of Egyptians working in them, with such branches exempted from exchange price restrictions observed inside the country. This would curtail the flow of these savings into the black market. Moreover, the national economy could utilize these savings directly instead of having to attract them through money changers and middlemen.

Maj Gen Hasan al-Alfi adds that another reason for the flourishing currency black market is the trend that emerged with implementation of the open-door economic policy--a tendency to pay in dollars and wages of a number of employees of banks, investment companies and other agencies. These wages amount to millions of dollars monthly, and they are sold entirely on the black market. This is done even though there is no law requiring these agencies to pay the wages in a foreign currency, especially since the objective of these wages is to meet the cost of living in Egypt, not abroad.

These are the most important reasons for the flourishing activity of the foreign currency black market and that have made it impossible to economically control exchange prices on this market. But from the security aspect, what is the role that the police can perform to curtail foreign currency transactions outside the banking apparatus?

Gaps in Law

Col 'Ala' 'Abbas, head of the currency crimes section, says that the role of the police in this issue is restricted by its nature as a result of the laws applied, considering that the police cannot exceed the provisions of the currency laws in force when dealing with cases of trading in foreign currency. Insofar as existing law is concerned, it contains several provisions that the currency dealers have been able to exploit skilfully to cover up their illegal transactions. These gaps in currency law No 97 of 1976 and in subsequent decrees have caused the value of the dollar to rise on the black market to levels exceeding levels prevalent before issuance of the law, instead of the opposite.

How?

Col 'Ala' 'Abbas says: Article 1 of the law states that every person of natural or legal status, excluding government agencies, public authorities and public sector companies, may retain any foreign currency that reverts to him, that he possesses or that he acquires through operations other than commodity exports and tourism. The second paragraph of this article entitles such persons to engage in any foreign currency transactions, including internal and external transfers and internal transactions, provided that these transactions are concluded through accredited banks. It is thus possible for any citizen to possess any quantity of foreign currency without being asked about its source. This has caused those who have such currencies to wait until their prices rise. This situation has created a tendency toward speculation, the emergence of the black market, widespread transactions in dollars outside the banking apparatus and the creation of a new class of middlemen who have enriched themselves immoderately and illicitly through this activity.

Criminalization of Possession

Col 'Ala' 'Abbas says: To deal with the problems stemming from the currency law, we must first amend law No 97 of 1976 which regulates foreign currency transactions and must then criminalize illegal acquisition. We must also stiffen the penalties stipulated for such crimes so that we can deter the smuggler and eliminate the phenomenon of trading in foreign currency. We must also extend the ban on dealing in foreign currency to include all establishments and individuals, excluding only tourists. This is in addition to the economic measures that must be taken immediately to curb the demand for foreign currency outside legal channels.

Banks and Illegal Trading

In addition to the gaps existing in the currency law, there are other obstacles faced by the security men when they confront the crimes of currency transactions. The most significant of these obstacles come from the banks.

Col 'Ala' 'Abbas says: The recent period has witnessed the spread of a serious phenomenon, namely, that many currency black market dealers have started to use the lobbies of investment banks as the centers for their activities conducted openly and flagrantly under the patronage of the officials of these banks, relying on the fact that the authorities cannot apprehend them when they are dealing illegally within the bank lobbies in vast sums totaling millions of dollars daily.

Consequently, a question must be raised about the investment banks' role in the national economy and about whether these banks are doing what they were established to do, namely, contribute to economic development by financing development projects. In this respect, it behooves us to point out that investigations have shown that the investment banks do not implement executive regulations or the provisions of the currency law. Their actual activity has turned to gathering the citizens' savings in foreign currency and reinvesting these savings abroad. Moreover, many prominent currency smugglers and dealers use these banks as a curtain for smuggling foreign currency. A notification is affixed to the passports of these smugglers attesting that the currency has been withdrawn from a bank and the smugglers are then permitted to leave the country [with the currency]. This is the so-called "legal smuggling" under the protection of the investment banks!

Colonel 'Abbas says that to deal with the currency problems stemming from the violations committed by some investment banks, the police authorities must be permitted to seize any illegal transactions taking place between individuals inside the banks' lobbies. In this regard, the Investment Authority must issue instructions to the investment banks requiring them not to attest to the withdrawal of any sums on the passports of the individuals concerned unless these individuals have actual accounts covering such sums and unless there is a permit for the exit of these sums. Control of the Central Bank over all kinds of investment banks must also be strengthened so that the state's currency policy, interest rates and tariff set for banking transactions are observed.

Clearing House

Officials at the Currency Crimes Police note the role of the clearing house in smuggling and trading in currency. This phenomenon recently resurfaced strongly. Col 'Ala' 'Abbas says that the currency clearing house was incriminated in the previous currency law. It is one of the most dangerous means of smuggling, considering that the smuggling activities take place in several ways and in large sums, with the payments made inside the

country in Egyptian currency and outise the country in foreign currency. The situation has now reached the point where smugglers have turned their attention to the clearing house system because it is so easy. Recently, a number of checks sent into the country in Egyptian currency in return for foreign currency that had been smuggled out of the country or bartered for were seized. Under current law, such checks are not considered illegal. This situation must be reversed.

Smuggling Egyptian Currency

A new phenomenon has emerged recently and is considered an extension of the foreign currency trading links inside the country. This is the smuggling of Egyptian currency out of the country.

Col Fu'ad Jamal, head of the Bureau for Control [of Crimes] Against Public Monies, says that the smuggling of Egyptian currency out of the country, especially to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, has recently spread considerably. This is interesting, even though numerous attempts have been foiled by apprehending the smugglers while they were trying to depart by air and sea outlets. Colonel Jamal says that it has become evident from the growth of such incidents and from studying them that the Egyptian currency smuggled out of the country is used to purchase foreign currency which is then brought into the country and sold on the black market for big profits and to take advantage of the difference in the exchange rates between Egypt and the Arab countries. Moreover, the Egyptian currency is again smuggled into the country with a large number of Egyptians working in these countries. It has become evident that the Egyptian 100-pound note is in circulation in the Arab countries and that it has become easy to obtain any quantity of such bills in serialized numbers. The well-known Arab banks supervise the operations to smuggle Egyptian currency out of the country by virtue of the large profits yielded by this activity. This is the reason for the disappearance of the 100-pound note from the local market, considering that it is being smuggled out of the country by the millions.

To deal with this problem, which contributes to lowering the Egyptian pound's exchange rate, Col Fu'ad Jamal suggests that the penalty stipulated in the currency law for smuggling Egyptian currency out of the country be stiffened. He also proposes that a study be conducted on abolishing the 100-pound note to wipe out the large sums existing abroad. In such a case, the state is not obliged to notify other countries to collect and return this banknote for compensation because its presence abroad is illegal. Such a step would enable the Egyptian pound's exchange rate to again assume its proper position among foreign currencies. This proposal is supported by the fact that the illegal presence of the 100-pound note outside the country helps to obstruct the flow of savings of the Egyptians working abroad into the country as a result of the ease with which these savings can be exchanged for banknotes and be brought into the country secretly.

Thus, it is obvious that the negative effects of the black market trading in foreign currency after these long years of the open-door economic policy have reached their peak, especially since some estimates say that the sums circulated by the black market amount to \$3 billion annually. Under the present conditions, it is impossible to determine the extent of the contribution of these billions to the national economy. Finally, is there a more respectable economic alternative to the currency black market--an alternative through which it would be possible to attract the dollars that refuse to enter legal channels?

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PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY SPEAKER DISCUSSES ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS

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[Interview with Dr Sufi Abu Talib, People's Assembly speaker; date and place not given]

[Text] In a comprehensive interview with AL-MUSAWWAR, Dr Sufi Abu Talib, speaker of the People's Assembly, has shed the light on many of the current legislative session's accomplishments and on its discussions that have crystallized in the form of laws or are still in the form of bills, such as the tax law, the personal statute, the housing and building code, the legal profession law and the law to develop the public sector. He has discussed each of these laws, shed light on the opposition's stand in the assembly and explained when the parties meet and when they disagree. He has also discussed the system according to which the elections will be held in the coming phase, noting that no decision has been made on this system yet, even though there is a tendency to adopt the simple relative list formula. He has also discussed the People's Assembly budget and why and how assembly members' trips abroad take place. He has explained the role of popular diplomacy in bolstering Egypt's foreign policy line and has discussed the privileges that assembly members have and what they pay in return.

[Question] At the outset of the interview, I said to Dr Sufi Abu Talib, the People's Assembly speaker:

The current parliamentary session is about to be concluded. By next fall, the state agencies and the parties will be preparing to wage an election battle, beginning with the Consultative Council's by-elections and ending with the People's Assembly elections. There has recently been a lot of talk about adopting a more advanced system for the People's Assembly and Consultative Council elections in the coming phase. What formula has it been decided to adopt for the coming elections?

[Answer] First, we must not forget that the objective behind holding elections generally is to get the voters' opinion of the program projected by each party and the extent of their support for such a program. Moreover, democracy demands by its nature that the state's constitutional institutions do what achieves the voters' wishes and opinions. The ideal

way to do this is through elections. Elections are the thing that brings democracy, even though elections take numerous forms. An election may be direct or indirect. We are dealing here with direct elections, which means that the voter elects the candidate, i.e., the relationship here is between the voter and the candidate. As for indirect election, there are two levels: The voter elects a group and this group in turn elects its representatives to the parliament. This was our system under the 1930 constitution.

But in the coming elections, we will be seeing the individual election as it was practiced years ago or election by list, as is currently proposed. Now, how do we reconcile the two systems with the existence of four parties?

Both the individual election and the election by list are forms of direct election. But in the first case--individual election--the candidate's personality, the views and promises he makes and his efforts to achieve them carry the most weight. Consequently, the candidate's personality gets the primary consideration.

In the second case, namely, the election by list, the voter does not elect this or that candidate because he is this or that candidate but because he believes in a number of principles adopted by a certain party or political or social current. Consequently, election by list confines the criteria on whose basis the voting is done to the principles or the program advocated by a party, not to the candidate's personality.

[Question] There certainly are virtues and faults in each of the two systems. What are the virtues and faults?

[Answer] The important thing insofar as the suitability of this or that system is concerned is how truly the election reflects the wishes of the masses. The issue is not one of ideals but of society's real situation. This is why we find that some countries adopt the list system and may then revert to the individual system or vice versa, depending on each society's conditions.

[Question] How does this picture generally reflect on Egyptian society?

[Answer] Regarding the People's Assembly, the system followed so far is, as you know, the system of individual election. As for the Consultative Council, we adopt the system of election by list, which includes various forms, contrary to the individual election system. The individual election is simple and is based on majority vote. The majority might be an absolute majority or a relative majority. In England, for example, the system of relative majority is used, meaning that whoever obtains the largest number of votes in an electoral district wins even if his total vote is less than 50 percent, whereas in France the system of absolute majority is used. This is the system we have adopted here in Egypt. An election is won by an absolute majority and it is conditional that the candidate get more than 50 percent of the vote. This is also why we use the runoff system, whereas the British system has no runoff elections.

[Question] This is insofar as the individual electoral system is concerned. What about election by list?

[Answer] There are various forms of election by list, including, for example, the absolute list or absolute representation, meaning that if the list representatives obtain an absolute majority, then they represent the people in the parliament. This is what is applied in our Consultative Council. Another form is the relative representation list, meaning that each party wins a number of parliamentary seats commensurate with the number of votes it gets in the election. In this case, the country is divided into relatively large [electoral] districts compared with the individual election and each party offers a list of candidates. The voter then selects from these lists.

[Question] Isn't this system difficult to apply in our society at this time?

[Answer] This is a truly complex system that requires a high-level administrative system and full awareness on the part of the voters. It is a system applied in some European countries.

[Question] Several opinions have been expressed for adoption of the system of simple relative representation by list. This system has gained the support of a broad sector within the National Party and the opposition parties. Has a decision been made in this regard?

[Answer] Actually, there is a view advocating this system, even though discussions are currently underway on the form of simple representation lists that can be chosen. But no decision has been made so far on which of the two systems to adopt. We are still studying them.

[Question] Assuming that the system of the simple relative list is adopted, how can this system be applied in our enormous number of electoral districts in their present condition?

[Answer] In such a case, a simple and easy system dividing the republic into a small number of districts, similar to the system applied in the Consultative Council elections, will be followed and, as I have already mentioned, provided that each governorate becomes a single electoral district, except for the big governorates which can be divided into several districts, depending on their population. Cairo, for example, can be divided into four districts because of its large size.

[Question] Let us assume, for example, that the number of seats allocated for governorate S, consisting of a single district, is 10. In this case, each party presents a list of 10 candidates and then the voters express their opinion. Let us assume that the National Party gets 70 percent of the votes in this district and that the Liberal, Lablr and Grouping parties each get 10 percent of the vote.

In this case, we have two ways: Either leave it to the party with the list to omit whomever it wants or we can apply the system of descending order to the list, with those topping the list selected and those further down the list omitted. This is a simplified explanation for relative representation in general.

[Question] Is it required in this case that a party's, any party's, candidates obtain a certain percentage of the vote as a whole, meaning the vote in all the districts, keeping in mind that they may obtain a high percentage in certain districts while not obtaining a percentage close to that in other districts?

[Answer] Some countries do not set a restriction on the relative list, meaning that every designated number of voters has its representative in the parliament as long as this representative gets a certain percentage of the votes in the district concerned. This system is applied in Israel, for example. Other countries, such as Germany, demand a minimum percentage of the votes throughout the republic, the percentage in this case being 5 percent. As for us, if we apply this system, then we must first find out the number of votes obtained by each party throughout the republic.

Speaker's Constitutional Status

[Question] What about the People's Assembly speaker? The constitution has, for example, set his term at 6 years, with the term being renewable. But what is the constitutional status of the People's Assembly speaker if he is renominated?

[Answer] Usually, countries follow two systems insofar as the speaker of parliament is concerned. The first system selects the speaker for the entire legislative term, with the term consisting of a number of sessions. Under the second system, which we use in Egypt, the legislative term consists of 5 years and is divided into five sessions, each session extending over 1 year. The system of some countries is based on electing the speaker for the entire legislative term, without annual renewal. When the legislative term ends, the parliament's term ends and new elections are begun. Consequently, it is up to the deputies to agree with the parties and their leaders on the candidates for the new legislative term. The party deputies may nominate the same individual if they win the majority in the second legislative term. The same individual may be nominated for the new legislative term.

[Question] So this system permits the assembly speaker to continue to hold his position for more than one legislative term?

[Answer] Yes, he may continue for more than one term. This depends on this individual's weight in the party and on whether the party has the votes to enable him to gain a majority. We had this system under the 1923 constitution.

There is also the single-session system, which we apply in accordance with our constitution. The speaker of parliament is elected for a single session. If he wants to be reelected for the following year, then he, and the two deputy speakers if they wish, are renominated for election by the parliament.

[Question] Let us move to the opposition. What is your evaluation of the opposition's experience in Egypt?

[Answer] I can evaluate the opposition within the assembly, i.e., the opposition actually in parliament. I can say that it has performed a good and fundamental role because democracy not only means providing opportunity to supporters to express their opinion but also means first providing opportunity to those who disagree with us to express their opinion. In other words, it is opinion and counter opinion.

[Question] I believe that the public interest demands the establishment of a dialogue with all the parties and inclinations so that the discussions lend to the weightiest and most beneficial opinions.

[Answer] This is the method we are following at present, whereas if we apply the principle that prevailed in Egypt previously, the opposition would not get more than a few minutes [to express its views in the parliament]. This would be undemocratic. It is worth noting here that members of the National Party, representing the overwhelming majority in the assembly, have willingly accepted this tradition because they believe that it is their duty to establish and reaffirm the democratic system in parliament. This is why they always give the opposition the chance to express its opinion. To tell the truth, the opposition has expressed its opinion within the assembly with utter freedom, and there has been agreement on some issues between opposition representatives and the majority party representatives, as in cases when proposals for amendments have been presented. In such cases, the majority party has taken the opposition parties' opinion into consideration.

[Question] Give us an example.

[Answer] The latest provisions on which there has been agreement pertain to certain laws presented to the assembly, such as the law governing reciters of the Koran. When this law was presented to the assembly, the opposition's opinion agreed with the majority opinion on the provision permitting remuneration for Koran recitation. The majority immediately agreed with the opposition's opinion, approved what the opposition proposed and explored the opinion of al-Azhar.

Emergency Law Also

[Question] I believe that during the discussion on the emergency law, there were obvious points of agreement as well.

[Answer] Yes. When the assembly discussed the emergency law, a number of amendments to the law were presented, including an amendment permitting appeals against the decrees issued for implementation of the emergency law, against terms of imprisonment and against the period allowed for appeals to the judiciary. The opposition raised these points and there was agreement by the National Party. I can say that points of agreement often emerge between the opposition parties and the National Party. In my view, this is a very healthy phenomenon.

[Question] What have been the most prominent points of disagreement recently?

[Answer] On some issues, there are principled political stands and then agreement is nonexistent. Take the discussions on the latest legal profession law as an example. I can say that the National Party, the opposition parties and the lawyers hold unanimously that the law is beneficial and excellent for the lawyers insofar as their union is concerned. The disagreement has been over the question of whether it is proper for the People's Assembly to discuss a law on the legal profession (when the constitutionality of law No 25 of 1982, which dissolved the Lawyers Union Council) is being contested or whether the assembly should wait until the Constitutional Court issues its decision on the appeal. The opposition's viewpoint has been that the assembly must wait and not discuss the law until the court decision is issued.

[Question] So it is a subsidiary issue?

[Answer] The assembly's issuance of the law, with the benefits it realizes for the lawyers, changes nothing in the situation insofar as the majority's opinion is concerned. So, what is the problem? Assuming that the court decides on the unconstitutionality [of the dissolution of the Lawyers Union Council], the council will return as it was. But what I want to say is that the general principle serves all. To discuss or not discuss the law is an issue of a principled political position. It has been obvious that it is a principled position.

Difficult Situations in Assembly

[Question] During your assembly speakership, you have faced more than one difficult situation. How did you deal with these situations and how did you overcome them?

[Answer] I must put on record that in decisive and fateful situations, the People's Assembly always stands as one. But in the nonfateful situations, viewpoints diverge. An example is the experience of the transfer of power in the wake of the stand incident [al-Sadat assassination]. The position was magnificent and the consensus was perfect, all of which made world leaders praise us.

[Question] During the discussions on the latest legal profession law, you were in an embarrassing position in the assembly. Can you shed any light on this position?

[Answer] It is true that one of the most difficult situations was the one we faced during the discussions. A deputy represents the entire nation and he is entitled to speak on any issue. Law is the art of formulation. At times, I was compelled to explain some legal concepts when the members dealt with some provisions requiring legal knowledge, such as the provision in the legal profession law on the stipulated privilege [imtiyaz] concerning legal fees. Some members thought that this privilege is an exception when we are in a society that condones no exceptions. So they attacked the provision, thus compelling me to explain that the word "privilege" is nothing but a legal expression intended to guarantee a financial right and the degree of this right compared with other financial rights, such as the alimony right, which is not a privilege but a special financial right.

[Question] The legal profession law has caused an uproar. Can we follow it from the time it was a bill up to its approval?

[Answer] Five members of the assembly presented the legal profession bill. The bill was sent to the Proposals and Complaints Committee, which was to report to the assembly after studying it. The committee then referred it to the Legislative Committee (with a proposed bill). Even though neither the constitution nor the assembly's bylaws require the assembly to seek lawyers' opinions on the bill, the assembly and the Legislative Committee, out of their eagerness to explore all views concerning this bill, held hearings to discuss the provisions of the bill, to which the members of the Lawyers Union Council, led by Ahmad al-Khawajah, the elected members of the subsidiary lawyers councils and the deans of the republic's law schools, totaling more than 300 persons, were invited. Some of those invited came, expressed their opinions and asked for postponement so that the bill could be studied further. The postponement has been granted.

[Question] How long did discussions on the bill take and what is the outcome of this experience as far as you are concerned?

[Answer] The discussions took five full sessions, and this is something that has never happened before. Moreover, a number of papers have published and reviewed some of the provisions. I would like to say there that we are in a democratic country and that we must follow democratic channels and paths in which to express our opinions. The People's Assembly is the only place for the promulgation of laws, the parties are the only organizations for the expression of political inclinations and the unions are the only organizations for the expression of union members' opinions on matters pertaining to their union. The majority must listen to the minority and the minority must respect the majority's opinion.

Why Are These Laws Delayed?

[Question] The People's Assembly is faulted for the fact that some laws take a long time without a decision being taken on them. Examples are the bills on housing and buildings and on developing the public sector. What is your comment?

[Answer] A law, any law, has two normal paths to take to reach the People's Assembly. It is either proposed by the government and called a bill or proposed by an assembly and called a bill proposal. A bill proposed by the government is supposed to have undergone studies by the government's appropriate specialized technical committees, which study the bill from the legislative standpoint, philosophy guiding it and the standpoint of its consequences. Moreover, in a state governed by a multiple party system, the general inclinations of the bill must first be studied by the party's pertinent committees.

[Question] So a bill, any bill, travels a long journey. Where does it start and where does it end? Take the housing and building code as an example.

[Answer] First, we have the National Party's Housing Committee, which may change or amend the bill. A discussion on various aspects of the bill is then held by the Council of Ministers, which may again amend the bill in light of the party's recommendations. This is followed by the party's Parliamentary Committee in which either People's Assembly members alone or members along with Consultative Council members discuss the broad lines, but not the details, of the bill. The bill is then returned to the Council of Ministers for final discussion. This is followed by the issuance of a republican decree on the detailed bill after its presentation to the State Council, which reviews it from the standpoint of technical formulation and the compatibility of its provisions with the constitution. After completion of the procedural requirements, the bill comes to the People's Assembly, which refers it to the specialized committee concerned, in this case the Housing Committee. This committee, in which the other parties are also represented, discusses the bill and may end up approving or rejecting it. All this is possible. The committee then drafts a report on the opinions expressed during the discussion and the bill is presented to the assembly for general discussion. If this discussion ends up approving the bill in principle, we begin dealing with the details.

[Question] Can you give us an example of the observations of the president of the republic on one of the bills recently discussed by the assembly?

[Answer] The best precedent in this respect is the tax law. After it was approved by the assembly, the late President Anwar al-Sadat observed that this law did not establish tax justice and did not, in a socialist state, give enough consideration to alleviating the burden on the working classes. The bill was returned to the assembly, the observations were taken into consideration and some of its provisions were amended to achieve the objective. It was then returned to the president of the republic to be ratified and turned into law. Here, I would like to point out that if a bill goes to the president of the republic and he fails to ratify it or return it to the assembly within a given period set by the constitution, it becomes an effective law. This is true when the bill is presented by the government.

[Question] What about a bill proposal submitted by a member of the assembly?

[Answer] If the bill is presented by a member of the assembly who does not have a technical unit capable of drafting the bill precisely, then in accordance with the constitution and the assembly bylaws, the bill proposal submitted by the member must be sent to a special committee for discussion of its technical and philosophical aspects. We have in the assembly the Proposals and Complaints Committee to which any proposal submitted by a member is sent. If the committee approves it, and if it is compatible with the constitution and society's general policy, it is presented to the assembly for reference to a specialized committee.

[Question] Can you sum up this description in practical terms for a specific law that has been issued?

[Answer] An example is the law governing Koran instructors and reciters. This law was proposed by some members of the assembly and was sent to the Proposals and Complaints Committee. The committee studied the proposal and found some of its provisions to be compatible or incompatible with the Islamic Shari'a. The committee discussed whether it is permissible to collect wages for reciting the Koran and whether wages should be collected for teaching the Koran. The discussions ended with some amendments that the committee wanted and on which the opinion of al-Azhar was taken. The bill was then sent to the assembly, which in turn referred it to the pertinent specialized committee. The bill, along with this committee's report, was then discussed in detail by the assembly and was approved in principle. It was then subjected to discussion article by article.

When Will Building Code See the Light?

[Question] So it can be said very briefly that a bill presented by a member supposed to be lacking in technical capability is referred to a special committee before being presented to the assembly, whereas a bill presented by the government and reviewed and drafted by the agencies concerned is supposed to meet the technical requirements. Here we come to the second part of our question, namely: When will the People's Assembly complete discussion of the building code?

[Answer] Immediately upon the collapse of an apartment building in Heliopolis, the government presented a bill that was discussed by the Council of Ministers and then in the parliamentary committee. The bill contained a provision calling for confiscation which the parliamentary committee rejected because this is a sensitive issue that could arouse the fears of some people. The confiscation was abolished and replaced by a fine, which could amount to the value of an apartment built in violation of the specifications. This amendment was introduced by the National Party's parliamentary committee and the bill was then returned to the Council of Ministers for study in light of the amendment. A republican decree was then issued after this final drafting and I have just received the bill today and have immediately referred it to the specialized committee, the Housing Committee and the Legislative Committee.

[Question] So the People's Assembly is not responsible for the delay in this case?

[Answer] Let us begin with accountability within the assembly as of today. As for what happened outside the assembly, it is not right that we be held responsible for it. However, I wish to state generally that as it is undesirable to be extremely slow where legislation is concerned, it is also undesirable to be extremely fast. Deliberation and study are a must because legislation entails a change in existing economic, social and legal conditions.

[Question] Where is the law for development of the public sector?

[Answer] It has not reached the assembly yet. This is why we do not include it with the laws for whose completion or noncompletion we are accountable.

[Question] Whom do we hold accountable then?

[Answer] It is customary for the media to consider the People's Assembly responsible for delay in the promulgation of laws as soon as the idea of a bill is proposed, forgetting the long journey the bill has to take and which I have described to you in detail.

[Question] Let us move from civilian laws to the personal statutes. Every now and then a voice rises here or there demanding that the amended provisions in the legal statutes law be returned to what they were 4 years ago. What is your comment?

[Answer] We must talk about matters pertaining to the Shari'a softly and deal with them sensitively because they require specialization. However, the Shari'a is distinguished by containing two kinds of rulings: Rulings that are constant, proven and unchanging, such as inheritance shares and issues, and interpretive rulings that are not decisively proven with evidence and are left to legal [religious] interpretation, which represent the major part of the Shari'a.

[Question] Where does the amended law stand vis-a-vis the examples you have cited?

[Answer] Before promulgation of the law, we followed al-Hanafi doctrine. Since its promulgation, we have followed other doctrines, such as al-Maliki doctrine, as long as they serve the people's interest and do not constitute a deviation from the Shari'a. It is legal to abandon an opinion and adopt another opinion but people do not like change.

[Question] I believe that the mere mention of the word change in any law is likely to create an uproar, not to mention the personal statutes law, which is family and social law.

[Answer] The same uproar developed when the personal statute laws and the inheritance laws were issued in 1929. But long discussions have taken place in this assembly on the new personal statute laws.

[Question] Has the assembly received any comments concerning problems in implementing the law? What I mean is, have certain gaps emerged or accompanied the implementation?

[Answer] So far, no problems have emerged in implementation. Should they develop, they will be dealt with legislatively. Should such problems develop in the future within the framework of the dictates of the Shari'a, then we cannot be blamed if we choose a certain opinion over another opinion within the framework of the interpretive rulings as long as the choice serves the public interest. Consequently, we will give this law the opportunity to be implemented if its soundness and compatibility with society's conditions is proven. If it is proven that there are gaps in implementation, then the law will be reexamined in order to close these gaps.

[Question] There is another issue that has recently raised more than one question in numerous circles. The People's Assembly budget has grown considerably. The budget for external travel is growing constantly. What do you have to say on this?

[Answer] The increase over last year's budget has two causes: First, the state laws provide allowances and raise the minimum wages and these laws are applicable to People's Assembly personnel. Consequently, the assembly's financial burdens have grown. Second, the assembly has a social services fund that covers members and personnel and this fund provides medical and other services.

Five Pounds for Privileges

[Question] How much does the People's Assembly member pay monthly in return for the privileges he gets?

[Answer] He pays 5 pounds. As for the personnel, each of them pays a certain percentage of his salary, depending on his grade. This fund finances the meals the members eat when they are in session, the medical expenses of the members in case of illness and the expenses of the pilgrimage to Mecca. A part of the fund is financed by the state and the rest by the members.

[Question] How are the expenses divided between the state and the member?

[Answer] Insofar as the pilgrimage is concerned, the member pays nearly three-quarters of the cost and the fund contributes the remaining quarter. The same applies if the member makes a trip abroad.

[Question] Specifically, have not the expenses for foreign travel increased?

[Answer] No increase has been made in the provision for external travel. Rather, if we compare the situation of our People's Assembly with other parliaments, we would find that our assembly does the least external traveling. You hear daily of delegations coming to our country from this or that part of the world whereas the number of delegations going from our country abroad is very limited and is virtually confined to participation in the African Parliament, the parliament of the French-speaking countries and the International Parliament. All these are meetings held by groups in which we are members, which we must attend and in which we must be represented because they are the international podium from which we can convey Egypt's voice to the world.

[Question] This leads us to the Egyptian parliamentary movement vis-a-vis international parliamentary groupings.

[Answer] Egypt's voice has always been an honorable voice. Moreover, many resolutions have been taken under the impact of Egypt's demands. You may remember that the nonaligned countries at one time reached the (point) of condemning the Camp David accords. (To counter this condemnation, a number of countries drafted a provision calling for revocation of the condemnatory resolution and the resolution has been omitted, thanks to the efforts of the Egyptian delegation).

[Question] Does this not create contradictions with UN work?

[Answer] The International Parliament's meetings rejuvenate the efforts made by the United Nations. The United Nations includes representatives of states, i.e., officials, whereas the International Parliament includes the representatives of peoples. Winning the support of peoples, especially the European peoples, is essential for any cause. As you know, the European parliaments are the authorities that make the fateful decisions for their governments. It is important to convey Egypt's voice and opinion to the deputies in these parliaments so that they can communicate this voice and opinion to their peoples. This is how public opinion is formed.

[Question] (Simone Ville), president of the European Parliament, and Mr Colombo, who chaired one of this parliament's sessions, visited us earlier. But this is the first time in which a delegation comprising 10 members representing 10 states in the EEC is actually visiting us. What is the significance of this delegation's visit to our country at this particular time?

[Answer] This delegation represents a number of countries, including Greece, Italy, France, England, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium and others. They want clarifications from us on numerous issues. This being the case, we must reaffirm their faith in what they believe and must neutralize any tendency toward rejection that exists among them. They will then convey all this to their parliaments, especially since they have come as part of a tour of a number of countries, each of which has different policies. The delegation members will make comparisons and form their opinions.

Role of Popular Diplomacy

[Question] There is work with connected, even mutual, links between the official diplomatic apparatus represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the popular diplomatic apparatus represented by the parliament. What are the limits of this [task]?

[Answer] Certainly, and this is why the parliament plays a role in bolstering the official political line, because nowadays decisions are not made simply at the level of heads of state or of governments but must have an impact on public opinion. This is why we have won the support of U.S. and European public opinion for the Palestinian cause and for the issues of aid and assistance for development.

[Question] You have invited the speaker of the East German parliament. When will he respond to the invitation?

[Answer] I recall here that while visiting East Germany to attend the meetings of the International Parliamentarians conference last year, I had a long discussion with East German officials and the discussion resulted in overcoming the freeze in relations between the two countries, starting with relations between the two parliaments. I invited the parliamentary speaker to come to Egypt and we hope that the visit will take place shortly.

[Question] What about contacts with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] No delegation from their side has come yet but the contacts are continuing at the level of the official diplomatic apparatus in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Question] How about Cyprus?

[Answer] Some delegations have already visited us and we are awaiting a visit from the Cypriot parliamentary speaker because this visit will open the door to the restoration of official diplomatic relations between the two countries.

[Question] When, specifically?

[Answer] As yet, no final date has been set. However, the visit will take place in the next few months.

[Question] Through the parliamentary meetings, there has been raised the idea of establishing an assembly [muntada] of Mediterranean peoples. A large wing within the ECC is enthusiastic about this idea. Considering that we hold a sensitive position within the Mediterranean basin, how do you view this idea and how does it affect Egypt?

[Answer] It has been proven by experience that Europe's stability and prosperity depend on stability in the Middle East. This is a fact acknowledged by Europe.

The governments here make their decisions, taking into considerations the North-South dialogue, the north-north dialogue and the south-south dialogue. The effects of this dialogue are crystallized in resolutions that are tantamount to recommendations or guidelines presented to the governments, which may or may not adopt them. The question here is: We wonder, if there a distinctive identity characterizing the countries along the Mediterranean coastline so that there could be dialogue and meetings between countries of the two coasts--the northern and the southern--on economic, cultural and political matters? Will this assembly give them something different from what takes place within the African Parliament, the International Parliament and the parliament of the French-speaking peoples?

Greece, Spain and Portugal Have Now Joined the ECC

[Question] This point leads us to ask about the effect of Portugal's and Spain's accession to the ECC on the goods we have been exporting to the ECC, Spain and Portugal and on the goods we have been importing from them.

[Answer] We still enjoy some customs privileges in the ECC and vice versa. These are issues that must be taken into consideration, especially since Spain and Portugal each compete with us in exporting some agricultural crops, such as vegetables, and agricultural goods, such as cotton and textiles, to the ECC countries.

[Question] Let us return to the concept of the assembly [al-muntada] from the political standpoint.

[Answer] Our policy in the area is that stability cannot be achieved unless the Palestinian issue is settled. Therefore, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon is an essential prelude to final solution of the issue. This is why I will answer the question with another question: Are the resolutions taken by the European countries in Venice and Luxembourg enough or is it necessary that the parliaments, led by the European Parliament, adopt this direction so that it will serve as a means for propelling their governments in this direction. The European Parliament has actually adopted this line.

What is required here is the constant exchange of views between parliamentarians in the area.

[Question] Does this mean that there is an idea to create a parliament for the Mediterranean basin?

[Answer] We cannot say now that we can establish a Mediterranean basin parliament similar to the African and International Parliaments and the parliament of the French-speaking peoples.

But within the framework of an "assembly," we can exchange views in the political, social and other spheres. Through a regional gathering, we may draw up a clear-cut map for area policy toward the two superpowers and may form a regional grouping on the economic policy to be followed vis-a-vis these two powers. In brief, such an assembly will open the door to discussion.

[Question] But there is more than one obstacle in the way.

[Answer] Yes, there are obstacles, the first being the presence of Israel in the Mediterranean basin and the Arab League in Tunisia, of which Egypt is not a member. But I believe that through such an assembly we can open the door to dialogue in hopes of achieving a certain satisfactory framework. In any case, the dialogue is going on and will continue.

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CSO: 4504/327

NEED FOR COMBINED PETROLEUM, MINERAL RESOURCES MINISTRY REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 742, 4 Apr 83 pp 24-25

[Article by Dr Mahmud Amin: "Where Is Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources?"]

[Text] Egypt's mineral resources are diverse but their production is not enough to meet local needs, which amount to nearly 140 million pounds annually, of which Egypt produces nearly 45 million and exports 5 million. Egypt then imports nearly 100 million pounds. Egyptian mines and quarries produce iron, phosphate, sand, gravel, calcareous rock and salt with a total value of nearly 37 million pounds. As for other mineral resources, which do not exceed 30 to 40 resources altogether, the value of their production amounts to no more than 7-8 million pounds. This is mineral backwardness in its true sense for a country whose deserts cover nearly 1 million square kilometers. This is why the mining sector needs a strong boost, such as the boost given the petroleum sector in the 1960's when Egypt was importing oil to meet local needs and as the mining sector now is doing. The petroleum situation then changed, and petroleum production now exceeds local needs and is exported, bringing the states millions of dollars annually. This is what we hope for from the mining sector.

The petroleum sector has succeeded in developing its production capabilities thanks primarily to a courageous decision taken by the political leadership in the early 1960's on the need to seek the help of foreign expertise and funds in developing this sector without undermining Egypt's rights and sovereignty and, second, thanks to giving the petroleum sector the freedom to function as part of the Ministry of Industry, Petroleum and Mineral Resources in the early 1960's and then as the Ministry of Petroleum when it was established in 1973 and, third, thanks to the enormous efforts exerted by the sector to attract oil companies and to eliminate administrative obstacles. This has enabled the sector to advance to many of the accomplishments it has achieved and to be a pioneer in cooperation between foreign capital and national capital since the early 1960's. This is a lesson from which the mining sector must learn.

Mining is still part of the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, which supervises a vast number of diverse industrial companies with all their technical, financial and economic problems and their large manpower--all of which does not give the minister in charge the chance to devote enough time to the concerns of a sector that is completely different from other industrial activities. Mining is a conversion industry in which man deals with what the soil conceals. It is thus totally different from other conversion industries, such as iron, steel, textiles and fertilizers. This is why mining is closer in nature to the oil projects and why, if we want mining to develop and advance as the petroleum sector has advanced, a special ministry must be established for mineral resources, in charge of affairs of the petroleum and mineral resources sector.

The mining sector needs to benefit from the experience of the petroleum sector and its presence with the petroleum sector under one minister would make it possible for it to benefit from this experience and to create the right climate for dealing with foreign investors, study negotiating procedures and provide the data, information and team specialists required for this work in order to shorten the negotiating time to the minimum and enable the investor to know from the start the data he needs to supply and the steps involved in the course of the negotiating process. It is also necessary to have the proper format for mining agreements in order to settle many issues and save time. There is no harm in having this done within the general framework of the oil agreements while consideration the great difference between the economics and nature of oil and those of mineral resources. These differences must be reflected in the details of the mining agreements. Such differences include, for example, the following:

1. In petroleum, the ratio of production cost to sale revenues is a small percentage that does not exceed 10-15 percent in the wake of the rise in oil prices since 1973, whereas in mineral resources this percentage rises many fold because the prices of most metals have not risen to the extent oil prices have risen. The rise in oil prices has resulted in enormous profits for the oil companies, which have come to rely more strongly on their financial resources to finance their oil projects, whereas mining companies still depend on the money markets to secure the funds they need for mining projects due to the low profitability of these projects.
2. The big difference between the nature of oil as a liquid or gaseous substance in the bowels of the earth--a condition that enables oil to rise automatically and through self-propulsion from the wells to the surface without the need for means of elevation. The opposite is true for solid and petrified mineral resources, which require complex machinery and vast amounts of energy to get them from the bowels of the earth to the surface. This doubles the costs of extracting minerals compared with oil.
3. The size of the market, which is much bigger for oil, amounting to nearly 3 billion tons annually. This volume is many times the demand for any other mineral resource--which restricts the ability of the producers of minerals to market their production and makes it necessary for them to raise their production gradually because of the drop in prices that

any surplus production causes. Consequently, a [mineral] project's growth rate is slow and, therefore, the period needed to recover the investments in mining projects is relatively long.

Egypt's Idle Mineral Resources

Officials in charge of mineral resources affairs will perhaps give priority to this issue so that Egypt can benefit from its mineral resources, many of which remain idle despite the efforts exerted by the geological and mining research agencies to discover and evaluate these resources by digging wells and tunnels. These resources include:

The aluminum ore in Abu Khuruq area in the heart of the Eastern Desert, where the presence of 26 million gons of exploitable aluminum has been proven.

The precious metals in the areas of Abu Diyab, al-Nuwaybi' and others in the Eastern Desert, where it has become certain that there are nearly 18,000 tons of such metals. This is an economically viable volume for these precious metals.

Zinc: there are nearly 50,000 tons of this metal in al-Nuwaybi' and Abu Diyab that can be exploited.

Titanium ore in Abu 'Udun area in the Eastern Desert, where there is nearly 40 million tons of this ore, the main source of titanium oxide needed for the paint industry. It is also the main source of the titanium metal used in spacecraft because it is as strong as steel and as light as aluminum.

Rock sulfur: There are signs of its presence in the Gulf of Suez and in north and west Sinai. Despite this, Egypt annually imports nearly 200,000 tons of this mineral, costing no less than 25 million pounds.

The black sands present on the shores of the delta overlooking the Mediterranean Sea from Alexandria to al-'Arish. These sands consist of a combination of economically exploitable metals found in varying amounts among the coastal sands. These sands have been studied at various sites and it has been proven that they exist at the rate of 1-3 million tons per square kilometer of sand beach. A million tons of this sand contains nearly 5,000 tons of radioactive metals and nearly half a million tons of titanium ore, which can produce 400,000 tons of paint worth \$600 million. All this can be extracted and processed from a single square kilometer of the delta coast.

The geological and mining research agencies have done their duty in discovering and evaluating Egypt's mineral resources. The national sector has also been able to utilize some of these resources. This is a great effort. But it is still confined to the narrow framework of local consumption needs. Therefore, the complete development of the mining sector depends on giving it the same freedom of movement and ability to move forward that has been given to the petroleum sector. This can only be achieved with the presence of a specialized ministry of petroleum and mineral resources. It is enough that the mining sector is 20 years behind the petroleum sector.

ELECTION OF SALAH JALAL AS DOYEN OF JOURNALISTS CONTESTED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 22 Mar 83 p 4

[Article by Hazim Hashim: "Three Lawsuits Contesting Election of Doyen of Journalists"]

[Text] Lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad last Saturday filed a lawsuit before the Court of Cassation on behalf of more than 200 journalists contesting the election of Salah Jalal as doyen of journalists on 4 March 1983. The contesting journalists and their lawyers filed the lawsuit on the grounds that the election was conducted without implementing the controls set by law No 76 of 1970 and by the Union of Journalists' bylaws to guarantee a fair election.

The books on the presence of the general assembly members were not properly controlled, so that names of those entitled to attend the assembly were added. Other names were also added to the lists of media workers on the day preceding the election, in addition to other incorrect procedures, such as failure to guarantee a quorum and to properly issue resolutions and count the votes for the position of doyen. Moreover, no control was established over the voting committees and over the presence of the members and this allowed some people who are neither journalists nor members of the general assembly to infiltrate. Moreover, a number of journalists who are members of the general assembly were prevented from voting through improper and unacceptable means. The committee in charge of counting the votes in the ballot boxes pertaining to the doyen--a committee comprising Mahmud Sami, the union's general secretary; Ahmad Farghali, union council member; and Hasan al-Sharqawi, a member of the General Assembly--did not file a report on the vote count process after watching the count carefully. Mahmud Sami wrote the report on his own, declaring Salah Jalal the winner. Lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad has also proven that the books on the presence of the General Assembly members were not controlled properly, thus allowing the election process to take place in a confused and disorganized atmosphere, either intentionally or unintentionally. The lawyer has also filed a suit against the minister of state for information because the outcome of the election, declared by one of the committee members individually, was immediately broadcast over television. The result was broadcast at 2100 and was conveyed to the papers, which published it on the following morning so that all would be faced with a fait accompli that had been rejected at

the time it was born. Committee members Ahmad Farghali and Hasan al-Sharqawi refrained from declaring the result and signing the report pertaining to it. Lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad has cited in his lawsuit the case of a nurse working in AKHBAR AL-YAMW House who was caught at the assembly with voting papers in his possession. The lawyer has also proven that an accountant working at the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY [MENA] was present in one of the voting committees. For all these reasons and others, the journalists are contesting the election of Salah Jalal as the lawyers doyen in the election which took place on 4 March 1983 and taking all the subsequent legal steps stemming from this suit.

Kamil Zuhayri's Lawsuit

Kamil Zuhayri, a candidate for the post of doyen in the recent elections, has also filed a lawsuit before the Summary Court in Cairo through his lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad, demanding that the election process papers and the ballot boxes be rechecked and that an impartial committee of former doyens Husayn Fahmi, Hafiz Mahmud, Ahmad Baha' alODin and Mustafa Bahjat Badawi, who was chairman of the committee that supervised the first elections to take place in accordance with Union of Journalists law No 76 of 1970, be formed.

The plaintiff has left it to the court to select whomever it wishes of the former doyens to examine the papers objectively. The lawyer pointed out in his statement before the court that Kamil Zuhayri has been the doyen of journalists twice and that he was one of the participants, if not the main participant, in drafting the union law and that, consequently, his concern for the soundness of the election procedures is understandable, regardless of his being a candidate for the position. Hundreds of other journalists who have contested the doyen's election are also right to be concerned.

On the other hand, lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad has filed on behalf of Kamil Zuhayri a third lawsuit before the State Council's Administrative Court against the doyen of journalists and the minister of state for information (in their personal capacity). In this lawsuit, the lawyer points out the incorrectness of the procedures followed in the doyen's election process and the incorrectness of the steps taken to declare the result, not to mention the fact that the result is certainly incorrect. The lawyer says that the decision declaring the result is contestable because it is in violation of the law.

It is worth noting that lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad resigned as the Union of Journalists' legal adviser in the wake of the elections. Moreover, more than 200 journalists from various press establishments are contesting the doyen's election. The union's law stipulates that for an appeal of an election to be valid the number of plaintiffs must equal one-fifth the number of general assembly members convening on the election day.

Four-Member Committee Formed To Impound Ballot Boxes

The seventh circuit Emergency Cases Court, with Counselor Mahmud 'Abd al-'Aziz Hajjaj as president and Mahir Ahmad Mahmud as secretary, yesterday issued its decision on the urgent lawsuit filed by lawyer 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad on behalf of Kamil Zuhayri, a former doyen of journalists. The decision calls for the formation of a four-member committee comprised of Husayn Fahmi and Hafiz Mahmud, two general assembly members, and two other members of the general assembly that the plaintiff and the defendant may select. The task of this committee will be to impound all papers, books, records and reports specified in the lawsuit until the issue is examined by the Court of Cassation and the Administrative Court.

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DETAILS OF NEW BILL ON PUBLIC SECTOR COMPANIES REPORTED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 14 Mar 83 p 6

[Article by Sana' Tabbalah: "MAYU Publishes Exclusively and for First Time Bill To Develop Public Sector; Establishment of Agency To Supervise and Coordinate Among Companies With Similar Activities and With Different Activities; Giving Boards of Directors Some Powers That Guarantee Flexibility in Achieving Goals"]

[Text] In an exclusive statement to MAYU, Counselor 'Adil 'Abd al-Baqi, minister of cabinet affairs, said that the Higher Committee for Economic Policies and Affairs has approved a bill on the development of public sector companies and authorities following the introduction of amendments to some of its provisions. The bill provides for the creation of an agency that will assume the form of an authority and will have independent legal status. The agency's main role will be to supervise and coordinate among companies with similar activities and companies with different activities. This agency will be established in a decree issued by the president of the republic. These authorities will be called public sector authorities to distinguish them from the public authorities set up under the provisions of law No 61 of 1963 concerning public authorities.

The decree establishing the authority will define the group of companies in which the state's net rights will revert to the authority concerned, with the companies classified on the basis of similarity or integration of activity. The decree may also entrust the authority with specified activity.

The minister concerned will supervise and follow up, via these authorities, general state policy.

Workers will be represented on the boards of directors of these authorities through a worker nominated by workers' general unions in the sphere of the authority's activity.

Law No 48 of 1978 governing public sector workers will apply to the workers in these authorities.

Insofar as the groups of companies controlled by these authorities are concerned, the authorities will have some major organizational powers, but will not interfere in executive powers. The most important of the authorities' powers are to:

Approve the general plans and goals of each company and of the group of companies that an authority controls in accordance with general state policies.

Coordinate among these companies to achieve maximum integration so as to overcome production bottlenecks.

Strengthen joint training systems in a way that guarantees that manpower, technical and administrative bottlenecks will be addressed.

Propose the transfer of investments from a company not using them to another company controlled by the authority.

Determine the recompense allowable to company representatives serving on boards of directors and general assemblies of other companies in which the represented company is a shareholder, the recompense not to exceed limits set by the Council of Ministers. Any recompense exceeding this maximum will revert to the company.

The authority's monies will be considered privately owned state monies, unless the decree establishing the authority states otherwise.

The provisions of law No 159 of 1981 governing joint-stock companies and limited-liability companies will apply to the public sector companies where no special provision is cited [in this bill] and provided this law is not in conflict with the provisions of the bill. This is in contrast to the prevailing principle which states that the provision of the law governing joint-stock companies does not apply to public sector companies. This is done to bolster the public sector companies, to enable them to benefit from all the advantages and guarantees given to the private companies and to guarantee them greater flexibility to perform their role in an exemplary manner.

The provisions of the bill will not apply to the public authorities and public sector companies that have their special regulations in accordance with laws or decrees issued by the president of the republic, except in cases where no special provision is cited.

The bill excludes from the category of public companies those in which one or more (public-status persons) own less than 51 percent of the capital. But the exclusion does not affect the status of the companies existing when this law goes into force.

The executive bylaws will determine the regulations on the basis of which the public sector companies will be evaluated and the consequences resulting from this evaluation, provided that a decree on the evaluation is issued

by the minister concerned. These regulations may be redefined in light of changes in the volume of a company's activity and in cases of merger and other situations. This power was previously assigned to the Council of Ministers.

In-kind shares of the companies will be evaluated by a committee formed in decree issued by the minister concerned and will include representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Accounting Agency, provided that the evaluation of these shares is approved by the company's general assembly.

As a general principle, it will not be permissible to circulate in the stock market the shares and bonds constituting the capital of the public sector companies.

A company's constitution will determine the nominal value of the share at no less than 5 pounds and no more than 100 pounds. This provision will not apply to the companies existing at the time this law goes into force. The present law stipulates that the value of a share may not be less than 1 pound and does not set a maximum value.

The public sector companies will be managed by boards of directors consisting of an odd number of no less than 7 and no more than 11 members. A company's board of directors will comprise a chairman nominated by the minister concerned and appointed by the prime minister. One half of the members of the board will be appointed by the minister concerned on the recommendation of the authority and the other half will be elected from among the company employees in accordance with the conditions and specifications set by decree issued by the minister of state for manpower and training.

The minister concerned may add to the board two part-time members with ability and technical expertise in the sphere of the company's activity. The bill assigns this power to the minister concerned instead of the prime minister.

The companies' boards of directors will be given some powers that will guarantee them flexibility and freedom in achieving the goals desired from them. These powers among other things, will enable them to:

Establish production cost systems, propose prices in light of costs and present these prices to the authority concerned. This authority is determined by the Council of Ministers.

Formulate a company's organizational and personnel structures in light of the controls established by the authority's board of directors, provided that any part of the structures pertaining to higher positions is approved by the minister concerned.

Draw up plans that guarantee performance of the replacement and renewal operations within the framework of the approved plan and in a manner compatible with the state's general plan.

Propose the transfer of workers within the companies, disregarding provisions of the law governing public sector workers when the public interest demands such transfers. In case the worker does not agree to the transfer, the decision will be up to the minister concerned.

Determine standard performance and production rates and tie them to the incentives system.

Set allowances, in-kind benefits and remuneration in accordance with the general rules established by the prime minister, provided that the board of directors' decision in this regard is approved by the minister concerned.

Formulate plans necessary to train new workers in order to raise productivity, meet the need for specializations and develop new generations of specialized skilled labor.

The minister concerned will issue a decree forming a committee to investigate any member to be removed from the company's board of directors, provided that such members are transferred within the company itself or outside it, depending on the outcome of the investigation. This will be done as an exception to the provisions of law No 35 of 1976 governing worker unions and law No 48 of 1978 governing public sector workers, i.e., without requiring the approval of the transferred. This will be done to guarantee the smooth progress of work at the company when it is decided to remove all or some of the members of the board of directors.

In cases of financing, merger, division of liquidation, the assets of a company will be determined with the help of a committee formed by a decision of the minister concerned and including representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Accounting Agency. This committee's decisions may be appealed to the judiciary. This is in contrast with the principle currently in force which makes such a committee's decisions final and not subject to appeals of any kind.

The bill has been presented by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (to a special committee including the ministers for manpower and training, for war production, for cabinet affairs, for administrative development, for industry and mineral resources, for economy and foreign trade and for tourism and civil aviation).

This committee held several meetings in the presence of the minister of planning and a representative of the Ministry of Finance and discussed the bill and the observations of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of State for War Production and the General Federation of Workers and (has redrafted the bill) in light of these discussions. The bill was again presented to the Higher Economic Policies and Affairs Committee on 2 March 1983 and the committee approved it, as we pointed out at the outset of this article.

REPORT ON CHINESE-TUNISIAN COOPERATION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Apr 83 p 8

[Article by S.B.S.: "A Major Project; The Long March of Chinese and Tunisian Workers: Exemplary Cooperation; Water to Irrigate Cap Bon and the Sahel"]

[Text] Seltan: 24 km from Tunis and 100 km from El Aroussia, the starting point of this imposing project: the Mejerda-Cap-Bon canal. Near and around this small village, in an area that is usually quiet in spite of being near GP 1 [expansion unknown], work on the canal has changed the landscape, worksites have been opened everywhere. Two impressive machines are used to move earth and line the canal. Moving at a quick pace, they are progressing toward Belli, where the canal will end. The commitment made when work began, in August 1979--to complete the digging of the canal by December 1983--will be honored.

Over 200 Meters Per Day

Intense activity prevails everywhere in a radius of close to 30 km extending to Naassan, where 900 Chinese have established their headquarters, to the two tunnels of Hammam Lif and Mokhtar, 2,700 and 540 meter long respectively, and to Seltan where, a few days ago, the two earth-moving and lining machines were operating. Mr Lin, an engineer, is pleased with the success of field cooperation between Chinese technicians and workers and their Tunisian counterparts. He added that digging this canal demonstrated the futility of certain preconceived ideas.

According to him, there is no opposition between entirely manual and purely mechanical labor. One or the other should be chosen, depending on the project location and nature.

In this respect, the canal demonstrated the interest and advantage offered by a judicious blend of manual labor and the use of machines, especially to move earth and to line the bottom and sides of the canal. The finish is nearly perfect and... the care used in making the canal reveals an increasingly obvious concern for the preservation and judicious use of our water resources. All the same, the amount of work involved and the number of worksites has resulted in

the hiring of close to 3,000 Tunisians and some 900 Chinese, who are working along several tens of kilometers along the canal.

Along the canal, which has a trapezoidal section, structures of various sizes and complexity are being built to overcome the natural obstacles that would hinder the flow of water along the 120 km of the canal. The leading structure, considering its importance and the technique used to build it, is none other than the 2,700-meter long Hammam-Lif tunnel which goes through the mountain.

That way, the canal did not have to go through the town.

Actually, in the initial project, the canal was to go through Hammam-Lif. But, thanks to its mountain, the pollution that would have been caused had the canal gone through the town will be avoided, although the town will benefit from other positive aspects of the canal, the irrigation of the Mornag plains.

Exemplary Cooperation

In considering the Mejerda-Cap-Bon canal, a distinction between Chinese and Tunisian participations is possible only for the purposes of... this article. Actually, if we except the 45 km of canal built by a Tunisian company in a site without any major natural obstacles, the remaining 75 km were built by the Chinese and the Tunisians working together at all stages and on all worksites. The two earth-moving and lining machines and all the rolling equipment were purchased by the Chinese and brought to Tunisia under temporary permits. Only the materials and parts required for the canal will, of course, remain... along the canal. Thus, steelplates are imported from China to make pipes 2.4 meters in diameter that will be used to replace the canal over a section some tens of meters long. Because of the difficult topography of the Hammam-Lif mountain slope, a pressure pipeline proved necessary. Production of small quantities of pipes 2.4 meters in diameter in Tunisia would not be profitable, we were told. It would take a larger market to encourage production of pipes of such and such diameters.

163 Million Cubic Meters To Start

In a first stage, when the canal is placed in operation late in 1983 or early in 1984, it will carry 163 million of cubic meters of water that will irrigate 11,100 hectares at Cap Bon (5,000 hectares of newly irrigated land and 6,100 hectares under a citrus protection program) and will supply drinking water to Tunis, Cap Bon (44 million cubic meters until 1985) and the Sahel (42 million cubic meters). Indeed, SONEDE [National Water Exploitation and Distribution Company] is going to establish a processing and storage station at Belli, to direct water from the canal to the Sahel and even to Sfax, we were told by Mr Ben Azzouz of the Ministry of Equipment.

Where Does the Water Come From?

In the first stage, the water carried by the canal to Cap Bon, Tunis, the Sahel, etc., will come from the Joumine dam (to be completed late in 1983) and the Sidi Salem dam (inaugurated by the Chief of State in May 1982).

When the Master Plan for North Tunisian Water is completed (i.e. when the Ich-keul and Far North dams are completed), the canal could transport 372 million cubic meters per year. Then, irrigation will extend over 19,000 hectares, including 6,100 hectares under a protection program (172 million cubic meters), and 158 million cubic meters will be required to provide drinking water to Tunis and Cap Bon. Another 42 million cubic meters will be needed to supply drinking water to the Sahel coast.

What About Evaporation?

To answer this question, which is asked by nearly everybody, namely whether the water flowing in an open canal could evaporate, Mr Ben Azzouz, engineer at the Ministry of Equipment, has no lack of reasons. He insists that "since this is running water, it is not that sensitive to heat and, therefore, is expected to have a low rate of evaporation."

Such a "life-bringing" canal will have considerable socioeconomic impact; it will be a profitable operation whose cost will not exceed 60 million dinars. We should note that President Bourguiba has agreed to inaugurate the first section of the canal on Victory Day (see LA PRESSE dated 28 April 1983, p 1).

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SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ENNACEUR INTERVIEWED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Apr 83 p 8

[Interview with Mr Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs, by B. Ben Maatouk: "Mr Mohamed Ennaceur Sums Up Labor Negotiations: 'Contractual Policy: Definite Progress Which Must Go On'"; date and place not specified]

[Text] For 12 months or so, public opinion was kept in suspense by the negotiations undertaken between social partners. It was not always kept adequately informed and this contributed to blur these negotiations which, at times, may have seemed as difficult to follow as "Ariadne's clew."

We must say that the government had imposed a strict reserve upon itself to guarantee the serenity required by such negotiations. Indeed, the government restricted itself to a role of conciliation, of arbitration between the parties to the labor negotiations, and these parties alone were involved legally and de facto in the questions negotiated.

Now, 34 out of 39 collective agreements have been signed. The SMIG [Interoccupational Minimum Guaranteed Wage] and the SMAG [Agricultural Minimum Guaranteed Wage] have been published unofficially. Ninety-five dinars (for a 48-hour week) for the SMIG, and 2.64 dinars per day of work for the SMAG. These amounts are expected to be made official by the government very shortly, probably this week. Finally, negotiations concerning the status of government employees have recently led to an agreement.

Mr Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs, has kindly accepted to answer questions for LA PRESSE to review and sum up what has been achieved until now--in 10 years of contractual policy--in Tunisia.

[Question] Mr Minister, we have just lived a decade of contractual policy since the implementation of the 1973 outline collective agreement, and the sectorial collective agreements which, already then, covered all sectors and laid the foundations for consultations on wages and labor conditions. Mr Minister, you were closely involved in organizing labor on a contractual basis. Therefore, could you kindly draw a balance for readers of LA PRESSE?

[Answer] That is correct; it is 10 years now since we started the contractual policy which was to mark a turning point in labor relations. Indeed, we must recall that until 1973 wages were controlled and set by government regulations. Although the Labor Code mentioned collective agreements, the social partners--that is the unions and heads of enterprises--could certainly negotiate labor conditions, but the Code contained one article that prohibited them from negotiating wages and accessory benefits. Therefore, starting in 1973, this prohibition contained in the Labor Code was removed and we started completing what is now called the contractual policy.

From then on, the government and the social partners--i.e. the workers as represented by their unions, and the heads of enterprises as represented by employers' organizations--could negotiate collective agreements, including wages and accessory benefits. During that period, two major negotiations took place: one in 1974-1975, the other in 1982-1983.

In the meanwhile, the social partners have much improved their experience of this type of negotiations, in that both the demands and potential of each have been "narrowed down." This, of course, did not make things easier. Quite to the contrary! For each party has acquired better control over its demands and potential... And let me tell you that, in spite of difficulties, in spite of slow progress--which caused the press and public opinion to say that things were "dragging on and on"--it was not the parties involved who got tired, but rather the commentators.

Actually, that slow progress was primarily due to the fact that each of the partners was more closely acquainted with its own problems, its own demands and potential and that, finally, this year the situation was exceptional. Indeed, negotiations on wages started simultaneously in the private sector, in the public sector, and with government employees. That was a lot all at the same time. As a result, for a time the negotiations were global, national and at a high level.

Then, when we had reached an outline agreement, we allowed the negotiations to progress: in each department for the public sector and in each federation for the private sector, while separate negotiations were taking place between UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] and the government concerning government employees. By thus breaking down the problems to be considered, we could progress faster. We have now reached a number of agreements or agreement on a number of questions--most collective agreements have been signed; most status have also been signed--and what remains is not much compared with what has already been agreed upon.

If I had been asked for a comment while negotiations were in progress, my comment might have been different from what I am telling you now. The essential now is that these negotiations have succeeded. The essential is that we were successful and that, finally, a responsible attitude prevailed over the reflex of putting forward claims and protecting the specific interests of individual sections of the population.

Indeed, it is a responsible attitude that finally prevailed. Whereas, at the time of the first negotiations in 1974-1975, we had chaired practically all negotiations, this time we remained much more in the background; besides, the social partners themselves had asked us to do so, as each of them wanted to defend its own position.

Therefore, we were there all the time to clarify, to conciliate, to arbitrate-- whenever arbitration was called for. I believe that this time the game was played fair, its rules established: there are the partners and there is the government; the latter is present, it intervenes to conciliate, to arbitrate whenever necessary. This is why things dragged on, and this is why progress was slow.

Something that you did not see and that we did experience is that the whole process was hard and painful. It was long and exhausting. For days and nights --and once for a full month--we worked nonstop at the Ministry. There were people who took all their meals here. Nonstop, we went through a veritable marathon.

Every time the dialogue was interrupted, we were there to make it resume. Every time there was a deadlock, we were there to orient, to suggest a solution. In a word, to reconcile points of view. Finally, I must say that, whereas many outsiders thought two months ago that there was a deadlock, a confrontation-- some even thought it was the 26th of January all over again--here we had confidence in the spirit of responsibility of the various partners, because we thought things had to work out. And it is true that, on the whole, there was a responsible attitude and a desire to succeed.

All this, therefore, demonstrates a certain experience of negotiation, an obvious desire to be treated as equals, and the government played by the rules by intervening only to arbitrate or to reconcile.

What could we say concerning the turn taken by negotiations between social partners? People are becoming more precise, more to the point. They argue, they discuss, they disagree, they ask for data. I believe that, except for that appearance of slow progress--due to the fact that public opinion was impatient--we have gone through and watched a veritable apprenticeship.

Indeed, we have gone one step further in the apprenticeship of labor negotiation, the apprenticeship of responsibility that allow negotiators to be not just union members or bosses, but Tunisians concerned about reconciling their interests. Instead of thinking in terms of diverging interests. Of course, properly speaking, we have not reached the point where they all "fraternize"-- to use a word that was dear to colonialists--but by keeping the dialogue, each comes to listen to the other party and, of course, they try to put themselves

in each other's shoes. And from the moment people will sit around a table to dialogue, relationships are no longer vertical, but horizontal. This implies that, from the start, the other party is accepted as a full-fledged partner.

I do not mean that we have managed to establish relations in this respect that are entirely free of any "reminiscence," that is not easy. But, if not a revolution, it is already a major change. Then, to dialogue you must listen to the other party. You may not agree to everything, but if you keep listening to a number of things, you will remember some, and this is the change we would like to promote in the minds and mentalities of all parties.

Did we succeed in that? No, honestly, not yet. But we achieved considerable progress. From 1973 and 1983, there has been a definite progress. And I believe that we must keep up that work. It is an in-depth work since it has to do with changes in mentalities. Nothing is more exciting, and also more difficult, than to contribute to a change in mentalities.

For the next round, it might be a good thing if we were all better equipped, so the discussion would progressively lose its subjective aspect and be based on objective and irrefutable data. Increasingly, we all must reason and negotiate on a number of well defined data. Then, our dialogue will become far more productive. As long as there remains a measure of personal appreciation, a measure of subjectivity, things will remain difficult.

This time, the economic budget was used as a basis. We showed by how much the country's production was going to increase. We explained to all that wage increases should be kept at the same level as production because, if they did exceed that level, inflation would be the result, which would in the long run be detrimental to the workers--as it would erode their purchasing power.

More precisely, this year we spent a lot of time discussing figures. For, this year, UGTT and UTICA [Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade and Handicrafts] delegations had brought their own experts. Indeed, they included university graduates, experts. One of the good results of this experiment is that we are increasingly talking in terms of figures, economic and social realities. And this has been very positive and has made a rational contribution to the negotiations. Therefore, I believe that, there again, this change toward a desire to know the truth, to get closer to it, to act within the limits of what is possible, will prove very useful, very positive...

The government, we must say, is largely responsible for that since, even before initiating actual labor negotiations, we had had several meetings of ministerial commissions to which four ministers took part: the ministers of plan, of economy, of social affairs and of civil service--UGTT, UTICA and, for a time, UNA [National Farmers Union] were also represented. We examined the data, possibilities and problems. This was quite interesting because the demands expressed and the progress wished for turned out to be those of Tunisia as a whole.

Therefore, there has been a definite progress, and we must continue and refine it. We must also refine our tools, our means, and do what is necessary so that, in the future, our dialogue can be based to a larger extent on mathematical, scientific data, on tangible and irrefutable data.

(Collective agreement negotiations are still in progress).

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ALIGNMENT ENCOURAGED BY RECENT EVENTS, POLL

TA080803 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 May 83

[News Analysis by Sara Honig: "Poll Launches Labor on New Wave of Bouyancy"]

[Text] TEL AVIV--A new mood of optimism is surging through the alignment, with its leaders again confident that they can bring the government down in the not too distant future. Labour strategists are now pinning their hopes on either an early election this autumn, which the party may soon demand, or improved chances for forming an alternative labour-led coalition in the present Knesset.

Alignment hopes are buoyed by the government's failure to contract a better agreement with Lebanon; the state of the economy; an opinion poll published on Friday by HA'ARETZ which, for the first time in 2 years, predicts a labour electoral victory; and, by considerable instability within two important coalition parties--the Liberals and the National Religious Party [NRP].

The combination of these factors, it is said in labour, has produced a dramatic switch in the public mood and in the probabilities of imminent, and profound political shifts. The switch was sudden, unforeseen, and only began to appear about a week ago, labour sources claim. The JERUSALEM POST has learned that prominent labour members plan to start this week collecting at least 100 signatures of the party's Central Committee members to petition for an early committee session initiating a labour Knesset faction move for early elections. The impression in Labour Knesset faction move for early elections. The impression in Labour is that there would not be far greater readiness in the party to move for elections, although it cannot yet be described as being swept by elections fever.

Thus far, labour saw three possible scenarios for a change, or a partial change of government: the formation of a national unity government, new elections, or a realignment of forces in the Knesset that would enable the creation of an alternative labour coalition. The idea of a national unity government seems to have been scrapped entirely by recent events, while the other alternatives are regarded as very viable.

An alternative coalition is still the favoured labour means to power. Elections are regarded as risky, despite the recent poll. Senior labour figures told THE POST that they are wary of euphoria and would still like to see whether the conclusions of the Ha'aretz poll are borne out by other leading pollsters.

The poll, conducted by the PORI Institute, gave the Likud 37.3 percent of the total vote had elections been held last month. Labour, according to the poll, would have emerged with 41.4 percent. In the 1981 elections, the Likud received 37.1 percent and labour only 36.6. Since the 1981 elections, no poll has shown a labour lead, although most have indicated some narrowing of the gap between the major parties, with the Likud retaining a very stable and solid plurality, well above its present Knesset strength.

Sources in a number of labour camps told THE POST that the one immediate effect of the HA'ARETZ poll will be to bolster significantly the position of beleaguered labour chairman Shim'on Peres within the party. Party insiders, both supporters and opponents of Peres, told THE POST that it will now become increasingly difficult for Peres' rivals to brand him a loser and demand his replacement on the grounds that under his leadership labour cannot possibly hold any sort of a lead.

The "rescue-labour-from-Peres" movement is bound to suffer a setback, as will the chances of former Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and former President Yithaq Navon, should the latter make a bid for the labour leadership. Sources close to Peres stress that he will not yield the number one labour position to Navon without a tough fight.

But party insiders add that even if the HA'ARETZ poll predictions are not corroborated by others, the very existence of a trend towards narrowing the gap between labour and the Likud is likely to increase calls in labour to move for new elections. Labour would count on the poor state of the economy, and on the disappointing conclusion of the negotiations with the Lebanese to swing the vote in the even of elections.

The Likud, it is believed in labour, would find it politically impossible to refuse elections, following its search for ways to find a Knesset majority to reschedule the elections from November 1985 to October 1983, when the municipal elections are due.

Indeed, sources very close to Prime Minister Menahem Begin yesterday told THE POST that "there is nothing we would like better than for labour to initiate a move for early elections. We would have a Knesset majority." Despite the latest poll, these sources remain eager for early elections and confident of a Likud victory.

But labour sources told THE POST that before their party moves for early elections, it would first like to see how the troubles inside the Liberal Party and the NRP develop. Instability inside these strife-torn parties has increased the prospects for the formation of an alternative coalition and, in labour eyes, this is a safer option than tackling the Likud in elections.

Labour's brightest hope at the moment is Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i and his four fellow Liberal MKS, who are now threatening to split their party. Such a split, labour politicians predict, would give malcontent Liberals such as MKS Yitzaq Berman and Dror Zeigerman a pretext to leave and team up with Shinuy to join an alternative coalition, despite their hawkish stance, thus assuring labour a majority, with tacit communist support.

A possible break-up in the NRP could also add recruits to an alternative coalition.

Although labourites deny rumours of a covert deal with Moda'i, whereby he and his followers have already been promised portfolios in a possible labour government, it is admitted in labour that even "such unfounded rumours are useful. They create their own dynamics, and instill panic among would-be Liberal or NRP labour partners who will rush to grab whatever benefits have not yet been snapped up."

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BEGIN'S RECENT HEALTH CONDITION ANALYZED

TA061015 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 May 83 p 9 political supplement]

[Commentary by Aharon Bakhar: "The Twilight of the Gods"]

[Text] Had Menahem Begin's staunchest fans been present at the opening of the Knesset's summer session this week, they would have been at odds to recognize their admired idol there. The man who slowly crossed the corridor as if feeling his way could at most have resembled his own shadow. Had a stranger happened to be in the area, he would have refused to believe that that was indeed the man who less than 2 years ago won the elections campaign all on his own, and that his image is somehow connected in the collective consciousness with Israel's strength, determination and resistance.

Menahem Begin now looks like an exaggerated version of the image 'Ezer Weizman wanted to give him on the eve of his rise to power: A good and benevolent grandfather who steers clear of excessive involvement in the political jungle. The man who drags his feet along the corridors in which he spent his best years seems to be seeing them for the first time. He looks like he is still feeling his way around, his glasses are befogged, his legs seem to have trouble carrying him, his body slightly tilts sideways like somebody who doubts the stability of the ground under him. For a few minutes Begin looked like an old captain standing on the deck of his ship in the middle of a fierce storm after having had one too many drinks. The look of such people usually focuses on their steps, and that is why their eyes are always looking down. Those who have not seen him for a long time will immediately notice: Menahem Begin has lost a lot of weight in the last few months and this has sharpened his facial features, particularly his chin, to the point where he currently resembles the unflattering caricatures in the Western press which always tried to highlight his "Jewish" features. His suit looks as if it hangs on him.

Begin only raised his eyes occasionally and one could see that this cost him a certain effort. However, his look remained opaque, like that of a man feeling his way in strange surroundings. Press photographers who occasionally come near him are asked not to use their camera flashes. The flashlight upsets the prime minister very much and causes an involuntary tic in his eyes.

People say that his voice has weakened a great deal in the last few weeks. His interlocutors find themselves in an embarrassing situation each time they have

to tilt their bodies forward in order to hear his words. The thunderous voice of the king of kings in the town squares has now dropped to a whisper. In such moments Begin looks like a man who finds the reality surrounding him a burden. Ministers emerge from meetings with him feeling that there is nobody to do business with. This vacuum is always filled by people who hasten to talk on his behalf and who more than once pronounce his name in vain. The prime minister said, the prime minister wants, I have concluded with the prime minister--all these have now become routine coined phrases in the corridors of power.

Those surrounding Begin are fond of recalling his previous and sudden recoveries from similar moods. On the eve of the elections, when the Likud's boat was sinking to rock bottom, it was Menahem Begin who recovered almost overnight and got out the best of himself in the town squares. This time it seems that on top of everything the prime minister is burdened by the distress of the war. When he set out on this war he promised to remove the sad atmosphere which had pervaded Israel since October 1973. Upon the approach of the first anniversary of the war which had been scheduled to end after 48 hours, this atmosphere has also pervaded him. Begin is currently struggling with George Shultz over achievements which had been in his pocket on the eve of the war. Major Sa'd Haddad's status has never looked more dubious than toward the end of the war which was designed to secure him forever.

It should be noted in his favor that nobody is agonizing over this war as much as Begin. In addition to the dead and wounded, the prime minister has become his main victim. Therefore, Begin is always willing to put aside all his possible occupations in order to listen to the feelings of the families of the prisoners, he is willing to receive them in his office anytime. When they leave he becomes lonely, bitter, pondering and taciturn; they leave behind a man on which this war stamped its mark in his eyes and features with slow and eroding bitterness, a bitterness which is even reflected in the tone of his skin, which has now turned very gray.

Those who followed the prime minister slowly making his way along the Knesset's corridors this week could not have failed to ponder the comparison that comes to mind with one of his predecessors who found herself in a similar situation.

Almost all those who were on the Western side of the Suez Canal in 1973 will not forget the sight: An old woman, her face wrinkled, stepping out of a helicopter which drove her to the middle of the desert. She was holding a black bag on which a scarf was loosely tied. Only from close-up could one see a look of deep and abysmal sorrow reflected in her eyes, but she did not let it overcome her. Soldiers in the reserves surrounded her on all sides and she waved at them.

The late Golda Me'ir was the only woman who was allowed to cross the Suez Canal. Her helicopter rapidly flew at a very low altitude over the Suez Canal to evade Egyptian radar until it landed in the African enclave, in front of hundreds of astonished soldiers who could have been her grandchildren. When she sat with commanders there was something very determined in her face, which was slightly perspiring and flushed. Given the all-male environment, there was nothing more surprising than the appearance of an old grandmother walking on the desert sands. Sometime later Golda Me'ir recalled that she had been unable to leave on a fateful trip to the United States before meeting the generation of grandchildren

who were spread in the desert without knowing for how long. She felt that she owed them a moral debt, perhaps she was encouraged by them.

Menahem Begin has become so fed up with the war he set out to wage amid lightening and thunder that he has not even gone to the trouble of going to Lebanon, not even to a rearguard position in the vicinity of Haddad's enclave in the south. The prime minister may have learned his lesson from his unfortunate visit to the Beaufort fortress immediately after it was occupied, when he rushed to declare that it had been taken without suffering any casualties at a time when the dead were still laying in front of him, and incidentally making some insulting remarks about the fighters of the opponent. The impression received now is that all this business with Lebanon has become completely alien to him. If only he could, Menahem Begin would willingly roll the responsibility for it into the alignment's court.

CSO: 4400/524

BRIEFS

FINANCING FOR AL-ITTIHAD--The Palestinian monthly, AL-KARMEAL, which is published in Cyprus, has donated \$30,000 to AL-ITTIHAD, RAKAH's Arabic-language organ. AL-ITTIHAD, which reported this in its issue last Friday, notes that the newspaper's management has decided to name its cafeteria al-Karmal as a token of appreciation. AL-ITTIHAD, which marked its 40th anniversary recently, will begin appearing as a daily this Friday. [Report by Qassim Zayyad] [Text] [TA101138 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 10 May 83 p 7]

DESTRUCTION OF SAMARIA SETTLEMENT--The Samaria regional council has destroyed near Qarne Shomron a structure built by a group of Israelis who had completed their military service and who intended to establish an agricultural village in cooperation with Arabs. Members of the group told our correspondent Shalom Oren that they bought the land from a local inhabitant, and a Nabulus court order said that the regional council was unauthorized to destroy the building. They said that it was destroyed while they were not at the site. [Text] [TA110640 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 11 May 83]

EXPORTS TO EGYPT--The scope of Israeli exports to Egypt dropped by half compared to last year, although two additional border terminals were opened this year in addition to the one in Ne'ot Sinav, which was operational last year, too. Israel claims that ever since the war broke out in Lebanon, Egypt has not re-validated the import licenses. Statistical data on the operation of the Tabah, Nizzana, and Rafah terminals was released yesterday, showing that exports from Israel to Egypt dropped to 11,000 tons compared to 21,000 tons last year. This year 392,602 persons crossed the border at the Ne'ot Sinay terminal, compared to 317,000 people last year, which is a 26 percent increase. This year 350,282 people crossed the border at Rafah, 75 in Nizzana, and 42,255 went through Tabah. Israeli imports from Egypt reached \$500,000 during the first year of the border terminals' operation, and included books, pebbles to pave the Tel Aviv seaside promenade, cotton fibers, and watermelon seeds. The number of Israelis vacationing in the southern Sinai has recently gone up, too. [Text] [TA070818 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 May 83 p 9]

IDF PURSUES EGYPTIAN SMUGGLERS--The IDF spent many hours last night pursuing smugglers who penetrated through Egypt, but they were not captured and managed to return to Egyptian territory, leaving behind 55 kg of good quality drugs. Our correspondent David Friedman reports that this phenomenon occurs nearly every night: Egyptian smugglers penetrate, and although the IDF pursues them,

many of them manage to escape. The smuggled goods are drugs, Swiss cheeses, sausages, and spare parts for cars. Security sources have told our correspondent that this year 500 smugglers were caught, but that many others--whose number is unknown--managed to penetrate Israel, some of them terrorists. [Text] [TA081919 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 8 May 83]

W. BANK CONSTRUCTION HALTED--Nabulus--Eighteen additional injunctions were issued yesterday by the local district court against the Gal development company to halt its construction work at the site of the Elqana Dalet settlement. The injunctions were issued at the request of villagers from nearby Biddiya, who claim ownership of the settlement's land. Nabulus police got the injunctions yesterday and are to serve them on the company this morning. This is the first time that the police have undertaken to enforce a local court order in the territories that was applied for by local residents against settlement developers. Eight similar injunctions were issued previously. [Text] [TA090619 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 9 May 83 p 2]

W. BANK DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS--A discussion was held yesterday on the establishment of six settlements south of Hebron and the expansion of four existing settlements there, by World Zionist Organization [WZO] settlement department head Matityahu Drobles, MK Hanan Porat (Tehiya) and the leaders of the Mt Hebron settlers council. They were meeting in Yitron, one of the Mt Hebron settlements. The WZO settlement department intends to establish Susiyya and Yaqin as part of the six, and proposes to turn the existing NAHAL settlements Tene, 'Otni'el, Adora and Eshkolot into civilian settlements. Last week 1,600 dunams near Aqraba village were taken over and declared state land, for the purpose of establishing the settlement Tel Hayyim, which has not yet been approved by the Ministerial Settlement Committee. [Text] [TA090631 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 9 May 83 p 2]

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GEORGE HABASH INTERVIEWED ON PALESTINIAN INITIATIVES

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 789, 20 Apr 83 pp 31-40

/Interview with Dr George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: "The Absolute Limit of Palestinian Flexibility"; date and place of interview not specified/

/Text/ Slogans such as "moderation" and "realism" conceal the readiness of the Palestinian bourgeoisie to engage in compromises.

Incapable people wish to divert attention from their lack of capability and their shortcomings by getting the most mileage possible out of the disputes between the Palestinians.

The absolute limit of our flexibility is that we will not pursue the path set by the U.S.

The Palestinian democratic forces are the ones responsible for changing the Palestinian balance of forces.

Before the ink of the Fes plan was even dry, those who were so enthusiastic about it backed away from it and declared their support for the Reagan plan!

The basis for our relations with Jordan must be respect for our freedom of action within the ranks of our people and our freedom of action to wage our political and military struggle against the zionist enemy.

After the recent meetings held by the Palestine National Council in Algeria, AL-TALI'AH held an interview with Dr George Habash, the secretary general of the PFLP /Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/. The interview took place during the beginning stages of the initiatives being undertaken by the executive leadership of the Palestinians, based on the decisions made by the Palestine National Council, and the beginning stages of the Palestinian-Jordanian talks which concluded with the Jordanian communique which was issued last week. In spite of the fact that these developments had not yet taken place when this interview was held, this candid interview with the "professor"

concerning the course of events in the struggle of the Palestinians and the political initiatives which were being undertaken on the basis of the fundamental principles of the Palestinian struggle nevertheless provides a realistic view concerning what happened after the interview was held and concerning what is expected to happen in the future.

The national tasks of the Palestinians which Dr Habash considers urgent are tasks which are once again being reaffirmed and which are demonstrating the value of analyzing the political situation from the scientific and academic point of view. The following is the text of the interview:

/Question/ We have information which indicates that there have been serious attempts to split the ranks of the PLO. According to this information, you, both personally and as the leader of the PFLP, were subjected to pressure which had the objective of keeping you from taking part in the work done by the Palestine National Council! How correct is this information? Was any political dispute the basis for these attempts? If so, please clarify matters for us.

/Answer/ First of all I would like to point out that the objective which the reactionary Zionist-imperialist alliance had in unleashing the recent war in Lebanon was not achieved as the alliance had planned to achieve it, in spite of all the violence and viciousness which characterized this war and in spite of the lengthy siege of Beirut. The Zionist enemy, supported by the U.S., had the objective of destroying the infrastructure of the PLO and liquidating both the political and military role which it is playing in our struggle. This is why the Zionist enemy mobilized its entire army, as well as about 60 percent of its reserve forces, and utilized its technological superiority to the utmost extent.

However, the heroic staunchness which was demonstrated by our forces in Lebanon and in Beirut prevented the enemy from being able to fully achieve his objectives and demonstrated, for the first time, that it is quite possible to inflict a defeat on our Zionist enemy. Of course, the failure of our enemies to achieve their objectives does not for a moment mean that they have renounced these objectives and given up conspiring, both directly and indirectly, against the Palestinian revolution. For this reason we believe that our enemies today are looking for new weapons to use against us. The most important of these weapons has been the attempt to deprive us of our principal weapon after Beirut, and by this I mean our weapon of Palestinian national unity. Although in Lebanon we lost one of our revolution's basic positions, today we still possess a basic foundation for the independence of our policy making and decisions--which is our firm national unity.

Those among the Arabs who are incapable and inept wanted to steal from us our victory in Lebanon and wanted to divert the eyes of the Arab masses from their lack of capability and their shortcomings. They wanted to do this by getting the most mileage possible out of the disputes between the Palestinians and ensuring that news concerning our internal disputes would be prominently reported in the newspapers, magazines, and various other informational media--

instead of having news about their ineptness and incapability prominently reported. These people also wanted to have the Palestinian revolution lose its historic opportunity to raise its voice loud and clear in the face of reactionary regimes and in the face of the incapable and inept Arabs.

This is clearly the reason for the dubious concern shown by the reactionaries and the attempts engaged in by a number of Arab parties to destroy Palestinian national unity.

In view of all of this, we in the PFLP have often declared--and we have backed up our words with our deeds--that we are very anxious to prevent our enemies from being successful in achieving this objective of theirs. We have declared that we will head off all attempts to disrupt Palestinian national unity and to break up the alliances of the Palestinian revolution with the Arab patriotic forces and regimes as well as with our international allies, especially the socialist nations led by the Soviet Union.

As for what you referred to in your question concerning the pressure which we have been subjected to in this regard, let me say that the PFLP has taken a clear and well-known position which cannot be influenced by anything other than what is dictated by the higher interest of the Palestinian people and their just cause. This position is one which is well known, and it is not a new position for the PFLP.

The recent experience of the Palestine National Council, as well as the success which we achieved in maintaining Palestinian national unity on the basis of a joint political program, has enabled us to reaffirm our capability not only of withstanding these pressures which are being exerted upon us, but also our capability of containing all of the tendencies which are harming our national unity and attempting to bring about a deviation from the political program of the PLO--no matter what the source of these pressures and these tendencies are.

/Question/ A few days before the holding of the meetings of the Palestine National Council, people were talking even more forcefully about disputes within the ranks of the Palestinian resistance movement. One of the most conclusive indications of this was the communique issued in Tripoli by the five organizations /who met there/. The PFLP also signed this communique, according to a statement made by a responsible PFLP source. However, another source denied that you had signed this communique. Still a third source, however, asserted that /you had, in fact, signed the communique/. After this meeting, and for a brief time, you participated in the Aden meetings which were held on the occasion of the anniversary of the beginning of the revolution and during these meetings you reaffirmed your support for the decisions made by the previous meetings which also had been held in Aden.

What are the facts concerning this situation? Could you please clarify for us just what has been going on?

/Answer/ Needless to say, there are disputes within the ranks of the Palestinians. As you know, these disputes are nothing new. Both before and after

Beirut there have been a number of political disputes among the ranks of the Palestinians, and, among other things, this demonstrates the vitality of the Palestinian arena and demonstrates the democratic approach which prevails among the Palestinians. In addition to this, this demonstrates the political and social differences and disparities which exist with the Palestinian national movement and which are reflected in the differences and disparities in the political theses brought forth by the various groups of the Palestinian revolution. But this also demonstrates a shortcoming in the way some people view the new developments and events which have taken place in both the Arab and Palestinian arenas as well as the fact that these people are continuing to cling to illusions concerning the possibilities of achieving a compromise and pursuing the political options which have been proposed recently.

With regard to the communique issued at Tripoli, the PFLP was one of the forces which signed this communique. We do not consider this to have been a polarizing or dissident action as far as the Palestinian arena is concerned. All of the Palestinian forces and groups were invited to attend the meeting at Tripoli, and the Fatah organization was no exception. In fact, we in the PFLP insisted that it was necessary to invite the Fatah organization to attend this meeting. For this reason, we feel that it was our right to accept this invitation, even though some other groups rejected the invitation--for reasons and considerations which are well known to you.

It is also our right as an organization to strive to have our point of view be the point of view of other Palestinian groups. This is what actually occurred at Tripoli. We consider that this communique, to a large degree, represents our political positions. This is why we, along with the other organizations, saw no reason not to sign the Tripoli communique and saw no reason not to /attempt to have/ the point of view contained in the communique become the point of view of these other groups.

With regard to the Aden communique, this is something which, at the time, represented the minimum consensus among the Palestinians. Since this is true, it is natural that this communique would show differences with the Tripoli communique--although it does not conflict with it in terms of real content. When alliances exist, it is only natural that the members of such alliances seek common denominators among themselves. The closer these allies are from the political point of view, the broader and more profound these common denominators become, and vice versa.

This is why the difference between the common denominators contained in the Aden communique and those contained in the Tripoli communique constitutes a difference which is understandable in terms of its limits and dimensions. It is from this angle or point of view that we view the decisions made by the Palestine National Council. They were tantamount to an expression of the common foundation which it was possible to establish for Palestinian national unity and, in this sense, they constitute a firm basis for this national unity. We should strive to develop and solidify this basis in order that it absolutely not permit any deviation from the basics concerning the established national rights of the Palestinian people.

We in the PFLP are adhering to the decisions made by the 16th session of the Palestine National Council. At the same time, we are adhering to all of the agreements which have been made between the groups of the Palestinian revolution. We do not see any conflict in this and we do not consider this to be an assault upon Palestinian national unity within the framework of the PLO. Whenever there is a strengthening of relations between two or more groups in the PLO within the framework of this unity, then our national unity becomes strengthened and its elements become more deeply rooted.

/Question/ Is what is being said about the fact the PFLP playing the role of mediator among the Palestinian resistance organizations true? If this is true, do you intend to keep on playing this role? In case this happens, what is there to prevent you from sliding into a swamp which you might find difficult to get out of?

/Answer/ As I said at the beginning of our interview, we feel that Palestinian national unity is the strongest weapon that we will have in our battles in the future. This is why it is the target of our enemies in their current assault upon the Palestinian revolution. This is why we are always against all positions and actions which deviate from the decisions made by the Palestine National Council and which reject the political program of the PLO.

This is also why we are against all positions which could be described as being characterized by impatience, this is why we demand that national unity prevail over secondary conflicts, and this is why we are warning against deviation in any direction.

We, of course, do not assign the same degree of responsibility to these positions for the rupture that has afflicted internal Palestinian relations. The principal rupture is being caused by positions and actions which ignore the decisions made by the Palestine National Council. But, in spite of this, we have felt that the ideal means of heading off the taking of these positions is that of holding a democratic dialogue on the basis of Palestinian national unity.

We did not stop at this. We have also attempted, via intensive contacts with the various organizations engaging in Palestinian national action, to keep these differences and disputes within the framework of our single Palestinian family.

The results of the meetings held by the Palestine National Council, the democratic spirit of unity which characterized the work of the council, and the success which we had in emerging with decisions reflecting a nationally-acceptable minimum as a basis for Palestinian action, all constituted a victory of the policy of Palestinian unity which we, along with the other Palestinian revolution organizations, have followed--in particular after our exit from Lebanon.

I could not describe this role as the role of a mediator. The reason I say this is that all of us in the Palestinian arena represent a single national

group within the framework of the PLO. As for your apprehensions about our sliding into a swamp which we would find difficult to get out of in case we continue with this role, let me say that we firmly believe that we have arrived at a stage of political maturity and practical experience in the waging of our struggle which makes us feel reassured that such a thing will not happen. We have a clear and definite political orientation, and events and developments have proven that the main elements of this policy have been correct. We have an organization which has been refined through long experience and day-to-day actions during the course of our struggle, and this is something which fills us with reassurance and eliminates any feeling of anxiety.

National Unity

/Question/ It is quite clear that national unity within the framework of the PLO was one of the most important issues which was put on the agenda of the meetings of the Palestine National Council. In fact, during the 15th session of the Palestine National Council, you said that the PLO was something which is much smaller than an overall national front and that it was more like a national coalition. How can national unity be developed, what are the obstacles to achieving this national unity, and who is responsible for doing this?

/Answer/ Palestinian national unity has not yet achieved the level of constituting the united national front which we are seeking in order to create a Palestinian national alliance.

This is something which is true, and there are reasons and circumstances which explain this fact. Some of these reasons and circumstances are objective ones which are beyond our control, and some of them are subjective ones which are related to the groups, policies, and programs of the Palestinian revolution.

As you know, the Palestinian revolution is composed of different social forces. These forces have their common interests which are considered to be the foundation of their national unity. At the same time, these forces have conflicting interests.

In addition to this, the fact that the Palestinians live in a diaspora has, in turn, meant that the groups engaging in Palestinian national action have come from different origins, have developed differently, have diverse ideological and political affiliations, and the policies of these organizations are subject to influences from different and diverse sources.

Furthermore, interference by the Arab regimes in the affairs of the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian people who live in the countries ruled by these regimes has played an important role in weakening relations between the groups of the Palestinian revolution, especially since relations between the Arabs are characterized by conflict and instability.

These are some of the objective aspects which constitute an obstacle to the development of Palestinian national unity. For the Palestinians, this is

reflected in the fact that the various groups of the Palestinian revolution have adopted different positions and different programs. This is something which has made it difficult, and is still making it difficult, to achieve the formation of a firm front for Palestinian national unity.

To this one must add another factor which is perhaps the principal factor responsible for the rupture which has afflicted internal Palestinian relations or has so far rendered us unable to form a united front. This factor is the fact that the leaders of the Palestinian revolution, who belong to the /bourgeois/ class, still lack political clarity and their political actions could be described as being hesitant and wishywashy. Also, their organizational approach, especially within the framework of alliances, could be described as being a tendency toward factionalism, working in isolation, monopolization, and rejection of the method of engaging in collective action as a united front.

This is not the place for us to discuss the reasons why the Palestinian revolution is continuing to be led by people in this /bourgeois/ class. However, we could sum up the most important reasons as being the following:

1. The dominant regimes in the Arab world which give their support and backing to this /bourgeois/ class and which consider that this class of people represents their interests and policies in the Palestinian arena.
2. The nature of the phase of national liberation and the role played by the forces and orientations of this /bourgeois/ class in unleashing the Palestinian revolution.
3. The poor alliance relations between the forces of the Palestinian left.

This is why we believe that any serious progress in the realm of building up a united national front will continue to depend on the extent of the role which will be played by the democratic forces of the Palestinian revolution in the Palestinian arena. As long as the balance of forces among the Palestinians remains as it is now, I believe that this will make it difficult to achieve the building of a united national front.

In order for us to begin to achieve any serious change in the balance of forces among the Palestinians, this will require that we first of all improve relations of cooperation between the Palestinian leftist groups and that we enter a tireless struggle among the masses which has the objective of strengthening the position of the left among the ranks of our people until this strong position is ultimately reflected within the framework of our Palestinian leadership.

Needless to say, this process must be accompanied by the beginning of the process of bringing about a serious change in the current balance of forces among the Arab nations so that we can head off any harmful influences on the Palestinian arena exerted by the Arab reactionaries and so that the Palestinian left can gain effective backing and support from the Arab world.

The achievement of serious progress in connection with these two tasks is something which will not only guarantee the building of a united Palestinian national front, but will also provide great forward momentum to the Palestinian struggle.

Experience With National Fronts

/Question/ As we know, one of the principles of a national front is that no party participating in such a front be politically independent or have its own independent media. But this situation does not apply in the case of the PLO. It is said that some groups other than the Fatah organization are responsible for the fact that there continues to be such independence /within the PLO/. To what degree is this a true statement? And if this is true, is there any possibility that this situation can be overcome?

/Answer/ Allow me first to make a comment concerning the content of your question, since it is inaccurate both from the academic and theoretical-political point of view. A national front is not--under any circumstances--a ready-made mould which can be transferred from one arena to another and from one experiment to another. This statement, in addition to the general laws involved in it, also acquires, in light of tangible experience, a special and distinctive character which causes it to differ, in many of its features and laws, from one arena to another and from one experiment to another.

The history of revolutionary liberation movements has witnessed many types of front alliances. For example, there was the Vietnamese model in which the united front served as the general framework for the Vietnamese progressive liberation movement, and it did not provide a wide margin of media independence for the various forces included within the framework of this alliance.

This pattern was also seen in many of the other liberation movement experiments in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and South Yemen. But this does not mean that this model can be utilized in conjunction with the circumstances and conditions of the Palestinian arena which is the scene of a political and social disparity, some of the characteristics and causes of which we have already previously defined, especially as they related to the nature of the leadership of the Palestinian revolution.

For this reason we believe that it will be impossible to eliminate the political and media independence of the various Palestinian groups as long as there is a continuation of the policy of monopolization of the bodies and organizations of the PLO and as long as /those who monopolize the PLO bodies and organizations/ continue to dominate Palestinian policy.

As for the other aspect of your question which has to do with the fact that other groups other than the Fatah organization are responsible for the fact that media independence still exists, let me state the following two facts:

1. Political, media, and organizational independence is something which is necessary within the framework of the PLO as long as internal relations between

its various groups continue to be on the present basis and as long as the balance of forces among the Palestinians continues to be as it is today. But this by no means makes it less important to have a Palestinian national alliance.

2. The policy of having some parties in the Palestinian arena monopolize and dominate the organizations of the PLO has impelled many of the groups to establish organizations parallel to those in the PLO, even in fields within the framework of which it is possible to unify the efforts of the Palestinians--such as fields involving the movies, theater, cultural heritage, arts, and other realms of joint activity.

Whoever takes a careful look at the situation in the PLO's bodies, organizations, and offices will notice that they are all of the same stripe and that the other groups of the Palestinian revolution have no presence of any kind in these organizations.

Therefore we believe that the responsibility for the scattering and fragmentation of these organizations is to be found in this individualistic and factionalist policy in the Palestinian arena.

Flexibility, and What It Means!

/Question/ There is virtual unanimity about the fact that the PLO is tending in a direction of more political flexibility. What are the guidelines by means of which it would be possible to control this flexibility and prevent the PLO from slipping into a situation where it would make concessions which might seriously harm the national progress of the Palestinian people?

/Answer/ I agree with you that there is a Palestinian trend in the direction of having more political flexibility and that this trend is being promoted under the slogans of "moderation" and "realism," whereas these slogans actually conceal an implicit readiness on the part of the bourgeois Palestinian national forces to engage in the compromises proposed for the Middle East in view of the serious rupture in the existing balance of forces.

Those who are in favor of this trend base their position on the premise of the difficult situation which both the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement find themselves in. But this trend of their will result in shutting the door to the option of continuing the struggle to change the existing balance of forces in order that our people achieve their objectives and aspirations.

This trend reflects the impatience of the Palestinian national bourgeoisie and the fact that it is too tired to continue the struggle under the present circumstances and in view of the new developments which have taken place in the area, especially after the war in Lebanon.

This trend is an alarming indication of the possibility that our entire Palestinian struggle will be jeopardized unless the trend is restricted by guidelines and controls which can prevent it from plowing ahead along its path.

We, of course, are not proponents of extremism and are not in favor of being divorced from reality, and we are also not people who coin general slogans and avoid entering the political struggle.

But we feel that the political plans /presently being proposed/ under the circumstances of the existing balance of forces--including the Reagan plan and the Fes summit plan which show the influence of contacts with the Egyptian regime and which would result in the /the Palestinians/ having a confederation with Jordan before establishing an independent Palestinian state--merely aim to divert the Palestinian struggle from its real objectives and harness it to the U.S. solution which is being proposed for the Middle East.

We in the PFLP feel that the absolute limit of Palestinian flexibility should not go beyond certain guidelines and limits. Certainly the most important of these guidelines and limits is that we should in no way pursue the path set by the U.S.--a path which **right** now is being laid down in our Arab world.

As for how to control this flexibility, our opinion is as follows: This primarily depends on the role and effectiveness of the Palestinian democratic forces which have the responsibility of engaging in the task of changing the existing balance of forces in the Palestinian arena. This secondarily depends on the role of the Arab national liberation movement--which involves the patriotic regimes--in continuing to remain steadfast and striving to change the balance of forces in the Arab world.

The fact that the Arab reactionaries are continuing to assume the decision-making role in the Arab world and the fact that the balance of forces among the Palestinians remains unchanged are two factors which cause this "flexibility" to involve serious dangers for the Arab and Palestinian struggle.

In the last session of the Palestine National Council we succeeded in establishing guidelines and limits for Palestinian political action. This is what should constitute the foundation, limits and horizons for this flexibility, and the important thing is that we must succeed in applying these guidelines and limits in actual practice. This is our task and it is the task of the forces of the Arab liberation movement at this present stage.

Operations Inside the Occupied Lands

/Question/ You talk quite a bit about escalating military operations inside the occupied lands, and so far none of this has been carried out in actual practice. Why is this so, and what can be done about it? Why is there no military cooperation among the groups in the occupied lands? In order to achieve escalation of the struggle in the occupied lands, does this not require a revival of the national front there?

/Answer/ Before beginning to answer this question, I would like to point out one important fact, and it is that our military struggle inside the occupied lands has never ceased at any stage. We constantly hear about military

operations that have taken place in this or that Palestinian village or town. Thus I do not consider it a true statement when you say that our call to carry out military operations in the occupied lands has not at all been responded to in actual practice. But let me also point out another important fact, and it is that these operations are not on the level which we aspire to. Also, they are not in conformity with the aspirations of our people and our revolution. This is something which is true, and this is something which we will be striving to change during the next stages of our struggle.

As for the reasons why this is true, there are objective reasons which involve the difficulties which our military operations inside the occupied lands encounter and the fact that they do not enjoy the necessary support in order to be escalated. I am thinking in particular about the difficulties resulting from the fact that the Arab regimes, the countries of which border on occupied Palestine, have closed these borders in the faces of our revolutionaries. This is something which requires that we expend even much greater effort in order to bring weapons, ammunition, and soldiers to the occupied lands.

Furthermore, the Zionist enemy has taken stepped-up security measures, especially in the areas of monitoring his borders and beefing up his security forces in the occupied Palestinian areas.

As for the subjective aspect, this involves the ineptness of the Palestinian revolution and the fact that it has not shown sufficient concern for this important aspect of our struggle.

For this reason, the greatest concern regarding this matter, especially after Beirut, /will be necessary/ in order to guarantee providing the basic elements for escalating Palestinian military operations inside the occupied lands.

As for cooperation among the Palestinian revolutionary groups in the area of military operations inside the occupied lands, this is something which is not on a sufficiently high level. The reason for this situation is to be found in the fact that Palestinian national unity has been generally fragmented. One must add to this the fact of the special nature of, and precision necessary for, operations in the occupied lands and the extremely complicated security measures which must be taken in connection with them.

With regard to the issue of a united national front, we in the PFLP call upon all sincere persons to revive and develop the national front in the occupied lands in order that it be able to undertake its role as the striking arm of the PLO in the occupied lands. We have demanded of the Palestine National Council, during its various sessions, that it strive to assure the success of this task and that it strive to put its decisions in this area into tangible actual practice.

We feel that the importance of this front has increased after the war in Lebanon, especially in view of the dubious activity being engaged in by the

stooges and organs of both the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes inside the occupied lands in an effort to keep the PLO from being the sole representative of the Palestinian people and in a notorious effort to create reactionary alternatives to the PLO.

As for the activities of the Village Leagues and some of the other collaborators--in particular, what has been made public concerning the "Charter of the 200" which calls for peace with the Zionist enemy on the basis of the Reagan plan and a Palestinian confederation with Jordan--for us, these activities confirm the importance and the necessity of reviving and developing the national front in the occupied lands.

We believe that, in this regard, the decisions issued by the Palestine National Council were positive and constructive ones, but the important thing is that these decisions be put into actual practice.

The Fes Plan Leads Toward the Reagan Plan

/Question/ In view of the fact that the agenda of the Palestine National Council included discussion of the Fes plan, does this mean that you give it your approval? What is your interpretation of Item 7 of this plan? Does it mean anything other than recognition of Israel?

/Answer/ We of the PFLP, ever since the first day of the emergence of the Fes plan, have stated that we reject this plan which calls for recognition of the Zionist enemy and would eliminate the military option in dealing with him.

As we made clear at the meetings of the 16th session of the Palestine National Council, we reject this plan not only on the basis of our judgment of the provisions in the plan--in particular, Item 7 which concerns the right of the Zionist entity to enjoy a secure existence within secure and recognized borders. We also reject the plan on the basis of our knowledge of the ulterior motives behind the proposal of the plan at this particular time when the pro-U.S. Arabs are striving to wring concession after concession out of the PLO in order to pave the way for success of the principal plan which has been proposed for the region--that is, the Reagan plan.

We render our judgement of this plan in accordance with this point of view rather than on the basis of its provisions and paragraphs.

As soon as the ink of the Fes plan was dry, the Arabs who were so enthusiastic about it hastened to back off from it and to declare their support for the Reagan plan. This is something which clearly reveals the nature of their objectives and intentions.

As for Item 7 in this plan, we consider that it can be interpreted in only one way rather than in more than one way--that is, it includes the principle of implied recognition of the Zionist enemy.

Thus we feel that any position taken with regard to this plan should be based on a clear understanding of its objectives and the context within which it was proposed. Also, such a position should involve refusing to recognize the Zionist enemy and refusing to renounce the military option for the PLO or for the Arab nations as a whole.

As for what was mentioned in the decisions of the Palestine National Council concerning the Fes plan, I would like to state three principal facts concerning the matter, which are the following:

1. The Palestine National Council viewed the Fes plan as a plan which met the minimum demands of the Arab nations which would enable them to engage in political initiatives. So the Palestine National Council, in taking this view, was saying that this plan was the choice of the Arab regimes rather than the choice of the PLO.
2. The Palestine National Council officially expressed its open reservations about the Arabs renouncing the military option in Fes, and thus asserted the necessity of having political initiatives be accompanied by military action in order to bring about a change in the current balance of forces.
3. The Palestine National Council once again rejected the contents of Item 7 of the Fes plan. The Palestine National Council thus reaffirmed that the Palestinian revolution, when making a judgment concerning this plan, bases its position on the decisions made by the various sessions held by the Palestine National Council which have always involved rejection of any form of recognition of the Zionist enemy.

This is what was contained in the final decisions made by the Palestine National Council concerning the Fes plan, and it represents the minimum demands of the collective Palestinian position. Obviously this demonstrates both rejection of, and reservations concerning, some of the suspect provisions contained in the Fes plan.

What Should Be the Basis of the Relationship With Jordan?

/Question/ Relations between the PLO and the Jordanian government are getting noticeably better. Will it be possible to utilize these improved relations in order to achieve the thing which you have always been calling for, that is, improved relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples in Jordan? If so, what direction would this take? Also, what program do you have for the national struggle being conducted in Jordan?

/Answer/ The PFLP has already defined its clear and frank position concerning the matter of relations between the PLO and the government of Jordan. This position of ours is not basically a nihilistic position as some people like to say it is. It is a position based on the realization and knowledge of what these relations could lead to.

In light of current circumstances in the Arab world and in the Palestinian arena, we feel that the guidelines for any Palestinian relations with any Arab

regime, especially the Jordanian regime, must insistently focus on the principle of Palestinian representation being solely within the framework of the PLO, on rejection of all forms of egotism, delegation of authority, or collaboration, and on the reaffirmation of an independent Palestinian policy and the reaffirmation of the rights of our people which cannot be sacrificed. These rights include the right of the Palestinians to return to Palestine, their right to self-determination, and their right to establish an independent nation. This position was the one that was taken by the 16th session of the Palestine National Council. Also, these relations should be based on the principle of respecting the right of the PLO to freely engage in its political, mass, and organizational work among the ranks of the Palestinian people. Also, they must be based on renunciation of all attempts to eliminate the activities of the groups of the Palestinian revolution among the ranks of the Palestinian people. In this regard, we assert the necessity of enabling the PLO to engage in its military activities against the Zionist enemy and state that this is the basis for relations between the Palestinians and the other Arabs--in particular, relations between the Palestinians and Jordan. We in the PFLP feel that strengthening relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples cannot be achieved by means of contacts with the Jordanian regime since the interests of this regime clash with the interests of our fellow-Arab Jordanian people. This process must take place via direct contacts with the Jordanian masses and with their democratic national forces which are waging their struggle.

One thing which perhaps increases the danger of the type of relations which exist today is the fact that they exist at a time of feverish activity on the part of the Arab reactionaries to pave the way for the Middle East to accept the plan put forward by Reagan--who refuses to have dealings with the PLO and who is calling for Jordan to play a basic role in any future talks.

This is why we are opposed to these relations /with the Jordanian regime/. It is on this basis that we fought to have the Palestine National Council eventually establish the guidelines which guarantee that such relations do not deviate from the basic interests of the masses of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples.

With regard to our program for national action in Jordan, I believe that now is not the time to talk about this in any sort of detail. For this reason I will content myself with mentioning the main principles, based on the special nature of the Jordanian arena and the role of the Jordanian and Palestinian masses in waging their direct struggle to achieve the establishment of a democratic and patriotically-oriented Jordan.

1. The democratic principle, which involves being able to obtain democratic freedoms in Jordan and to put an end to the state of emergency, martial law, usurpation of the rights of citizens, persecution of these citizens, and putting dozens of them in prisons and the dungeons of the intelligence and security forces.

2. The economic and social principle, which involves solving the economic, social, and everyday-life problems which afflict the masses in Jordan because

of the economic policies of Jordan. The result of these policies has been the undermining of the Jordanian economy, giving free rein to the parasitic bourgeois class, and allowing the skyrocketing of inflation and the cost of living which has been a hard blow to both the Jordanian and Palestinian working classes.

3. The struggle to have the PLO achieve the right to have a public and effective political, military, and mass presence among the ranks of the Palestinian people /in Jordan/, as well as the struggle to put an end to the policy of the regime, its ambitious in the direction of annexing /the West Bank/ and its attempts to take away the PLO's right of sole representation of the Palestinian people and to ignore the PLO.

These, in short, are the principles of the program of /Palestinian/ democratic national action in Jordan at this stage, and I believe that it is the duty of all the democratic and patriotic forces there to fight and struggle to have them be achieved.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

FATAH ADVISER HANI AL-HASAN INTERVIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 320, 9 Apr 83 pp 26-28

[Interview with Hani al-Hasan, member of the Fatah Central Committee and political adviser to Yasir 'Arafat, by Sulayman Namir: "Hani al-Hasan Tells AL-MUSTAQBAL: 'We Cannot Oppose Amman, Damascus, and Cairo, and As For Beirut, We Will Never Forget What It Did For Us'"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] The current phase should be one during which we harden our positions and do not yield to any pressures.

We will show a positive attitude toward Washington as soon as we are sure that Israel is going to withdraw from Lebanon.

If efforts to achieve peace in Lebanon are thwarted, then we will find ourselves in the same trench with the Lebanese in order to help them liberate their land.

After the exit of the PLO forces from Beirut, a series of questions were brought up concerning the PLO's situation and its various positions with regard to what was going on and what was expected to happen. Although the PLO both agreed to, and even participated in, the formulation of the Arab peace plan during the Fes summit conference, many questions still remained to be asked concerning the positions taken by the Palestinians with regard to various issues which had newly cropped up in the Middle East. Such issues included the Fes peace plan, President Reagan's plan, and the PLO's relations and contacts with a number of the Arab parties such as Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The numerous meetings of the Palestinian leaders which were held after the PLO exit from Beirut did not succeed in providing a really clear picture of the positions taken by the PLO--until the holding of the meetings of the 16th session of the Palestine National Council in Algeria last February. These meetings resulted in a definitive Palestinian position with regard to many of the issues which have preoccupied the PLO in particular and the Middle East in general.

When AL-MUSTAQBAL held its interview with Mr Hani al-Hasan, member of the Fatah Central Committee and a prominent political adviser of Yasir 'Arafat, it asked him most of these questions which have been posed concerning the various positions taken by the Palestinians. Mr Hani al-Hasan started off by vehemently denying that there was any vagueness in the position taken by the Palestinians, and he went on to say the following:

"After the meetings held by the Palestine National Council, there was no more vagueness in the Palestinian position. In fact, the PLO came to have a clear view of the future. The Palestine National Council decided that this is a phase during which we must plant crops rather than a phase during which we must harvest them. The Palestine National Council took a clear position with regard to the Reagan initiative, the Brezhnev initiative, and the plan offered by the Fes summit meeting. It also adopted clear positions with regard to Palestinian relations with the various Arab parties. We as Palestinians, and as members of the Fatah movement in particular, should cease our dialogues concerning many of the issues because they have already been resolved at the meetings held by the Palestine National Council."

[Question] What are these issues that were resolved?

[Answer] The Palestine National Council decided that the Reagan initiative is not a proper basis for achieving a just and permanent solution to the Middle East problem. We all know that if the coming 2 months of June and July pass by without any action being undertaken in connection with the Reagan initiative, then this initiative will come to an end and will die. As for the Brezhnev initiative, at the present time it is not being brought up for discussion and no dialogues are being held concerning it. The Palestine National Council has taken the position to support the Brezhnev initiative because it wants to improve Soviet-Palestinian relations and not because it wants to set guidelines for the future of the Palestinians, since we know that the Brezhnev initiative right now is not being brought up for discussion. According to my understanding of the decisions made by the Palestine National Council, we have concluded that, right now, no political proposal is being offered to us which would satisfy a majority of the people in the PLO. For this reason, we must prepare to escalate our struggle and to engage in a long political and military confrontation. I say political "confrontation" because there is a difference between a political understanding and a political confrontation. The phase which we are going through right now is not a phase of political understanding.

[Question] What do you mean by a "political understanding"? With whom would there be such a political understanding?

[Answer] The political understanding which I have in mind is an understanding with the U.S., with other parties, or with the Arab nations. Those who would be content with having a political understanding should know that the legitimacy of this policy is something which no longer existed as of the time the Palestine National Council made its decisions. Consequently, if they insist on promoting their point of view, this will

result in a split among the Palestinians concerning this issue. The Palestine National Council has decided that a political understanding could be reached with the U.S. or with other parties if they changed their positions. We all know that the U.S. position has not changed and that all efforts to introduce modifications favorable to the PLO in the Reagan initiative have been a failure. A change in the U.S. position can only occur if the PLO accepts UN Security Council Resolution 242 or directly recognizes Israel--and this is something which would lead the PLO to disaster.

All of this induces us to ask the following question: What should we do concerning the political confrontation which we are now engaging in? My answer is the following: We in the PLO, after our experience in Lebanon, have now been put in a defensive situation both politically and militarily speaking. Thus all of our policies right now are policies which oppose Israeli policies. Israel wants to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In order to achieve this goal, Israel has proceeded to prolong its negotiations with Lebanon so that later on it will be too late to bring up the issue of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel has also resorted to bringing up the idea of an alternative Palestinian homeland in Jordan. Every day Israel is putting this idea into practice by expelling Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and sending them to Jordan. The result is that the number of Palestinians in Jordan is steadily increasing and the Jordanians are feeling threatened and are feeling that their nation may become an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. Israel hopes thus to bring Jordan to the point where, in order for Jordan to save itself, it will have to be silent about Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When this happens, Israel could cease bringing up the idea of an alternative Palestinian homeland. That is, proposing the idea of an alternative Palestinian homeland [will become unnecessary because of] Jordan's silence about incorporating the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in Israel. Therefore, if we Palestinians want to take charge of our destiny, we will first of all have to work toward hastening an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. If the Israelis soon withdraw from Lebanon, this will be a good thing. But if it turns out that Israel does not want to withdraw from Lebanon, then in that case we will have to considerably escalate our military activity in order to deal with the Israelis. The reason for this is that if Israel suffers many losses in Lebanon, this will force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, but Israel will remain in Lebanon if it feels that it will not be losing anything there.

[Question] Does this mean that the PLO right now has decided not to escalate its military operations against the Israeli forces in Lebanon because it wants to facilitate the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Lebanese territory?

[Answer] Right now the PLO is supporting its allies among the Lebanese National Resistance forces in their operations against the Israeli occupation because we owe this to the Lebanese resistance movement. So far the forces of the Palestinian revolution have not openly or officially entered into any confrontation with the Israeli occupation in

Lebanon because we do not want to create any justifications for Israel to continue its occupation. But if Israel says that it will stay in Lebanon, then the forces of the Palestinian revolution will openly and officially fight, along with their allies in Lebanon, against this Israeli occupation and presence. We are taking this position not only because the Palestinians have this right, but also because we owe this to Lebanon. Lebanon has suffered and has given a great deal for the sake of the Palestinians. Consequently, the only thing that the Palestinians can do is to stand by Lebanon. All those who stand by Lebanon will be helping Lebanon to achieve what it is striving for--which is the withdrawal of Israel from its territory. But if the Lebanese reach a state of desperation because of not being able to achieve an Israeli withdrawal through negotiations, then we Palestinians must be at the vanguard of those who will be resisting a continuation of Israel's occupation of Lebanon. In addition to working quickly toward bringing about an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, we, as Palestinian leaders, must make sure that no type of Palestinian-Jordanian conflict arises at any time. The reason for this is that such a conflict would serve the purposes of Israel which plans to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and this would lead to Israel expelling more of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab lands. My belief is that, although our exit from Lebanon was a great catastrophe as far as the Palestinian cause is concerned, the loss of Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation and understanding would lead to an even greater clamity in the future as far as the situation in the Middle East is concerned.

[Question] Some people are saying that the decisions made by the Palestine National Council were not really historic decisions. They say that the decisions consist of general and vague phrases. One thing which enhances this point of view is some of the conflicting statements which have been made by the Palestinians. Each party is interpreting these decisions in accordance with its own convictions. What are your comments about this?

[Answer] This is not true. My opinion is that the problem consists of the fact that the decisions made by the Palestine National Council did not provide the masses--who were anxiously awaiting these decisions--with a political policy which appeared to them to be one which would result in a solution in the direction of the establishment of a Palestinian national state. The Palestinian masses are, without a doubt, really being oppressed in Lebanon and inside the occupied Arab lands. But at this stage our only choice is to keep struggling in order to come up with a peaceful formula within which it will be possible for the Palestinian revolution to participate in political initiatives. This is why some people think that this position is a vague one. The reason is that we have said that we have made no political gains, whereas the masses believed that political gains had been achieved after the war in Lebanon. We in Fatah say that the armed struggle is like planting a crop whereas the political struggle is like harvesting the crop. We are still in the stage of planting our crop because there is no doubt that we lost the battle of Lebanon. If we had succeeded in stopping enemy forces at the Litani River, today we would be negotiating the possibility of establishing a Palestinian national state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in return for leaving

Lebanon. The current political proposal would eliminate the national role played by the PLO. The reason for this is that it is being demanded of us that, if we want to participate in the currently existing political process, we make concessions such as accepting Resolution 242 and recognizing Israel.

[Question] Does this mean that a concrete proposal has been made to the PLO?

[Answer] The U.S. is telling us the following: If you accept UN Security Council Resolution Number 242, then we will be prepared to receive representatives of the PLO and to recognize the PLO.

[Question] In your opinion, would U.S. recognition of the PLO serve to solve the problem?

[Answer] There is no doubt that U.S. recognition of the PLO would provide momentum to the Palestine cause. But the price being asked of us for this is a high one. The price is that we become a bridge by means of which the Israelis can cross over to the Arab world.

[Question] Some people are saying that the decisions made by the Palestine National Council have restricted the freedom of movement of Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] as far as his contacts with Jordan and with Egypt are concerned. Is this true?

[Answer] I do not agree with what is being said about the fact that they have restricted Abu 'Ammar's freedom of action. It would be more correct to say that these decisions have prescribed certain limits for these relations and for these contacts. The Palestine National Council decided that the PLO would not give its approval to a Jordanian initiative based on the Reagan plan. The proper basis for any such political initiative should be the Arab peace plan. This is why we are making efforts right now, particularly with Saudi Arabia, to attempt to introduce the Fes plan into the international political equation. After having gained international support for the Fes plan, right now we are endeavoring to have the U.S. adopt a more moderate position vis-a-vis this plan. Important developments have recently occurred concerning this matter, but they have not been sufficient and I do not want to talk about them right now.

[Question] What are the main features of the future steps to be taken in conjunction with the political initiatives being undertaken in the Middle East?

[Answer] This depends on what we see happening with the Reagan initiative.

[Question] Will the U.S. give King Husayn what it promised to him? Will the Israelis withdraw from Lebanon? Will agreement be reached concerning such a withdrawal? Will the U.S. be able to prevent the Israelis from building more settlements in the occupied lands?

[Answer] These are the questions being presented right now by King Husayn. If the Jordanian monarch succeeds in achieving good results concerning them, then his position will become stronger, especially with regard to cooperation with the PLO and support from the Arab nations. If this happens, then we will study the situation. But as for right now, we should realize that if we show any readiness to make concessions, then this path of concessions will become an endless one.

[Question] Would it be possible for Jordan to conduct negotiations without the participation or approval of the PLO?

[Answer] There have been many attempts to drive a wedge between the Palestinians and the Jordanians. One such attempt has involved efforts to have Jordan engage in negotiations without the PLO. This is something designed to create apprehensions on the part of both parties. We feel that there is no reason to be afraid of the possibility that King Husayn will participate in such negotiations alone. The reason for this is that King Husayn, who has many times demonstrated his exceptional skill and ability to wage political struggles, realizes that the U.S. is either unable or unwilling to put the necessary pressure on Israel. But what we are apprehensive about is the possibility that King Husayn, at some time or other, may cease participating in the political initiatives taking place in the Middle East on the pretext that the PLO is not cooperating with him concerning the current political initiative. If this happens, then there will be a freeze in Palestinian-Jordanian relations. We Palestinians must make sure that the bridges remain open between us and the Jordanians. The reason for this is that the next phase will be a decisive one in the history of the Middle East, and whatever happens will affect the Middle East for the next 10 years. The present time and the next few weeks are a time which will be very crucial with regard to the future of both the Jordanians and the Palestinians. We Palestinians and Jordanians right now see in front of us a destiny which we must confront together. This is why we feel that it is important to keep Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation on clear-cut bases. We want no duplicity in our dealings because we want this cooperation to be permanent cooperation. Right now the Palestine National Council has not given its approval for us to form a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to take action on the basis of the Reagan plan. However, if dramatic new developments occur in the Middle East, such as Israel withdrawing from Lebanon and the U.S. taking a more positive position vis-a-vis the plan produced by the Arab summit meeting at Fes, then it will be possible for a high-level Palestinian meeting to take place in order that the Palestinian position be reviewed.

[Question] Do you believe that King Husayn is capable of withstanding the pressures to which he is currently being subjected to have him enter into negotiations even without the approval of the PLO?

[Answer] After the signing of the Camp David agreements, King Husayn was subjected to pressures which were stronger than the pressures he is being subjected to now. He was being pressured to participate in the Camp David process. Many parties participated in putting pressure on him, but King

Husayn staunchly resisted these pressures and did not enter into the Camp David process. And I believe that King Husayn will also be able to resist these pressures this time, especially if we stand behind him and support his position.

[Question] Do you believe that the Egyptian-Jordanian rapprochement has the objective of getting Jordan to enter into negotiations one way or another?

[Answer] It is not Egypt which will decide whether or not King Husayn participates in the Reagan peace plan. The Egyptian-Jordanian rapprochement which is taking place right now has more to do with the Iraqi-Iranian war than it does with the political initiative in the Middle East. We must recognize the fact that the Egypt of today is not the Egypt of Sadat, and that Egypt has succeeded in emerging from its condition of isolation. We Palestinians should begin basing our relations with Egypt on new premises rather than on old premises. The situation in Egypt has changed. Sadat is gone, and President Husni Mubarak has taken over in Egypt. We all realize that President Mubarak is still, to some degree, a captive of the situation which was created by Sadat and which he has not yet totally overcome. Right now he is striving to create a new reality in Egypt and a new regime, and in doing so he is benefiting from the experience of both Sadat and 'Abd-al-Nasir. At the same time, we have to say that Egypt's role in the Camp David process has dwindled and come to an end. A new phase has emerged and Egypt once again has a presence [in the Arab world]. This is why we should reorient our policy toward Egypt. We should revise this policy on the basis of the fact that Egypt has a national role which we must support and promote in order to render ineffective efforts by those who do not wish to see Egypt once again become part of the Arab world. President Mubarak right now is trying to restore equilibrium to the national role played by Egypt. This is an important step, and we should help President Mubarak to take it. And this requires that we take a harder line in our political policy and take a more patriotic position than others are taking.

[Question] Now that Egypt has been brought up, what is your comment concerning the "misunderstanding" which arose between the PLO and Egypt after the decisions made by the Palestine National Council led Egypt to mount a large-scale media attack on the PLO?

[Answer] There is no doubt that this media attack was an unjust one and there was no justification for it being such a large-scale one. A commentary was issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the decisions made by the Palestine National Council, and we were able to understand this.

Let me say quite frankly that there are two Arab nations vis-a-vis which we must have a clear-cut policy:

The first nation is Syria. With Syria we have a sort of Catholic marriage in which there is no divorce. We consider that the Syrian Army is the foundation of any military option taken with regard to the enemy. Consequently, it is necessary for us to have once again clear-cut relations with Syria. I say "clear-cut" relations, and not relations involving flattery and politeness. The reason I am saying this is that, before the battle of Beirut, we had a love complex concerning Syria and we began talking about positions taken by Syria which turned out to be non-existent. After the battle of Beirut we were afflicted with a hate complex concerning Syria, we began to bring up issues which were not objective issues, and we began to deal with matters on an emotional basis which was far removed from our common political interest. We should realize that, in spite of the difficult experiences which we have had in our relations with Syria, there is no alternative to having Syrian-Palestinian relations which will lead to the establishment of a strategic concept for joint cooperation and action--without this concept taking on a polarizing nature which would serve to divide the Arabs into two or three different camps. At this stage the Syrian-Palestinian strategic concept should be a concept which is a Syrian-Palestinian-Jordanian concept. The reason I say this is that there is no escaping the fact that these three powers must engage in joint cooperation and action. The reason for this is that, in the end, they are the powers which are the targets [of their enemies] and they are the powers which will decide the fate of the region. So this is the first nation with which we should have new and clear-cut relations.

The second nation with which we should have clear-cut relations is Egypt. We should begin establishing a new policy for cooperating with Egypt because Egypt has changed. We must work on having Egypt once again become part of the Arab world. When Egypt is part of the Arab world, the Arabs are stronger, and all of us, taken together, were weaker when Egypt deserted the Arab ranks.

[Question] What is your opinion concerning the statement that, if the Palestinians do not enter secret negotiations right now, Israel will continue to push ahead with the building of settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and consequently these areas will be lost to the Palestinians?

[Answer] In political science they call this "negotiating with a gun pointed at your head." My opinion is that whoever accepts the idea of negotiating on this basis is only giving his approval and signature to what his enemy is imposing upon him. The Palestinian political leadership, when taking any decision, takes such a decision on the basis of its view concerning the future rather than on the basis of feeling pressured by current circumstances. The situation of the Palestinian masses is not the only consideration. Another consideration has to be a clear-cut view of the future. No one doubts the fact that the Palestinian masses are undergoing great suffering in the occupied lands and that the Israelis are building settlements and are conducting a terror campaign there. But if our Israeli enemy senses that we are yielding to

these pressures, then he will continue with this policy of his and it will never end. We should reply to this situation by escalating our struggle rather than by capitulating. Our experience with the Beirut negotiations has taught us that, when you fail to obtain something on the front or in battle, you will not succeed in obtaining it at the negotiation table. Negotiations are not a matter of how skillfully one speaks, nor are they a matter of policies struggling with each other. They are a matter of the balance of forces. When we won the battle at the museum, we won the right to make our exit from Beirut on our terms. In view of the pressures which are being put on us, the present stage for us should be a phase in which we harden our positions and do not yield to any pressures--whether they are pressures concerning the occupied Arab lands or any other types of political pressures.

[Question] So far we have not seen a clear-cut position on the part of the Palestinians with regard to the matter of having contacts with the so-called "democratic forces" inside Israel. What is your opinion about this?

[Answer] At the meetings of the Palestine National Council we said that we were in favor of continuing contacts with forces inside the Zionist entity which reject the racist Zionist ideology. But we rejected the idea of having contacts with any other forces there. The reason for this is that, if we have contacts with any political forces in Israel on the pretext that we wish to penetrate the lines of the enemy, we would not be doing a service to our Palestinian people inside the occupied territories. In fact, if we did this, we would be aborting their struggle inside the occupied lands.

9468

CSO: 4404/326

INDIA

LONDON ARABIC PAPER REPORTS INTERVIEW WITH GANDHI

PM092201 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 7 May 83 pp 1, 2

[Report on interview with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Faruz Luqman in New Delhi--date not given]

[Text] Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has stated that her government will do its best to promote a peaceful solution to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, particularly because the recent nonaligned summit conference held in the Indian capital entrusted her with the task of mediation between the two warring parties. She cautioned, however, that there will be no quick settlement, adding that no progress has yet been made.

In an exclusive interview with ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT and its twin ARAB NEWS, Mrs Gandhi said that she is proud that the two combatants placed their trust in India to exert more efforts in this respect.

Mrs Gandhi warned that such a war cannot be ended quickly. Referring to her foreign minister's shuttle between the two capitals since the outbreak of hostilities, she added: "I admit that so far we have achieved nothing."

In reply to a question about the U.S. role in Lebanon, she said that the United States has considerable influence throughout the world and could use some of that influence to bring about an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Regarding President Reagan's peace plan for the Middle East, Mrs Gandhi said that India can do nothing if the Arabs themselves reject the plan.

When it was suggested to her that the plan contains some good points, she said: That may be so, but what is important is that "the parties directly involved accept it. We are constantly in touch with them. Not long ago one of our senior officials went to the region for consultation and contact with these parties."

Mrs Gandhi also spoke about relations with Pakistan. She expressed the hope that no new war would break out between the two countries. She added that she was endeavoring to improve relations with Pakistan.

Answering a question about the reasons for her concern regarding Pakistan's rearmament plans to confront the Soviet threat in Afghanistan, she said that to keep up with this rearmament is very costly for her country.

Asked why she does not speak out openly against the flagrant Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, she said that she has done so on several occasions, in Washington and also in Moscow, and that she is against foreign interference of any kind in other countries' domestic affairs.

Mrs Gandhi also spoke about the tragedy of Assam in northern India, where thousands of Muslims were the victims of ugly massacres recently. She denied that her decision to hold elections there was even indirectly responsible for the massacres, which claimed over 4,000 lives, most of them Muslim refugees from Bangladesh. She said that local political and living conditions complicate matters. She added that she almost reached a reasonable agreement with the rebels, but that some parties changed their minds at the last moment--which made her suspect foreign hands at work.

Asked to identify these hands, she declined to give a direct answer. She did mention some books published recently in the United States giving the impression that the CIA might have interfered in the affairs of Assam, but she made no direct accusations.

Mrs Gandhi answered 29 out of 30 questions put to her. The question she declined to answer was about daughter-in-law Maneka, widow of her son Sanjay, who recently formed an opposition party. Mrs Gandhi accused her of working for foreign powers which had probably planted her in that position from the very beginning. She added that her daughter-in-law's behavior was strange even during her married life. This is an extremely serious charge, because it means that the aforementioned powers paved the way for her son's marriage to Maneka for political reasons.

CSO: 4-00/1131

DALAI LAMA TO RESUME SENDING DELEGATES TO TIBET

BK080939 Hong Kong AFP in English 0819 GMT 8 May 83

[Text] New Delhi, May 8 (AFP)--Tibetan god king, the Dalai Lama, said today in Calcutta that he would resume sending refugee delegations to Tibet soon to study the situation there, but ruled out his return in the near future to his former, Buddhist homeland.

"My return to Tibet is not important.... The thing is, how best I can be useful to them (Tibetans).... I feel I can serve the people better from outside," the 48-year-old Buddhist deity told reporters.

Analysts said the Dalai Lama's intent to resume what has come to be known as "delegation diplomacy" was important. They said China had tried in 1979 to persuade the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile here to return to Tibet, now an autonomous region of China.

Contacts between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese suffered a major setback when the second five-member refugee delegation on a probing mission in Tibet was asked to shorten its tour following an unprecedented demonstration of support for Tibetan freedom by 2,000 people in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa on July 29, 1980.

Since then two delegations have visited China; but early last year the Chinese Embassy here told the Tibetans in India that it would allow no more visits.

"The ultimate solution of the Tibetan issue rested on the acceptance of the people's right to self-determination," the Dalai Lama said, reiterating his often repeated stand that China should allow an internationally supervised plebiscite in Tibet to determine if the Tibetans wanted to remain within China.

Analysts have ruled out China accepting such a suggestion, but they said the present Chinese leadership wanted to solve the issue.

The Dalai Lama said that although the situation in Tibet had "slightly improved," the "suffering of the people continued."

"Even today our people do not have any religious freedom," he said.

The Chinese Embassy here, contacted by telephone, refused to comment on the Dalai Lama's statement today, but one highly placed Indian source said China might agree to accept the "delegation diplomacy."

The Dalai Lama met reporters on his return from Arunachal Pradesh, a north-eastern Indian state claimed by China. His 45-day tour there, his first since he fled to India along with some 70,000 Tibetans in 1959, risked sparking off a diplomatic row between India and China, observers said.

But the Chinese only issued a statement in Beijing saying that the territory belonged to China, without commenting on the Dalai Lama's visit.

Indian diplomats said China was caught in a diplomatic bind. They said it could not protest the Dalai Lama's visit to an area that it claimed as its own.

"This might have been the reason why the Chinese preferred to remain silent instead of raising a row over his visit to Arunachal Pradesh," an Indian official said.

During his stay in the territory, the temporal and religious leader of the six million Tibetans held "kalachakra" initiation--Buddhist tantric rites. He also met tens of thousands of Buddhists living in the area and travelled as close as 10 kilometres (six miles) to the Sino-Indian border.

The Dalai Lama said letters and representations he had received from Tibetans asking him not to return had influenced his decision to remain in exile.

A majority of the Tibetans inside Tibet and those living in self-imposed exile in India, Nepal, Bhutan and Western countries, do not favour their leader's return, a prominent young Tibetan leader has said.

Tosang Jinpa, who leads the 10,000-strong Tibetan Youth Congress, said the Dalai Lama, now based in Dharmasala, north India, had been besieged with appeals asking him not to return.

"The Chinese call is a mere propaganda to deceive world opinion and avoid the real issue of Tibet," Mr Jinpa was quoted as saying.

CSO: 4600/1131

ISLAMIC CENTER ALLEGEDLY SUBJECTED TO 'DIPLOMATIC INTRIGUE'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 May 83 p 3

[Text] After the forcible closure of the Washington Islamic Center on orders of the so-called Moslem ambassadors, a new campaign is under way to deceive the Moslems. A letter, which appears quite innocent at first reading, is being circulated to the various mosques and Islamic Centers in North America. The letter is signed by one 'H.S. Hamod, Ph. D, Administrator-Program Planner' of the Islamic Center.

The letter reads in part: "We are pleased to inform you that the Islamic Center is once again serving you on behalf of the Moslem ambassadors who are the Board of Governors of the Center....

"...We have Islamic materials as well as Qur'ans and other texts on Islam...."

The letter then goes on to allege that "at present the Mosque is closed for repairs and design modifications.... In the meantime we are open as a Center in order to serve your Islamic needs."

Such blatant lies can fool only the most gullible. The Mosque was not closed for repairs. It was attacked in the early hours of March 5 by armed agents, hired by the Moslem ambassadors (see CRESCENT INTERNATIONAL April 1-15, 1983). The Moslem community is forcibly barred from entry into the Center by club-wielding, hired armed guards.

The front gate of the Mosque has been welded shut on the express orders of the ambassadors who claim to be Moslems. Allah Subhanahu wa'ta'ala says in the Qur'an: 'And who is more unjust than he who prevents (men) from the Masjids of Allah, that His name should be remembered in them, and strives to ruin them? (As for) these, it was not proper for them that they shall meet with disgrace in this world, and they shall have great chastisement in the Hereafter' (Al-Qur'an 2 114).

The choice of H.S. Hamod 'Ph.D' an Ariel Sharon look-alike, as Administrator-Program Planner is also revealing. Hamod is of Lebanese extraction and used to edit a magazine, the MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVE. The magazine was unabashedly pro-Saudi, supportive of US-zionist conspiracies in the Middle East and lauded Anwar Sadat's surrender to the Zionist entity.

Hamod's pretence that the Center was closed for 'repairs and design modifications' has led to speculation that part of it may be converted into a museum!

Despite the un-Islamic behavior of the ambassadors, the 'Committee for a Free Mosque' still opted for an Islamic solution. They sent a message to the ambassadors offering to hold a dialogue 'if they were willing to have the principles of the Qur'an as the basis of discussion.' But if they wanted discussions or negotiations from a power position, the Committee told them 'we are not interested.'

Their excellencies are not interested in the application of the principles of the Qur'an. They want to be governed only by US law and announced that the Center will remain closed 'for public safety' and there will be no discussions until 'the demonstrations cease.'

There has been no threat to public safety. The only people to have suffered so far are members of the Moslem community who have been attacked by the agents of these ambassadors.

At a time when all Moslems should support the Washington Moslem community, some representatives of the MSA in Ann Arbor (see letters page 4) and other supposedly 'revolutionary' Moslem have established new trends in hypocrisy. Under the guise of giving both sides an equal opportunity, they have parroted Saudi propaganda that the Islamic Center was being turned into a Shi'a Center and these Moslems are indulging in rhetorical overkill! Presumably that justifies the attack on and forcible closure of the Mosque by beer-drinking security guards!

USC: 4600/625

ROYALIST PAPER DISCUSSES TEHRAN-PARIS RELATIONS

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 25 Apr 83 pp 1-2

[Text] Today, France is the major obstacle that Khomeyni must deal with, whatever the cost. On the ideological level, French civilization is the living antithesis of the Islamic pseudo-civilization of the faghhih. Intellectually, no compromise is possible between the homeland of Boltaire and the Oumma of the integrist. In the economic sector, the interests of the governments of Paris and Tehran conflict on all levels. The extremist shi'ites can only persist in their folly by daily making massive sales of oil. The Socialist Party government can become healthy only if there is a spectacular drop in energy cost. In respect to defense, Mitterrand and Khomeyni are fated to confront each other across Iraq. For the past 10 years France has been linked to Baghdad by trade agreements that are vital to both parties. It is public knowledge that these agreements do not cover only the opening of major construction projects or building of nuclear power plants. They also involve the military field. The time is past when the Iraqi army was equipped only by the USSR. Today, its most sophisticated weapons are French. Without France, Khomeyni might have had hope of defeating the Ba'th troops.

This explains the "Imam's attitude. For him, destroying French influence is not only a theoretical objective; it is an absolute necessity. To this end, he has every reason to believe that, when the time comes, his usual methods of destabilization will be particularly effective. The time is favorable for him, and he is aware of it. France is isolated on the international scene. The United States, however substantial the pledges made to it, cannot but desire the fall of the socialist-communist majority, whose very existence is a challenge to its own ideology. Germany is of the same opinion, and Italy follows both the United States and Germany. The United Kingdom would like nothing more than the weakening of France. As for the Israelis, they no longer hide their present hostility for the socialist leaders, of whom they had expected so much and who so greatly disappointed them. Seen from within, France appears weak and divided. The rifts in the opposition have been added to the divisions within the majority. The political struggles are extremely virulent, and in some areas there is an atmosphere of civil war. Khomeyni's henchmen are aware of this situation and, seeing their enemy is in a position of weakness, are getting ready to pour in through the open breach. Their cockiness is even greater since there are 3 million Muslims living in France, including 800,000 Iranian nationals. They provide a favorable field for subversive activities. Moreover, fate has it that they have the field to themselves. The organizations that until recently held the membership of the Muslim community in France have lost their appeal. The celebrated Association of Algerians in Western Europe has been no exception to this trend. A direct

offshoot of Military Security, it has survived with difficulty the breakup of that police force by President Chadli. For at least several months now it has no longer been playing its unifying role. A vacuum has ensued that the fundamentalists are rushing to fill. This is even more of a concern because the Algerians, after the resignation of S.H. Boubaker, have taken over the Paris mosque, which is thus in danger of becoming a center of propaganda for extremist elements.

Moreover, in the near future the Islamic Republic is being offered a rare opportunity. The UN General Assembly has chosen Paris as the site for a UNESCO session. Among those expected in the French capital are Yasir Arafat and Ahmed Ben Bella, whose names are synonymous with agitation and subversion. We know from a definite source that the integristes are making massive preparations for this event. The Iranian Embassy, in Place d'Iena, serves as a haven for a raft of agitators from all the Afro-Asian countries, and from there they issue instructions, leaflets, posters, and appeals for demonstrations. They favor assassinations, knowing full well that the reaction of the French people would be unpredictable if they are victims to multiple killings such as other countries, Italy for example, have experienced. At any rate, some unrest seems inevitable. When the anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising was observed, representatives of the Jewish community in France warned the authorities that they would not tolerate any provocation by PLO leaders. What will happen when the fundamentalists run up against the ultra-Zionists? The worst is possible. It is even probable. If a catastrophe does occur, all the French Government's partners will secretly rejoice, from Moscow to Washington, and including Bonn and London. However, Khomeyni would be the real winner, for he would have put his power to a brilliant test. If he showed himself capable of upsetting a great Western state, he would make all the Eastern countries tremble and impose his law from the Indus to the Atlantic. The danger is real. If nothing is done to avert it, the catastrophe is unavoidable. For the present, there is no reaction in Paris. As for us, we have marked the date. History will be the judge.

492)

CSO: 4e19/59

GENERAL SECRETARY OF PUNJAB NDP INTERVIEWED, SLAMS JI

Rawalpindi HURMAT in Urdu 7 Apr 83 pp 12-14

/Interview with Farooq Qureshi, secretary general of the defunct National Democratic Party, Punjab; date and place not given/

/Excerpts/ Mr Farooq Qureshi is the general secretary of the defunct National Democratic Party (NDP) in the Province of Punjab. He was an official in NAP /National Awami Party/ before that. He talked on the present political situation with Shahida Tabassum of HURMAT's Lahore bureau.

/Question/ Mr Farooq, the developing countries lack political freedom and the governments of these countries are subject to the control of one of the two superpowers. In this context, what do you think of Pakistan's policies?

/Answer/ I agree with you fully. The superpowers and the developing countries have different interests. It is the duty of the leaders and governments of the developing countries to develop policies for their countries that remove them from the friction that exists between the two superpowers. Our country is in a critical geographical region from this standpoint. The fact is that our earlier governments did not recognize the significance of this. Had they formed a policy recognizing the importance of this fact, our country would have been free from the influence of the superpowers. This way we would not have wasted our country's resources and production in unproductive ways and would have invested in its future growth. Even without oil, our country would have become one of the richest in this area. We would have controlled the markets of developing countries near and far. Our experts would have been really involved in the country's industrial and economic planning. We have, however, lost all this. Because of our overinvolvement in politics, our leaders made us a puppet in the hands of a superpower. We go looking for a friend across the seven seas and have developed enmity with our neighbors.

As for leadership, to get rid of the repeated implementation of martial law in the country, the political parties should unite long enough to assume the political responsibilities of the country.

/Question/ Mr Farooq, your party has joined the MRD for the sake of our nation and has demonstrated unity and cooperation with some other political parties. But your party does not agree with an important group, the defunct Jamaat-e-Islami. Your differences with this group have greatly increased since the murder of Arbab Sikandar.

/Answer/ Jamaat-e Islami (JI) was a religious-oriented, preaching party when it started, but it began to take part in politics 2 or 3 years after Pakistan was established. This party made more financial investment in politics than other parties but still it could not show any notable success in the central or provincial legislative assemblies. The members of this party feel that they cannot succeed through democratic principles and have begun to use undemocratic methods. This party uses violence in the name of democracy. Even now we claim that the Arbab Sikandar murder was a political act and JI is involved in it. One of the murderers, Maulana Abdullah, has an important position in JI and is visited in jail by the leaders of JI and JI is giving him assistance. JI members know that they cannot succeed following democratic methods and this murder illustrates their beliefs. The Jamaat wants to establish fascism in this country through the back door even though it has failed to establish an ideological fascism.

/Question/ Members of NDP have accused JI of misappropriating funds received for helping Afghan refugees. Is there any truth in this accusation?

/Answer/ This is true. The Jamaat did not have so much money during Maulana Mowdoodi's era. There was a rapid increase in the resources of Jamaat after his death. How did it happen? It all started with the foreign aid for the Afghan refugees. This money never reaches the refugees and is used by JI. If the Jamaat believes that these accusations are baseless then they should publish audited accounts of the foreign aid received for Afghan refugees. That money is not their personal property. The Jamaat is involving Afghan refugees in this country's politics. This is wrong. The refugees have simply taken shelter in this country and are not its citizens. Now, I will tell you how Arbab Sikandar was killed. There were student elections in Peshawar University. Some Afghan refugees carrying modern weapons established themselves in the university. The Jamiat-e Tulba lost badly even though it had 50 or 60 cars and the support of armed groups. The students complained about the group trying to influence university elections. Arbab Sikander complained to Fazle Haq, the governor of NWFP, and he was murdered in retaliation for this. The murderer of Arbab is not a resident of Swat and belongs to a city across the NWFP border.

/Question/ JI claims that the money they distribute among the Afghan refugees is raised by them through their own resources.

/Answer/ They do not have any of personal resources they claim to have. The Jamaat should respond to the accusations made by Maulana Mowdoodi's son, Haider Farooq Mowdoodi. He has said that a very small portion of Jamaat's income is raised in the country and that the lion's share comes from other countries. Why do the Jamaat people not reply to this question raised by a person who is one of their own?

/Question/ Mr Farooq, the present government promised twice to hold elections and both times they were postponed. The government said that the elections were postponed at the insistence of some politicians.

/Answer/ I do not think that the military is so obedient as to postpone elections on demand from a politician nor are the politicians strong enough to make the army march at their beck and call. Were there a politician with such power, he would not need to call the army, he would himself take over the government with popular support.

/Question/ The Bangladesh Government has decided to establish relations with the Babrak Karmal government. Your party is also in favor of talking directly with Babrak Karmal in order to solve the Afghan crisis. Please explain your stand on this issue.

/Answer/ The problem is that we are of a very romantic nature and tend to hide from reality out of habit. We consider it appropriate to have a UN representative present during the Afghan talks and feel shy when the UN representatives leave. These are simply diplomatic formalities. I do not think it is a bad idea to talk directly with the Karmal government in order to solve the Afghan problem. As a result, Pakistan would gain safer borders, about which there is now so much concern. I believe that were there a representative government in Pakistan, there would never have been any danger from our northern border. The Bangladesh Government has announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Babrak Karmal government. I consider it a good decision and welcome it.

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CSO: 4656/161

COLUMN DISCUSSES POLITICAL CLIMATE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 May 83 p 6

["Karachi Diary" column by Aey Aey]

[Text]

Politics in our country has gradually been reduced to press conferences, press statements, denials, clarifications, rejoinders and condemnations. That is all.

What is said by someone today is denied, contradicted or condemned by another the next day.

The week under review was full of all this. Almost daily, the newspapers carried statements of political leaders which were denied or contradicted the next day.

J.A. Rahim, Vice President of the Tehrike Istiqlal, addressing a meeting of his party at Lakham House, declared in unequivocal terms that he did not believe in political alliances. In his opinion, a party with a pro-people programme and roots in the masses does not need any co-operation or alliance with any other political party or organisation.

Next day, Syed Munir Shah, the acting President of T.I., in a Press conference clarified that what J.A. Rahim said was in reference to the 1970 elections, when Mr. Rahim was Secretary General of the Pakistan Peoples Party. His views had nothing to do with the MRD.

In the same Press conference, Munir Shah declared that his party was not prepared to accept the 30-point programme of the National Democratic Party.

The other day there were a number of statements clarifying that the programme referred to was prepared by a four-member committee of MRD of which the NDP chief Sardar Mazari happened to be the chairman, and it had nothing to do with the NDP.

Next day I called on Sardar Mazari, was preparing to go to Nawabshah to attend the convention of the Nawabshah district NDP. As soon as I referred to the

Press conference of Syed Munir Ali Shah, he almost exploded, "Why should I go to the MRD with my programme? They pressed me to accept the chairmanship of the committee. Reluctantly, I did, but I knew at the very outset that in the end, this would happen. My apprehensions came true."

Sardar Sahieb threatened that if the programme was not adopted by the MRD, he would resign from the chairmanship of the committee.

CONFUSION

Earlier, a statement by Rao Rashid, Chairman of the Punjab PPP, created confusion in the MRD circles.

Musheer Ahmed Pesh Imam, Khawaja Khairuddin and even Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi came out with statements condemning and contradicting Rao Rashid.

A similar statement by Farooque Leghari, Secretary General of the PPP, has caused a lot of confusion in the MRD.

Mr. Leghari said that by the 1973 Constitution, he meant the constitution as it stood on July 4, 1977.

The MRD leaders particularly Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, were taken aback by this statement. Mazari was of the firm opinion that the PPP should clarify its stand on the Constitution, because in no case was he prepared to accept the Constitution with amendments enacted during the PPP tenure except the one passed by Parliament unanimously, i.e., the Qadiani amendment.

The latest came from Nafees Siddiqui, the expelled Information Secretary of the T.I. and currently Secretary General of the National

Council of Civil Liberties. He called a luncheon Press conference the other day only to say that the MRD has failed to fill the political vacuum created due to the imposition of martial law. His advice to convert this failure into success was that the MRD should gradually turn itself into an election alliance and give the people a programme conducive to the present conditions.

The same day, Perwaiz Saleh, Vice President of the Qaumi Mahaz-e Azadi, used all sorts of jargon to explain the situation with which the country and the nation was confronted today. He brushed aside all talk about the differences in MRD as mere rumours and wishful thinking of those who were afraid of the MRD.

The news from Nawabshah said Sardar Mazari was of the view that the MRD had been infested by agents of the Government.

AFGHANS

Meanwhile, the 'Jamaate Islami is more concerned about the Afghan refugee, than the people in their own country.

Once I asked a very prominent leader of Jamaat the reason for its passion for the people from Afghanistan. "They have saved us from the Soviet onslaught," was his reply.

"How about the Biharees in Bangladesh?"

"Well, that is altogether a different issue."

How it could be a different issue, I could not understand, but this was his explanation of the policy of his party towards the problem.

Sometimes the statements of J.I. leaders are interestingly self-contradictory. They demand elec-

tions under the 1973 Constitution, but on the basis of proportional representation.

They ask for the lifting of the bann from all political parties, at the same time suggesting that if this not possible, at least the parties which believe in Islam and the ideology of Pakistan should be allowed to work.

The Pakistan Muslim League of the Peer Saheb Pagara is another great party of this country.

They also want the restoration of democracy and the Constitution in the country, but a democracy and a Constitution which suits them.

According to them, first a political government led by the PML should be inducted into power. The Constitution should be amended to balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister, and then enough time should be provided to the PML to organise itself in a manner that it may emerge as a single majority party, and only then, elections should be held.

The JUP of Maulana Noorani is busier with the preaching of Islam abroad and has little time for the people here.

All this shows that we, the people of this country, are being led by novices and amateurs in the political field. Whenever they find time from their normal business, they issue a press statement or call a Press conference.

In conditions like this, their allegation against President Ziaul Haq that, he has usurped power and has no intention of handing power back to the politician appears baseless. In a situation like this, who would not be tempted to do what the President has done, or is doing.

POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS ON BIZENJO DISCUSSED

Rawalpindi HURMAT in Urdu 31 Mar 83 pp 23-24

/Column by Abdul Baluch: "Letter From Quetta"/

/Excerpts/ Even though a year has passed since Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil was murdered, the government has not allowed his close friend, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, president of the /Pakistan/ National Party, and other friends to visit Khalil's ancestral village to pay homage to him. It appears that Mr Bizenjo is not allowed to go outside of his district and his party has begun to make statements to newspapers on this issue. We are not aware of his personal plans, but political sources have expressed the view that if the government removes restrictions on his movements, Bizenjo could get the NDP /National Democratic Party/ and PNP on one platform. Perhaps such a happening would have made Mr Mazari mad, forcing him to establish his own party.

In the context of restrictions on Bizenjo, we must mention David Peach of BBC's Eastern Service, who visited Quetta for 4 days. In addition to meeting the former governor, Akbar Bugti, and the former attorney general, Yahya Bakhtiar, he met several other people in the state. His meetings, however, were restricted to people living in Quetta. He also visited a refugee camp. He came to the Press Club at the invitation of veteran journalist and member of Majlis-e Shoora Malik Mohammad Ramazan and talked with Baluchi journalists. He said that people he talked with expressed concern for freedom of the press, political rights and other problems. In answer to a question, he said that no one had made any mention of "Greater Baluchistan" to him. People talked about their political rights, however. He also said that he was not sure how many people or whom these people he talked to represented. He said he would return to Quetta again.

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CSO: 4656/161

POLITICIANS ADVISED TO GO EASY ON MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS

Rawalpindi HURMAT in Urdu 7 Apr 83 p 5

/Article by Zahid Malik: "Politicians Should Also Think"/

/Excerpt/ The heckling at some of the veteran politicians' meetings and their mutual disagreements are now common knowledge and are forcing people to question the ability of these leaders to work together and "establish democracy" when they cannot even work together. For this same reason, people are ignoring the speeches these leaders make in support of the restoration of democracy.

Similar to these daily fights between veteran politicians are the efforts of some "historian" politicians to undermine the name of our founder, Quaide-e Azam, and our national ideology. Both of these groups are losing face. Mr Abid Zuberi's statement on Independence Day falls in this category. In that speech, he said that "There is no other God but Allah" was not the slogan of Pakistan during the struggle for independence. We are amazed at such poisonous utterances from a politician like Abid Zuberi against the country that has made him a millionaire.

Anyhow, this is not the time for explanations. We would like to tell the politicians that if they do not read the handwriting on the wall, do not develop unity among themselves, do not rid their ranks of black sheep and elements hostile to the nation and are not willing to opt for the security of Pakistan, the word "politician" will become a dirty word here. We especially would like to urge politicians such as Mr Abid Zuberi that they not become enemies of the country by showing enmity toward the government. Governments come and go. President Zia, despite his powers, is after all a mortal being. Today Zia is in power as the result of the 1977 movement; these politicians might gain power one of these days. Do they consider themselves ready for such a role should they be required to play it in near future?

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CSO: 4656/161

MUSLIM LEAGUE'S FUTURE COURSE, PAGARA'S POSITION UNCERTAIN

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Apr 83 p 9

/Article by Iqbal Riaz: "Peshawar: It Does Not Appear That the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Muslim League Will Be Held"/

/Text/ According to certain responsible circles of the North West Frontier Province, the meeting of the defunct Muslim League's central executive committee is not expected to be held in the province this April, as a result of which certain league circles are speculating about the policy of Pir Pagara Sharif. In the meeting of the defunct Muslim League held last month in Islamabad under the chairmanship of Pir Pagara, the matters discussed included the future policy of the Muslim League. Muslim League members in the North West Frontier Province in particular have insisted that the Muslim League determine the course it intends to follow and decide whether it will support or oppose the government.

Thus, it was decided that a meeting of the Muslim League's central executive committee would be held in April to arrive at a decision regarding the league's policy. Peshawar was selected as the site of the meeting so as not to give offense to any North West Frontier Province league members. Upon being asked, certain Muslim League members in the province said that a meeting of the Muslim League's central executive committee does not appear to be possible in the current month. Pir Pagara is not expected to call a meeting in May either; he will continue to postpone the meeting until a political structure is presented by President Zia.

It is believed that Pir Pagara, who now regards the 1973 constitution as a closed book, will accept the political structure. These circles consider the statement of Amir Maulana Fateh Mohammad Khan of the North West Frontier Province's defunct Jamaat-e Islami noteworthy because in it he suggested that if the Muslim League, Jamaat-e Islami and Jamiatul Ulema-e Islam (Darkhasti group) were to unite, they could exert considerable pressure on the government. The North West Frontier Province's Muslim League members are not expressing any definite opinions yet as to what their reaction would be if Pir Pagara should accept President Zia's political structure. The defunct Muslim League's provincial chairman, Mian Mohammad Iqbal, is a strong supporter of the 1973 constitution rather than of any political structure. He maintains that if the 1973 constitution is ignored, no such constitution will be drawn up in the future; there is the further possibility that certain left-wing parties will again raise the issue of provincial autonomy.

JAMAAT-E ISLAMI MAKING GAINS IN BALUCHISTAN

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Apr 83 pp 9, 12

/Article by Aziz Bhatti: "The Young Are Active in Every Political Party"/

/Excerpts/ Quetta--Almost all of the political parties complain that none of them has the wholesale freedom enjoyed by Jamaat-e Islami in political and social activities. In this connection, actions to aid the Afghan refugees are mentioned in particular. Jamaat-e Islami members maintain that other parties do not volunteer to undertake this charitable work. Both sides are right to a certain extent. Jamaat-e Islami is also accused of cooperating with the government; the defunct NDP /National Democratic Party/ is especially insistent on this accusation whereas one of the leaders of Tahrike-e Istiqlal says that the government is collaborating with Jamaat-e Islami and not vice versa. It seems that on the political front, Jamaat-e Islami is once again the target of its political fraternity.

In Baluchistan, in addition to becoming the target of criticism by other parties, Jamaat-e Islami has for the first time become a challenge as well. This party is working nowadays in a manner not seen in the past. An important change that Jamaat-e Islami has made in its new political approach is that it has entrusted its leadership to the young instead of to the old. This change is not confined to Jamaat-e Islami, and other parties as well have entrusted their leadership to the young. Jamaat-e Islami has young Baluchi members such as Abdul Majid Mengal and Amanullah Baluch; Tahrik-e Istiqlal has, in addition to Khuda-e Nur /sic/, and Anvar Durani, all of whom are educated young men.

The organization of like-minded students are the strength of political parties; now even the leadership of the parties is falling into the hands of the young.

As a result of the change in Jamaat-e Islami's political approach, the party's leadership has come into the hands of not only the young but Baluchi youth. These young Baluchis have adopted the same course in general politics as in tribal politics, a course that is characteristic of other tribal politicians. This is a major change the effects of which are becoming evident. Jamaat-e Islami is one of the few parties with branches in every district of the province. A 2-day camp was recently set up in the mountains of Chaghi district for 300-400 members of Jamaat-e Islami; nearly all the participants were Baluchi or Pathan young men. In view of this situation, Jamaat-e Islami can be expected in the future to become a pressure group if not a voting power in Baluchistan.

NWFP POLICE UNITS TO GET CHINESE ARMS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 28 Apr 83 p 1

[Text]

APRIL 27: The NWFP Governor Lt-Gen. Fazle Haq today said that an enquiry has been ordered to probe into the incident in Khyber Medical College yesterday and those involved will be given exemplary punishment.

Talking to newsmen after the annual parade of Frontier Constabulary at Shabqadar the Governor said that it was the follow up of Islamia College incident linked with the previous students clash in the Campus in the past. He said that such a tendency on part of students was deplorable as parents were hurt over such incidents. Students, he added, should maintain sanctity of their educational institutions.

To a question the Governor said that the total number of on-the-spot arrests was 65. However, he added that only those will be tried who were directly responsible for the incident.

When asked if there was any involvement of Afghan refugees in the incident the Governor emphatically denied and said that our weakness should not be attributed to poor refugees.

Answering another question he said that situation in Gomal University was normal and added that no clash had taken place there.

Earlier addressing the annual parade of Frontier Constabulary Gen. Haq said that the Constabulary and NWFP police will switch over to latest Chinese weapons to cope with anti-social activities including smuggling.

He said that the process to equip the two forces with the Chinese weapons will take year and a half and said that it was matter of great pleasure that frontier constabulary had wholeheartedly cooperated with the provincial administration in maintaining a law and order.

Earlier in his welcome address Mr. Dil Jan Khan, Commandant Frontier Constabulary, highlighted the performance of Constabulary in wiping out anti-social elements and said that efforts were being made to impart training with latest techniques.

The Governor also gave away prizes to recruits for all-round performances.

CSO: 4600/610

TRADING CORPORATION TO EXPORT MORE ITEMS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 30 Apr 83 p 6

[Text]

KARACHI, April 29: The Trading Corporation of Pakistan TCP, proposes to embark upon a phased programme for developing and introducing its products to such foreign markets which remained so far outside the sphere of both public and private sector agencies, its Chairman Mr. Mohammad Yousuf, said here today.

He told APP that the TCP would also open up export channels for non-traditional items. In order to achieve these goals, he said, the TCP would organise, guide and help the small entrepreneurs and craftsmen in planning their products to meet requirements of export markets where potential had not been fully tapped by private sector and which were inaccessible for the producers due to lack of resources.

With these measures, the Chairman hoped the TCP's exports would substantially improve during the next financial year.

He said that during the first nine months of the current fiscal year, exports by the TCP touched the level of Rs. 110 million as against Rs. 69 million in the corresponding period last year and Rs. 85 million during fiscal 1981-82. It is expected that the total export turnover for the current financial year will touch the level of about Rs. 180 million which will be almost 34.12 per cent more than last year's level.

The Chairman said that there

existed great potential for boosting both exports and imports by the TCP. He said the TCP must generate its own business. With that object in view, the TCP was now preparing a plan to streamline the exports.

As regards imports by the TCP, Mr. Yousuf said that bulk import handled by this organisation was edible oil. But now as per Government directive, the Ghee Corporation of Pakistan would itself import edible oil to meet its requirements.

He, however, said that the TCP would provide service to small industries. In this connection, he said, the TCP would now pool the requirements of small industries and import in bulk. The products imported in bulk would be at competitive prices. In this way, their working capital would not be blocked. Those industries would be supplied goods according to their requirements at reasonable prices and on time.

As regards trade with India the Chairman said that procedures for the import of 40 items had been simplified. Now both importers and exporters should have no difficulty in trading with India.

He said the TCP had proposed to the Carpet Manufacturers' Fund Exporters Association to place orders for bleaching powder to meet its requirements. The TCP will import on their account.

PUNJAB TO ENFORCE TRADITIONAL WATCHMAN SYSTEM

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 30 Apr 83 p 10

[Text] The Government has announced the Punjab Chowkidara Rule, 1982 enforcing Chowkidara System in rural as well as urban areas with effect from May 1.

These rules provide that for each village or for more than on small villages united one or more village watchmen will be appointed. Their remuneration shall be contributed rateably by such villages.

The chowkidar will perform the duties of watch and ward and assist the local police in detection and control of crime. In the case of rural areas he will be required to keep the record of births and deaths in his area and report the same to the Union Council concerned without any delay and would also render assistance to the lumbarid in collection of land revenue.

The village/urban chowkidar will be or med with a club. He will be entitled to get one free licence for NPB arm transferable to his successor in case he leaves or is removed from office.

Every chowkidar will report in person on the state of his beat once in a month to the officer-in-charge of the police

station.

Every chowkidar will report bound to communicate to the officer-in-charge of the police station, the movement of all bad characters in his village or beat, the arrival of suspicious characters in the neighbourhood, absence at night of any notorious character residing in his village or beat without having given notice of his departure, all the disputes likely to lead to any riot or serious affray and all intelligence he receives affecting the public peace within or near his village or beat. He will also convey any information regarding any person found lurking in such village or beat who has no ostensible means of subsistence, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself, or any person who is a reputed house-breaker or thief, or who is of notorious livelihood.

He will further provide at once the information respecting the commission of, or intention to commit offences like rioting, concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body, causing miscarriage, exposure of a child, mischief by fire, mischief to animals by

poisoning and attempt to commit culpable homicide

In addition, each headman and chowkidar will report the appearance of any epidemic in his village or beat at once to the officer-in-charge of the police station and to the Medical Officer incharge of the nearest dispensary. He will also assist in the prevention of the commission of any cognizable offence of any injury attempted to be committed in his view to any Government, municipal or railway property, movable or immovable or to any public landmark.

Every person is bound to render to a chowkidar or village headman discharging the duties of a police officer under the rules made hereunder all the assistance which he is bound to render to a police officer.

Any person who obstructs a watchman or headman in the discharge of his duties may be arrested by a police officer or any watchman or headman under a warrant issued with hte permission of the District Magistrate or any other person empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government.—APP.

MINISTER SAYS LABOR POLICY TO BE ANNOUNCED IN JULY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 May 83 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, April 30: The Federal Minister for Labour and Manpower, Ghulam Dastgir Khan has said the points on which the government, employers and employees are agreed, unanimously, will be announced before or during the discussion on the next fiscal year's Budget. This was stated by him while addressing the concluding session of the two-day Punjab Labour Conference held here today under the auspices of National Labour Federation.

Ghulam Dastgir Khan said it was utmost desire of the government that new labour policy should be announced in the shortest possible time. If that was not possible, then the points unanimously agreed to

by the employers and employees would be announced.

Ghulam Dastgir Khan said that his conscience could not be satisfied unless the rights of the employees were safeguarded. He apologised for the delay in the announcement of the labour policy and added that the government wanted to develop congenial atmosphere between the employers and the employees.

The Federal Labour Minister said the employer could not be granted a right to terminate services of the workers whenever he wanted to. Therefore, the government was trying to devise a way through which the employers and the employees should come closer.

Ghulam Dastgir Khan said the government was ready to arrange referendum for collective bargaining agent in WAPDA and directed the National Labour Front to submit their application in this regard.—PPI

CSO: 4600/612

PROBLEM OF CHILD LABOR DISCUSSED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 1 May 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Child Labour"]

[Text]

Perhaps the ugliest concomitant of poverty is child labour. At an age when a child should receive physical and mental nurturance as a preparation for working adulthood, he is deprived of both functioning as a supplement to the national labour force. Now that Pakistan is making effective strides away from the poverty line the continuing evil of child labour is weighing on the minds of the economists and social workers.

The State forbids the employment of anyone under the age of 14 but it has practically no way of implementing the law since most of the children work in informal cottage industry models, a grey area in our economy about which hardly any accurate figures are available. Another daunting factor is the economic survival of the families which send out their children to work in the city sweet-shops. A child working is still better than a child starving or begging by the roadside.

Hence, our optimistic long-term hope has always been attached to the salutary effects of education; that an educated family will be less numerous, that its bread-winning capacity will increase and thus the youngsters would be sent to the school instead of the workshop. Unfortunately, the reports emanating from the primary school sector no longer justify such optimism. There is a 60 per cent drop-out ratio in the primary school and in the Punjab alone annually 3 million children leave the school to be fed into the evil machine of child labour. In other words, children are sent to school only to tide over that period when their limbs are absolutely tender: but by the age of nine or ten, they are taken out and put to labour. The only way out for us is to work in the schools, to prevent dropouts by all means available to us, including the Zakat fund which can be utilised to provide books and other articles to needy children.

FACTS ON PAKISTAN'S LABOR FORCE RELEASED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 May 83 p 8

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, April 30: Pakistan's labour force constitute 30.31 per cent of the country's 83.8 million population, with women accounting for only 3.79 per cent, the lowest in the Third World developing countries.

According to the 'Pakistan Basic Facts', 20th edition issued by the Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing, women's participation in the labour activities was higher in the rural areas. Out of 27.06 per cent labour force in the country's urban areas, having a total population of 23.7 million people, the female labour constitutes only 1.23 per cent, whereas out of 32.55 per cent of the working labour in the rural areas with a total population of 60.1 million, the female labour consisted of 4.58 per cent.

The highest number of women actively engaged in productive activities was in the province of Sind, where out of the total labour force of 33.44 per cent of the provincial population of 1,38,63,000 the female share stood at 4.81 per cent. The lowest women's activities in the labour sector were recorded in the province of Baluchistan where out of the 26.04 per cent of the civilian labour force of the province's total population of 43,05,000 the female share was only 0.90 per cent. In the rural areas of the province, having a total labour force of 33.71 of the rural population, the women's share (0.97%) was slightly better.

Punjab, having a population of 4,31,16,000 commanded a total labour force of 31.12 per cent out of which the female participation

was 3.97 per cent. Again their percentage was much higher in the rural areas of the province as they constitute 4.65 per cent of the 32.30 per cent of the rural labour force. Whereas in urban areas of the province their number was not more than 1.83 per cent of the 25.56 per cent of the labour force of the entire urban population.

The situation is different in the rural areas of the NWFP, where the percentage of the working women was conversely higher in the urban areas. The province has a total population of 1,08,85,000 (FATA not included) out of which 24.96 per cent of the people were engaged in labour activities. The female participation stood at 1.42 per cent. In the urban areas the labour community constitutes 24.90 per cent of the population while the women's share is only 1.62 per cent. However, in the rural areas having a labour force of 24.97 per cent of the rural population the percentage of working women was not more than 1.38.

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES: A 10-year survey of the labour situation has revealed that since the imposition of Martial Law in the country, the number of industrial disputes has remained restricted to double figures and in 1980 their number had even gone down to 59. The year 1972 was industrially the most troubled year in the country's history with a record number of 779 industrial disputes involving 3,61,149 workers causing a loss of 20,18,308 mandays.

The following table provides an interesting study of the labour situation in the country:

Period	Number of stoppages of work	No. of workers involved	Mandays lost
1973	536	2,33,568	8,03,583
1974	370	3,01,753	14,53,553
1975	260	1,29,385	7,98,183
1976	171	77,502	5,14,891
1977	81	49,093	2,00,865
1978	85	58,563	1,08,527
1979	65	38,733	2,47,867
1980	59	24,710	54,730
1981 (Jan.-June)	31	20,139	1,27,237

CSO: 4600/612

CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER CONSTANT ACADEMIC DECLINE

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 3 May 83 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text]

There cannot be two opinions that academic standards in the country are constantly on the decline. The recent decision of the Federal Public Service Commission to raise the age-limit for candidates appearing in competitive examinations comes as another proof and confirmation of the trend. In a detailed report, the Federal Public Service Commission has commented on the extremely poor performance of the candidates and recommended measures to upgrade the students' knowledge of Pakistan and world affairs, everyday science and history. After evaluating the competence of the young men and women now coming out of our colleges and universities, it came to the conclusion that the age-limit for competitive examinations should be raised to 28 to allow students to prepare themselves better for working life.

The question goes deeper than age-limits and levels of proficiency in various disciplines. We still have some of the best brains coming out of the existing

educational machine and going on to claim higher achievements in foreign institutions. But the overall situation is hopeless and getting worse every day. People point to many factors but the basic reason is that education is at a discount in our society. Money is now the ruling value, the criterion by which a man's worth is measured. In old times learning was a reward in itself and a sure guarantee of social importance. This is no more so. In fact, those in the so-called intellectual professions are looked down upon as good-for-nothing. The skill to make money by any means, fair or foul, is what counts and attracts respect. Ours is a materialistic society which has little use for an intangible thing like learning. The attitude is reflected in the Government's policies and the low priority attached to education. Nothing shows our approach to this sector better than that where as some most backward countries in Africa have been able to teach a majority of their people the three R's in a decade, our

literacy rate even after 35 years of independence is a paltry 24 per cent. It is the prevalent system's judgment that the bookish are not good at making money, and it is to a large extent reflected in parents' attitude to the education of their children. No wonder, the process of national de-education has gathered pace in recent years. If graduates and master's degree holders don't have basic knowledge about Pakistan and the world and everyday life, we can imagine the kind of future we are heading for.

! There are problems galore at every stage. The syllabi, particularly at the lower and middle levels, are ill-prepared and out of tune with the needs of the scientific age. The teacher is worried financially and whiles away his time waiting for a better opening

elsewhere. The parents at home have little time for their kids, and the latter themselves spend more time watching TV than reading books. The examination system is rickety and vulnerable to pressure and manipulation. The entire system is corroded. The solution does not lie in raising the age-limit as the FPSC has done or introducing piecemeal reforms. There must be thinking at the highest level as to how to revamp the education system so that there is large-scale flowering of talent, and education and the educated get the respect and reward they deserve. An educated, trained and skilled manpower is the greatest asset that a country can have. The examples of Japan and South Korea are before us.

CSO: 4600/612

ZIA SUPPORTS IDEA OF PAKISTAN INSTITUTE

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 6 May 83 pp 1, 9

[Text]

President Zia-ul-Haq on Thursday emphasised the need for establishing an independent institution for Pakistan Studies to undertake extensive research on various aspects of the country and the nation.

In his presidential address at the annual function of the Urdu Digest he invited the leading journalists of the country to launch the project and assured every possible assistance for the same.

A proposal for such an institution had earlier been made by Mr. Altaf Hasan Qureshi, Editor of the Urdu Digest.

The President said that although the Government had already established as many as six institutions on Pakistan Studies in different parts of the country a similar institution, if set up by the country's intelligentsia could discharge its functions in a much better manner.

President Zia said that such an institution could play a pivotal role in strengthening the foundation of this Muslim State and projecting its ideolo-

gical character if dedicated and enlightened writers imbued with Islamic and patriotic spirit, were associated with the same.

The President, however, said that such a project should be launched only by private personalities and the institution should not be dependent upon the Government funds.

He was of the view that an outline and set-up for the proposed institution could be given by the Qureshi Brothers of the Urdu Digest while Mir Khalilur Rehman of Daily Jang could finance the project. Mr. Salahuddin of Daily Jang could infuse an Islamic spirit to the institution he added.

The President said the editors of the National Press Trust Papers could also be asked to co-operate in the working of the institution.

Mr. Altaf Hasan Qureshi had suggested that there should be an institution outside the Government to undertake research on socio-economic, political, geographical, historical and other aspects of the country.

OFFICIAL TALKS OF REFUGEE INFLUX

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 30 Apr 83 p 10

[Text]

KARACHI, April 29: The Afghan refugees have been coming to Pakistan at an average rate of one lakh persons per month. This was disclosed by the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Mr Abdullah here last night.

Speaking at National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) he said that Pakistan has given shelter to 2.5 million Afghan refugees who constitute one fourth of the total refugees in the world.

He said that Afghan refugees had been coming to Pakistan from 278 routes along the 1,200 miles long Pak-Afghan border since 1974. He said that there were 2.5 million refugees in NWFP alone. They have come from almost all the 29 provinces of Afghanistan and belonged to various nationalities such as Pakhtoons, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkuman, Hazara, Nuri, Kirghis etc. Forty eight per cent of refugees were children, 28 per cent women and 24 per cent men mostly above the age of 40. There were very few youngmen among the refugees.

Mr. Abdullah said \$ 1 million were being spent daily for providing food, clothing

and shelter to the refugees. Out of this 45 per cent were being provided by Pakistan by her own resources, while the rest is being contributed by foreign countries and international agencies.

The Refugees Commissioner said that 282 administrative camps known as refugee tentage villages had been set up at 120 sites all over NWFP to accommodate three lakh Afghan refugee families.

Sixty per cent of the 2.2 million Afghan refugees had been accommodated in settled districts of NWFP and 10 per cent were in camps in tribal agencies.

The refugees were provided food items such as wheat, sugar, rice, skimmed milk, pulses, tea, edible oil and dates.

They were also provided non-food items such as tents, quilts, blankets, shoes, garments, cloth and kerosene oil, he added.

Mr. Abdullah said the refugees were also given monthly allowance Rs. 50 per individual, three hundred and fifty-four primary schools for boys and 26 primary schools for girls have been set up in different refugee camps, he added and said that there were 120 basic health units in various camps.—APP.

CONTINUED HIGH OIL PRICES BRING GENERAL PRICE INCREASES

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Apr 83 p 10

/Editorial: "Rise in the Prices of Necessities"/

/Text/ As justification for maintaining higher prices on petroleum products in spite of the decision by OPEC countries to reduce the price of oil by \$5 a barrel, the federal minister of finance explained that the government would use the additional revenues to explore for and promote gas and oil. His decision has the force of law; but one of the indirect results of not allowing the consumers to benefit from the drop in prices has been that the prices of articles of daily consumption have risen. Officials who supervise supply and prices have chosen to turn a blind eye to it all rather than take any steps to help consumers.

The prices for mutton and chicken have increased 2 to 4 rupees per kilo over the past 2 or 3 months. The price of eggs remains high even though the coldest part of winter is over. The quantity of sugar allowed to be sold on the open market has been increased, but no notice has been taken of the fact that even with an increase in the amounts available, the price of sugar has not fallen. It seems that far from controlling prices, it is not considered necessary even to supervise prices in order to discourage illegal profiteering. The federal minister of finance may be under the impression that the move to review the wages of government employees will console them to a certain extent. But not all the people in the country are government employees; thus, the situation of government employees alone should not be used as the criterion for judging the impact of rises in the prices of necessities. Nor should the task of determining the effects be left to the sole discretion of the high officials the greater part of whose needs are supplied by the government.

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CSO: 4656/154

SPEECHES MARK OBSERVANCE OF ANNIVERSARY OF ZULFIQAR'S DEATH

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Apr 83 pp 9, 12

/Article by Ilyas Shakir: "Eyewitness Report: Mr Bhutto's Anniversary"/

/Excerpts/ The fourth anniversary of the death of the former leader of the defunct People's Party and former prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, passed quietly and without any disturbances. To attract crowds to the anniversary celebration and demonstrate its political power, the defunct People's Party issued a special call for the first time, advertised in the newspapers and sent out about 12,000 /as published/ invitations to "special people" all over the country. But in spite of all these efforts, attendance at the anniversary celebration was half that of the number of invitations issued. Some disgruntled members indicated that the number of participants was even less than that. To make the anniversary events interesting, the Mazar committee had announced that cultural activities such as oratorical contests, political gatherings and poetry recitals would be held. Nevertheless, the anniversary celebration failed to establish any political "line of action"; no joint declarations were issued nor were any resolutions passed that would provide members with political incentive. After the recitation of the Koran and prayers, speeches were made extolling the virtues of the late Bhutto and condemning the government; a poem was read entitled "We are the people of Kufa", which was greatly applauded by the audience.

A large number of members attended the Bhutto anniversary celebration, but the numbers did not exceed Shirin Amir Begum's /word illegible/. The Mazar committee tried to give the anniversary arrangements an atmosphere similar to that of celebrations observing the anniversaries of the sufi saints, as a result of which the anniversary events of a politician resembled the festivals held on saints' anniversaries. From morning to midday, small processions from different areas of the country brought green and black sheets that were spread over the grave. Seeing this, our friend remarked, "They have made a saint out of Bhutto." The result of all these nonpolitical actions was that the foreign media did not attach too great an importance to the anniversary events. The celebrations held at Garhi Khuda Baksh Bhutto on 4 April can be described briefly as consisting of the following events: people came together, prayed, listened to speeches and left. Most of the speeches were identical to those that the MRD leaders give at their gatherings; only a few of them adopted a different approach in an effort to reassure their members.

On 4 April, after the recitation of the Koran and prayers, a meeting was held in the yard of the late Bhutto's ancestral home presided over by Bhutto's picture. The stage was totally monopolized by the young members of the Sind People's Students Federation (SPSF) led by Ghazi Salah ud din. The choice of Bhutto's picture to preside over the meeting was also announced by the SPSF members and was clearly intended to show that not only did they profess unbounded loyalty to the late Butto but also that they did not consider any of the living leaders worthy of presiding over the anniversary celebration. Before the speeches started, poems were recited, at which a member said in a loud voice, "Why recite poems? We need action, not poetry." But no one paid much attention to him.

The meeting started with a speech by Begum Ashraf Abbasi. As a representative of the members, she declared that they could no longer be ignored and that the true members were those who refused to be ignored. The former vice chancellor of Sind University, Ghulam Mustafa Shah, spoke next, saying that participation in the celebration was a blessing. He referred to Bhutto as "marhum" [the term customarily used for the dead, meaning "of blessed memory"]. A voice called out saying, "Call him martyr." Ghulam Mustafa Shah answered, "I am a Muslim and a Muslim who has departed from this world is referred to as marhum." But he changed his stand later in his speech and went so far as to make the strange statement: "There are only two martyrs in this world, Pakistan and Bhutto."

He also said that he was sure that when mullas [persons acquainted with or merely professing acquaintance with theology] go to pray over Quaid-e Azam's grave, he must be cursing them back. Ghulam Mustafa Shah's metaphorical statement at Bhutto's grave attracted a great deal of attention as having conveyed much meaning in a few words. He was the only person in Shah Garhi Khuda Bakhsh who announced loudly and clearly that Bhutto was not an angel but a sinner. He also added, "God save this country from angels."

Hussain Shah Bokhari, general secretary of the provincial organizing committee for Sind of the defunct People's Party, said, "If the people of Punjab do not rescue us from the oppression of the present government, next year they will have to get a visa to visit Larkana."

Maulana Ehteram ul Haq Thanavi said in his speech, "Those who say that conditions are not right and are opposed to participating in a movement are in fact trying to save their own lives." He warned that the present government will be forced ultimately to recognize the Government of Afghanistan.

Speaking on the occasion, Taka Khan said that he remembered the late Bhutto telling him that he needed a loyal general and passed over eight generals to appoint General Zia as commander of the army. Some people smiled at this juncture.

A video film was made of the entire proceeding and the speeches were recorded on tape. According to one account, these will be sent to Benazir Bhutto and were recorded for that purpose. But she may not be able to see on that film the enthusiasm of the members and the secret fear of the leaders that prevented

several of them from going to Garhi Khuda Bakhsh. She will not be able to see the pomp and circumstance exhibited by the leaders on 3 April when they stayed in a fashionable hotel in Larkana. She will not see how calmly Larkana went about its usual business on 4 April; how the hustle and bustle of life proceeded as it does daily and school examinations for the 9th and 10th grades were held satisfactorily. Benazir Bhutto will not see on the video tape what happened at an evening party in Shikarpur and how the leaders of the People's Party consoled themselves and drowned their sorrow.

How we wish that these scenes could have been captured on film!

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CSO: 4656/154

GRAIN GODOWNS BEING BUILT IN BALUCHISTAN

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER In English 4 May 83 p 3

[Text]

QUETTA, May 3: The Federal Government is spending Rs. 140 million on the construction of grain godowns to augment the storage capacity for foodgrains in Baluchistan.

This was stated in a report telecast by the PTV.

A sum of Rs. 38.37 million has already been spend on the construction of eight grain godowns in Quetta, Dhadar, Ahmadwal, Turbat, Gwadur, Panjgoor and Kharan in the province, while work on other godowns is in progress.

Under this project, the Pakistan Agriculture Services and supplies Corporation (PASSCO) is also engaged in the construction of 50 grain godowns in various parts of the province with a total capacity of 55,000 tons of foodgrains.

PASSCO will incur a total amount of Rs 54.90 million on this project. Of this, the Federal Government will provide Rs 21.6 million Rs 23.3 million by the World Bank and Rs 9 million by the Government of Switzerland.

the Government of Switzerland has given this total amount as grant to Pakistan.

Work on this project began last year and is expected to be completed by 1985.

The project envisages the construction of eight grain godowns in Quetta with a total storage capacity of 8800 tons of foodgrains.

These godowns are air-tight and the material used in their construction can protect the wheat from weather conditions and other damages.

The Federal Government is providing more than Rs 47 million and under a plan the National Logistic Cell started work and this project is expected to be completed within a couple of months.

The project is the first of its kind in Baluchistan under which 15 foodgrains storage godown called grain silos are being constructed, having a total capacity of 60,000 tons of foodgrains.--

CSO: 4600/612

NOTED SCIENTIST URGES ACTION ON WATERLOGGING CENTER PLAN

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 26 Apr 83 p 3

[Text]

JHANG, April 25: Referring to the international competition figuring Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Bank backed International Water Management Centre Nobel Laureate Dr. Abdus Salam has suggested that instead of waiting for the result of the competition, Pakistan should go ahead with setting up here the Government approved International Centre for Waterlogging and Salinity.

This Centre, it may be recalled, was proposed by Dr. Salam, who also suggested Jhang as the ideal place for it. The proposal was backed by the District Council and finally approved by the Pakistan Government.

The World Bank in the meantime announced an International Water Management Centre to be established in one of three countries—Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. Since the proposed Centre aims at providing modern research facilities for the reclamation of land hit by waterlogging and

salinity, Dr. Salam has suggested that Pakistan should set up its own Centre in Jhang and if the result of the International competition is in its favour, the World Bank backed Centre for Water Management be made a part of the Waterlogging and Salinity Centre.

Financial assistance for the Waterlogging and Salinity Centre, says Dr. Salam in a letter to District Council Chairwoman Syeda Abida Hussain, can be sought from the Italian Government, the UNDP and elsewhere.

Other factors apart, Jhang, Dr. Salam's hometown, has two canals—one 'lined' and the other 'unlined'—each with different patterns of waterlogging and salinity. And, Jhang is also right in the centre of a region worst hit by the 'Twin Menace'.

Dr. Salam is also trying to have a radiotherapy centre set up here with financial assistance of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

CSO: 4600/610

BRIEFS

JAPAN DONATES CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL--APRIL 28--Laying the foundation stone of the 200-bed children hospital at the Islamabad Medical Complex, the Federal Minister for Health, Dr. Nasiruddin Jomezai, said that it would be a symbol of Pakistan-Japan friendship. The Rs. 200 million hospital has been donated by the Japanese Government which will finance its construction and provision of facilities for which an agreement was signed last year. The hospital will be commissioned in Feb. 1985. Earlier, the Japanese Ambassador to Pakistan spoke of his country's involvement in the project which, he said, would be a monument of the Pakistan-Japan friendship. Japan, he said was keenly interested in the social progress of Pakistan. He referred to assistance in malaria eradication, grant of facilities in hospitals in Sind and a pilot project at the National Institute of Health, Islamabad. [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 29 Apr 83 p 14]

MIRAGE-50 VARIANTS FOR AIR FORCE--Current MIRAGE aircraft being delivered to Pakistan's air force are MIRAGE 50 version aircraft, not MIRAGE IIIP versions as previously understood. These are of two variants: the air-to-air missile version with Cyrano IV radar (as used in the FlC-version), and the air-to-ground strike version with the "Agave" radar (as in the Super Etendard naval aircraft). Each is respectively designated MIRAGE 5PA2 and MIRAGE 5PA3. Two trainers, also powered by the Atar 9K-50 are also due for delivery. Both aircraft versions are based on the MIRAGE 50-series airframe, which owes its lineage to the original Israeli prototype built in France and never delivered (due to the French embargo on arms to Israel). [Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Mar 83 p 94]

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